State v. Chalpin

1

2024 N.H. 36

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE v. GABRIEL CHALPIN

Nos. 2019-0413, 2020-0573, 2022-0108, 2022-0191

Supreme Court of New Hampshire

July 12, 2024

Argued: November 14, 2023

Hillsborough-northern judicial district

John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony J. Galdieri solicitor general (Sam M. Gonyea, assistant attorney general on the brief and orally), for the State.

Reis & O'Keefe, PLLC, of Portsmouth (James B. Reis on the brief and orally), for the defendant.

DONOVAN, J.

[¶1] The defendant, Gabriel Chalpin, appeals his convictions following a jury trial in the Superior Court (Brown, J.), on one count of first degree assault, enhanced for manifesting exceptional cruelty or depravity in inflicting serious bodily injury, see RSA 631:1, I(a) (2016); RSA 651:6, I(c) (2016), and one count of second degree assault for recklessly causing bodily injury to another under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, see RSA 631:2, I(c) (2016). He argues that the trial court erred by: (1) providing the jury with an inadequate definition of the word "cruelty"; (2) determining that there was sufficient evidence to prove, with respect to the enhanced first degree assault charge, that the defendant "manifested exceptional cruelty or depravity in inflicting serious bodily injury" on the victim; (3) determining that there was sufficient evidence to prove, with respect to the second degree assault - extreme indifference charge, that the defendant acted "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life"; and (4) determining that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant committed two separate acts of assault.

[¶2] The State cross-appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that there was insufficient evidence to prove four separate assault convictions. We conclude that: (1) the jury instruction on the definition of "cruelty" was sustainable; (2) there was sufficient evidence to sustain both the enhanced first degree assault and second degree assault - extreme indifference convictions; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support four separate assault convictions. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I. Facts

[¶3] The jury could have found the following facts. The defendant and the victim began a romantic relationship in late 2015 and started living together in October 2017. On the evening of February 2, 2018, after returning home from seeing a movie, the victim went to bed while the defendant watched television in the living room. Sometime after the victim went to bed, the defendant woke the victim up, and, once awake, the victim expressed a desire to go outside to smoke a cigarette, but the defendant did not allow her to do so.

[¶4] When the victim attempted to leave the bed, the defendant began restraining her from behind while she was lying down.^[1] The victim "struggled to try to get away from him," but the defendant "grabbed tighter" and "started putting his arm around [the victim's] neck," causing her to have trouble breathing. Eventually, the victim and the defendant slid off the bed and fell onto the floor. From there, the defendant "grabbed [the victim] by the hair and [dragged her] into the main room of the house," pulling out a "large chunk" of her hair in the process. Once in the main room, the defendant started hitting the victim "[p]retty much everywhere," though mostly on the "torso, ribs, [and] legs."

[¶5] Throughout the night, the defendant hit the victim on at least four separate occasions. In particular, the victim recalled that, during the course of the night, the defendant delivered what the victim believed to be a "liver shot" when the victim and the defendant were standing by the back door. The defendant, who was a trained boxer, had previously told the victim that a "liver shot" is a technique that boxers use to incapacitate an opponent for about ten seconds. In addition, the victim recalled that when she was sitting on the love seat with her knees to her chest "trying to protect [herself]," the defendant approached her and punched her directly on a surgical incision on the left side of her body that was still healing from a recent procedure.

[¶6] After the incision strike, the victim fled the house wearing only a torn long-sleeve t-shirt and socks. Not knowing where to go at that time of night, and because it was "very cold" and dark outside, the victim returned to the house. While she was walking up the stairs and across the deck that led to the back door, the defendant punched her in the nose. Eventually, the defendant decided that it was time for them to go to bed. When they got into bed, the defendant hit the victim again "in [the victim's] right ribs."

[¶7] On February 4, the victim went to an urgent-care facility where staff recommended that she go to the hospital. The victim drove herself to a nearby hospital, where she was diagnosed with numerous injuries, including collapsed lungs, eight fractured ribs on both sides of her body, a broken nose, and a fractured spine.

