State v. Chavez-Aguilar

STATE of Connecticut v. Emanuel CHAVEZ-AGUILAR

No. HHBMV170397070T

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Britain, New Britain

June 28, 2019

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

OPINION

Hon Vernon D. Oliver

The defendant moves to exclude the admission into evidence of statements made by him to law enforcement during an interview at the New Britain police station, based on claimed constitutional violations pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 8 and 9, of the Connecticut Constitution. The defendant seeks to exclude the entirety of his interview. For the following reasons, the Court finds that the defendant has failed to establish that he was in custody before or during the interview. The court further finds that the state has established that the challenged statements were made voluntarily. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

The defendant asserts that on January 6, 2016 he was brought by law enforcement to the New Britain Police Department for questioning related to the investigation that led to his arrest in the instant matter. He claims that he was in custody based on the nature and duration of the questioning on that date. The defendant claims that, based on the circumstances of the alleged custodial interrogation, the potentially inculpatory statements made by him were not voluntary. The defendant further asserts that, as the January 6 statements were "unwarned," in that he was not advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, they were not made voluntarily.

The defendant was picked up at his home by two New Britain Police Department detectives on January 6, 2016. He was brought into an interview room in the New Britain Police Department for an interview with (then) Lt. Jeanette Portalatin. The defendant asserts that, based on the circumstances of the custodial interrogation, the statements were not made voluntarily. Additionally, the defendant claims that any statements made to law enforcement at that time were not voluntary as they were not the product of free will as his will was overborne by coercive police conduct. He further claims that the statements were made without a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination and in violation of his constitutional right to counsel.

On June 18, 2019, the court took evidence in the form of testimony from Officer Portalatin and exhibits, including the entirety of the subject Spanish language interview and its corrected English translated transcription.

II. LAW

Suppression Under the Fifth Amendment

"The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); State v. Mullins, 288 Conn 345, 361 (2008).

"[T]he Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Grant, 286 Conn. 499, 525, cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 271 (2008). "The purpose of Miranda warnings is to assure that a confession is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jenkins, 82 Conn.App. 802, 811, cert. denied, 269 Conn. 915, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1025 (2004). Miranda is concerned with counteracting an inherently coercive, police-dominated atmosphere. State v. DesLaurier, 230 Conn. 572, 581 (1994).

Admissibility of Statements Made Pre-Arrest: January 6, 2016

As the defendant’s January statements were alleged to have been made before Miranda warnings were given, the defendant must prove that he was subjected to custodial interrogation. State v. Kirby, 280 Conn. 361, 393 (2006). "Custodial interrogation occurs when questioning is initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rasmussen, 225 Conn. 55, 76 (1993).

Custody

In the instant matter, as the claim of custody in January relates to a location within a police station, the Connecticut Supreme Court, in State v. Mangual, 311 Conn. 182 (2014), wrote: "[The ‘ultimate inquiry’ is whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would believe that there was a ‘restraint on [his or] her freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 194. When an interview is conducted at a police station, the court, in State v. Bridges, enumerated a number of highly relevant factors to consider in determining the question of custody: Did the defendant voluntarily accompany the officers to the station; Did the officers repeatedly inform the defendant that he or she was free to leave; Was the defendant physically restrained or subjected to police consistent with a formal arrest; Was the defendant informed that he or she was not under arrest; Was the defendant transported by the officers in an unobtrusive manner. State v. Bridges, 125 Conn.App. 72, 80-84 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 931 (2011). In addition, the fact the defendant freely left the interview "may, in hindsight, lend credence to a determination that the suspect was actually free to leave during the course of the questioning." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 84 n.4.

The defendant has the burden of proving that he or she was in custody when the statement was made. State v. Brown, 118 Conn.App. 418, 433 (2009).

Interrogation

"[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301-02 (1980). "The test as to whether a particular question is likely to elicit an incriminating response is objective; the subjective intent of the police officer is relevant but not conclusive and the relationship of the questions asked to the crime committed is highly relevant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Evans, 203 Conn. 212, 226 (1987).

Whether a defendant in custody is subject to interrogation necessarily involves determining: the factual circumstances of the police conduct in question, and whether such conduct is normally attendant to arrest and custody or whether the police should know that such conduct is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. State v. Mullins, 288 Conn. 345, 362 (2008); see State v. Gonzalez, 302 Conn. 287, 298-99 (2011) (officer’s statement to defendant that it was the defendant’s opportunity to tell his side of the story is the functional equivalent of interrogation).

"[I]nterrogation, as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Walters, 94 Conn.App. 297, 304, cert. denied, 278 Conn. 908 (2006) (bringing victim to identify defendant in the back of the police cruiser was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating statement); State v. Early, 152 Conn.App. 466, 484-85, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 939 (2014) (officer’s statement, en route to the station after arresting the defendant, that "I told you we were going to continue to work on this" was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating statement).

Miranda Warnings

Prior to subjecting a suspect to custodial interrogation, the police must provide the following warnings: you have the right to remain silent; anything you say can be used against you in a court of law; you have the right to the presence of an attorney and if you cannot afford the services of an attorney, one will be appointed for you prior to any questioning if you so desire. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). What is mandated is that the substance or fully effective equivalent of the language of the warnings be given to the suspect; minor deviations do not invalidate warnings. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202-03 (1989); State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694, 715-16 n.29 (2000); State v. Gray, 200 Conn. 523, 531, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 (1986); State v. Ralls, 167 Conn. 408, 428-29 (1974).

"The failure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion which is irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecution’s case in chief ... Even patently voluntary statements taken in violation of Miranda must be excluded from the prosecution’s case." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v Hoeplinger, 206 Conn. 278, 289 (1987). The state bears the burden of proof that the warnings were adequately given. State v. Gray, supra, 200 Conn. 531.

Voluntariness: Due Process Considerations Pre-Arrest and Post-Arrest

"Irrespective of Miranda, any use in a criminal trial of an involuntary confession is a denial of due process...