State v. Casiano

922 A.2d 1065

282 Conn. 614

STATE of Connecticut v. Jason CASIANO.

No. 17600.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 9, 2006.

Decided May 29, 2007.

Katharine Goodbody, with whom was Jason Casiano, pro se, for the appellant (defendant).

Martin Zeldis, public defender, with whom was Gerald A. Smyth, chief public defender, for the appellee (intervenor office of the chief public defender).

SULLIVAN, C.J., and BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.¹

PALMER, J.

This case comes before us on a motion for review filed by the defendant, Jason Casiano, who is indigent, challenging the trial court's denial of his application for the appointment of counsel in connection with his appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant claims that General Statutes § 51-296(a)² entitles him to the assistance of counsel for the purpose of appealing the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. We agree with the defendant.³

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant's claim. In 1995, the defendant was arrested and charged with felony murder, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree. Following plea negotiations, and pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 54-94a,⁴ the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to all three charges. The trial court, Devlin, J., accepted the defendant's plea, which was conditioned on his right to appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress certain incriminating statements that he had made to the police prior to his arrest. In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a total effective prison term of fifty years. On appeal, the Appellate Court rejected the defendant's challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress and affirmed the trial court's judgment. State v. Casiano, 55 Conn.App. 582, 591, 740 A.2d 435 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 942, 747 A.2d 518 (2000).

Thereafter, the defendant, acting pro se, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22.⁵ In his motion, the defendant alleged that his sentence had been imposed in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights because his plea was not knowing and voluntary. Specifically, the defendant claimed that his trial counsel erroneously had advised him that he would serve no more than thirty-two and one-half years of his fifty year sentence. The trial court, Fasano, J., denied the defendant's motion on the ground that the defendant's claim was not appropriate for a motion under § 43-22.⁶

Subsequently, the public defender's office, on behalf of the defendant, filed a motion for waiver of fees and costs to appeal, and an application for the appointment of appellate counsel pursuant to Practice Book § 43-33.⁷ The trial court granted the defendant's motion for waiver of fees and costs but denied his application for the appointment of appellate counsel. The defendant, acting pro se, appealed to the Appellate Court from the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence and from the denial of his application for the appointment of appellate counsel. The Appellate Court, sua sponte, dismissed that portion of the defendant's appeal challenging the trial court's denial of his application for the appointment of counsel. The Appellate Court concluded that, under Practice Book § 63-7,⁸ a motion for review is the sole mechanism for such a challenge. Without reaching the merits of the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, the Appellate Court remanded the case to the trial court with direction to appoint a special public defender for the limited purpose of filing a motion for review of the trial court's denial of the defendant's application for the appointment of counsel. In particular, the Appellate Court ordered appointed counsel "to address in the motion for review whether the defendant is entitled to a public defender to represent him in [his] appeal from the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence." Finally, the Appellate Court granted intervenor status to the office of the chief public defender "for the purpose of filing an opposition to the motion for review...." Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion for review⁹ challenging the denial of his application for the appointment of counsel, which we transferred from the Appellate Court to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

In this court, the defendant claims that § 51-296(a) affords him the right to the assistance of counsel in connection with his appeal from the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. In particular, the defendant claims that a motion to correct an illegal sentence and his appeal from the denial of that motion fall within the purview of the term "any criminal action" for purposes of § 51-296(a).¹⁰ The office of the chief public defender objects to the mandatory appointment of counsel for the purpose of filing a motion to correct an illegal sentence only if the motion is devoid of merit. In other words, the office of the chief public defender does not object to the appointment of counsel for the purpose of determining whether a sound basis exists for the filing of such a motion and, if such a basis exists, for the purpose of representing the defendant in connection with the preparation and filing of the motion and any direct appeal from the denial of the motion. We agree with the office of the chief public defender that § 51-296(a) entitles an indigent defendant to the assistance of counsel for the purpose of determining whether a legitimate basis exists for the filing of such a motion and, if so, for the purpose of representing the defendant in the preparation and filing of the motion and, thereafter, in connection with any direct appeal from the denial of the motion.¹¹

Whether § 51-296(a) affords an indigent criminal defendant the right to the assistance of counsel in connection with the filing of a motion to correct an illegal sentence and any direct appeal from the denial thereof presents a question of statutory interpretation over which our review is plenary. See, e.g., Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 280 Conn. 1, 8, 905 A.2d 55 (2006). "The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply."¹² (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

We begin, therefore, with the language of General Statutes § 51-296(a), which provides in relevant part that a court shall appoint counsel to represent an indigent criminal defendant "[i]n any criminal action...." The term "any criminal action" is not statutorily defined, and neither § 51-296 nor any other statutory provision specifies whether the term includes a challenge to the legality of a sentence pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22.

Our resolution of that question, however, is guided by our analysis and holding in Gipson v. Commissioner of Correction, 257 Conn. 632, 778 A.2d 121 (2001), in which this court recently examined the meaning of the term "any criminal action" for purposes of § 51-296(a). In Gipson, the petitioner, Bernard Gipson, was convicted of robbery in the first degree. Id., at 634-35, 778 A.2d 121. Because Gipson was indigent, counsel was appointed to represent him in connection with his direct appeal to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of conviction. Id., at 635, 778 A.2d 121. Gipson thereafter filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his right to the effective assistance of counsel had been violated because his court-appointed appellate counsel had failed to file a petition for certification to appeal to this court. Id. The habeas court rejected Gipson's claim but granted his petition for certification to appeal to the Appellate Court. Id., at 636, 778 A.2d 121. On appeal, the Appellate Court concluded, as a threshold matter, that § 51-296(a) did not afford Gipson the right to the assistance of counsel for the purpose of filing a petition for certification to appeal to this court.¹³ Id., at 637, 778 A.2d 121.

Thereafter, this court granted Gipson's petition for certification to decide, inter alia, whether he had a right to the assistance of counsel in connection with the filing of a petition for certification seeking this court's review of a judgment of the Appellate Court affirming a trial court's judgment of conviction. See id., at 638, 778 A.2d 121. We concluded that, for purposes of § 51-296(a), the term "any criminal action" includes all appeals, including petitions for certification, and not just first appeals as of right. Id., at 638, 646, 778 A.2d 121. We therefore reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court. Id., at 653, 778 A.2d 121.

In concluding that Gipson was entitled to counsel under § 51-296(a), we first observed that the word "any" connotes "all" or "every." Id., at 640, 778 A.2d 121. We further observed that "the legislature, in using the word `any' to modify the term `criminal action,' intended that term to be broad, rather than restrictive, in scope." Id. With respect to the word "action," we explained that its meaning may vary depending on the context in which it is used and, therefore, that it was appropriate to employ a functional approach to ascertain the meaning of the word for purposes of § 51-296(a). Id., at 641, 778 A.2d 121. Looking to the legislative history of § 51-296, we concluded that that history supported the view that the word "action" includes a discretionary appeal to this court because, at the time § 51-296 was enacted, it already was well established that a criminal defendant had a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in connection with his or her first appeal as of right. Id., at 645, ...