State v. Carter

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ANTHONY LEE CARTER

No. W2019-02278-CCA-R3-CD

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON

February 2, 2021 Session

June 22, 2021

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County

No. 19-94

Donald H. Allen, Judge

The Defendant, Anthony Lee Carter, appeals from his Madison County Circuit Court conviction for driving as a motor vehicle habitual offender ("MVHO"), for which he received a six-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that after his arrest and before his trial, our legislature amended the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act such that the Defendant was entitled to the benefit of a lesser penalty under our criminal savings statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-11-112 (savings statute), 55-10-601 (MVHO Act). Following our review, we conclude that when the legislature removed the offense of driving as a MVHO and the associated penalty and replaced it with a mechanism for MVHOs to petition for reinstatement of their driver's licenses, the legislature enacted a lesser penalty. As a result, the Defendant should benefit from the lesser penalty pursuant to the criminal savings statute.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed; Case Remanded

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

Jessica F. Butler, Assistant Public Defender, Public Defender's Conference (on appeal); George Morton Googe, District Public Defender, and Gregory D. Gookin, Assistant Public Defender (at trial), for the appellant, Anthony Lee Carter.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Jonathan H. Wardle, Assistant Attorney General; Jody S. Pickens, District Attorney General; and Eric V. Wood, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On September 17, 2018, the Defendant, who had a lengthy criminal history and was declared a MVHO in 1987, was arrested for driving as a MVHO, felony evading arrest, and misdemeanor traffic offenses.¹ The proof at trial established that in the early hours of the morning, officers initiated a traffic stop after observing the Defendant's committing a traffic infraction and driving a car with an expired registration. The Defendant drove one mile to a motel parking lot before stopping, fled from the officers on foot, and unsuccessfully attempted to hide in a motel room. The officers questioned the Defendant's passenger, who identified the Defendant as the driver, and the officers reviewed their dashboard camera's recording at the scene and identified the room into which the Defendant fled. It was undisputed that the Defendant was a MVHO at the time he drove the car.

Before the Defendant's case went to trial, on May 24, 2019, our legislature passed a bill removing the statutory provisions related to the MVHO offense and replacing them with a procedure to reinstate a MVHO's driver's license. See 2019 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 486, § 3. The relevant portion of the bill, which was entitled "AN ACT to amend Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 39; Title 40 and Title 55, relative to criminal law," provided,

Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 55, Chapter 10, Part 6 is amended by deleting the part and substituting instead the following:

A person whose driver license has been revoked or restricted due solely to the person's status as a motor vehicle habitual offender prior to July 1, 2019, may petition the court that originally made such a finding to reinstate the person's driver license. Upon receiving a petition for a reinstated driver license, the court shall determine whether the person's driver license was subject to revocation or restriction under prior law due solely to the person's status as a motor vehicle habitual offender and, if so, order the reinstatement of the person's driver license. The person may provide a copy of the court's order to the department of safety, which shall then reissue the person's driver license without restriction.

After a jury trial on August 1, 2019, the Defendant was convicted of driving as a MVHO, a Class E felony; evading arrest in a motor vehicle, a Class E felony; improper lane change, a Class C misdemeanor; violation of the financial responsibility law, a ClassC misdemeanor; and evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor.² See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-603, 55-8-123, 55-10-616, 55-12-139.

At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel made a motion to dismiss the Defendant's conviction in Count 1, noting the July 1, 2019 change in the law; in the alternative, defense counsel requested that the trial court enter a judgment in Count 1 reflecting no sentence. The trial court stated relative to the amendment, "I'm not sure the legislature understood what they were doing. I understand they were trying to make it so that people who were [MVHOs] could hopefully get that status lifted[.]" The court asked defense counsel whether the legislature intended to "do away with prosecutions" for driving as a MVHO. Counsel responded affirmatively, noting that the legislature wished to prioritize incarceration of violent offenders in order to curtail the cost of rising prison populations. Counsel also cited to a section of the relevant bill reclassifying all failures to appear as misdemeanor offenses.

The trial court denied the motion, noting that the Defendant's conduct was illegal at the time it was committed and that "notwithstanding any subsequent repeal" of the statute, the Defendant was subject to prosecution for driving as a MVHO. The court subsequently imposed a sentence of six years for driving as a MVHO as a Range III, career offender. The trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing such that the Defendant's effective sentence was twelve years. After the Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied, he timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

The Defendant's sole contention on appeal is whether the criminal savings statute should apply to his conviction for driving as a MVHO in light of the legislature's having removed the penalty and the offense itself from Title 55, Chapter 10, Part 6. The Defendant argues that no penalty is a form of a lesser penalty and requests that this court order the entry of a judgment reflecting a zero-day sentence. The Defendant notes in support of his argument that although the legislature eliminated the possibility that a MVHO could receive a felony sentence in confinement, it did not remove the MVHO designation from those previously designated as such and that as a result, MVHOs could still be prosecuted for misdemeanor offenses like driving with a revoked license. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-504. The State responds that the legislature repealed the MVHO Act and did not thereby reduce the penalty for driving as a MVHO.

In order to address the Defendant's issue, we must engage in statutory interpretation. "The most basic principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute's coverage beyond its intended scope." Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995) (citing State v. Sliger, 846 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tenn. 1993)). "We presume that every word in a statute has meaning and purpose and should be given full effect if the obvious intention of the General Assembly is not violated by so doing." State v. Sherman, 266 S.W.3d 395, 401 (Tenn. 2008). Where the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we derive the legislative intent from its plain and ordinary meaning. State v. Collins, 166 S.W.3d 721, 726 (Tenn. 2005) (citing State v. Wilson, 132 S.W.3d 340, 341 (Tenn. 2004)). If, however, "the parties derive different interpretations from the statutory language, an ambiguity exists, and we must look to the entire statutory scheme in seeking to ascertain legislative intent." Owens, 908 S.W.2d at 926 (citing Lyons v. Rasar, 872 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn. 1994)).

In ascertaining the intent of the legislature, courts "'may look to the language of the statute, its subject matter, the object and reach of the statute, the wrong or evil which it seeks to remedy or prevent, and the purpose sought to be accomplished in its enactment.'" Collins, 166 S.W.3d at 726 (quoting State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 275 (Tenn. 2000)). "Statutes 'in pari materia'—those relating to the same subject or having a common purpose—are to be construed together." Owens, 908 S.W.2d at 926 (citing Lyons, 872 S.W.2d at 897). Statutes are presumed to apply prospectively in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary. Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 797-98 (Tenn. 2001). Furthermore, the rules of statutory construction direct courts not to "apply a particular interpretation to a statute if that interpretation would yield an absurd result." State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tenn. 2001). Statutory interpretation involves questions of law that we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. State v. McNack, 356 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tenn. 2011).

The Defendant was convicted in Count 1 of violating Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-616(b) (2018), which provided that "[a]ny person found to be an habitual offender under this part who thereafter is convicted of operating a motor vehicle in this state while the judgment or order of the court prohibiting such operation is in effect commits a Class E felony." As stated above, the legislature deleted the entirety of Part 6 by an amendment passed on May 24, 2019; the relevant part was replaced by the current Code section 55-10-601, which provides a method for a MVHO to petition for reinstatement of a driver's license that was revoked solely pursuant to the MVHO Act. 2019 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 486, § 3. The parties dispute whether the Defendant can benefit from the change in the law.

The Defendant's December 2019 sentencing hearing took place after the MVHOAct was repealed.³ The criminal savings statute found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-112 provides as follows:

When a

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