[¶8] The defendant was indicted on four counts of first degree assault, enhanced for manifesting exceptional cruelty or depravity in inflicting serious bodily injury on the victim, see RSA 631:1, I(a); RSA 651:6, I(c), four alternative counts of second degree assault for causing serious bodily injury, see RSA 631:2, I(a) (2016), and four alternative counts of second degree assault for causing bodily injury under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, see RSA 631:2, I(c). For each variant of assault, the indictments alleged that the defendant caused either serious bodily injury or bodily injury in the form of a fractured spine, a fractured rib, a fractured nasal bone, or pneumothorax of the lung - otherwise known as a collapsed lung.

[¶9] In March 2019, the court held a five-day jury trial. Witnesses for the State included the victim and several medical providers who treated the victim at the hospital. The defendant testified on his own behalf. At the close of evidence, when discussing jury instructions, the defendant asked the court to provide the jury with a definition of the word "cruelty" based upon the definition of "cruel" set forth in State v. Morehouse, 120 N.H. 738, 744 (1980). The court initially declined to provide a definition. During deliberation, the jury issued a question regarding the appropriate definition of the word "cruelty." The defendant again requested the definition from Morehouse, but the court declined and instead provided the definition of "cruelty" from Black's Law Dictionary.

[¶10] The jury convicted the defendant on two counts of enhanced first degree assault, six counts of second degree assault, and two lesser charges of simple assault. The court sentenced the defendant on two counts of enhanced first degree assault with respect to the lung and rib injuries, and two counts of second degree assault - extreme indifference with respect to the spine and nasal bone injuries. The remaining convictions were merged for sentencing purposes.

[¶11] In July 2019, the defendant moved to dismiss all but one of the charges against him based upon the doctrine of double jeopardy, or, in the alternative, moved for a new sentencing hearing. The State objected. The court issued a written order in April 2020 denying the defendant's motion. After his counsel withdrew, the defendant, representing himself, subsequently filed a series of motions challenging the court's decision. Following a hearing in December, the court issued a written order in March 2021 agreeing that the four sentences violated the defendant's double jeopardy rights and scheduled another sentencing hearing. In January 2022, following the hearing, the court sentenced the defendant on one count of enhanced first degree assault and one count of second degree assault - extreme indifference. The defendant moved to reconsider, which the court denied. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.

II. Analysis

A. Definition of "cruelty"

[¶12] The defendant first challenges the trial court's response to the jury question asking for a definition of "cruelty." A response to a jury question is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Boudreau, 176 N.H. 1, 6 (2023). We review the court's response under the unsustainable exercise of discretion standard. Id. at 6-7. We review the trial court's answer to a jury inquiry in the context of the court's entire charge to determine whether the answer accurately conveys the law on the question and whether the charge as a whole fairly covered the issues and law in the case. Id. at 7.

[¶13] The defendant was indicted on four counts of enhanced first degree assault, all of which alleged that when perpetrating the assault, the defendant manifested "exceptional cruelty or depravity in inflicting serious bodily injury to" the victim. See RSA 631:1, I(a); RSA 651:6 I(c). During deliberation, the jury requested a definition of "cruelty." Defense counsel suggested that the court define "cruelty" based upon the definition of "cruel" from Morehouse. See Morehouse, 120 N.H. at 744 (defining "cruel" as "disposed to inflict pain . . . in a wanton, insensate . . . manner" or "given to killing and mangling or to tormenting"). The court declined and instead provided the following definition of "cruelty" based upon the definition from Black's Law Dictionary: "The intentional and malicious infliction of physical or mental suffering upon living creatures, particularly human beings. As applied to the latter, the wanton, malicious and unnecessary infliction of pain upon the body or the feelings and emotions, abusive treatment, or inhumanity/outrage." (Quotation...