State v. Chester J.

204 Conn.App. 137

253 A.3d 971

STATE of Connecticut

v.CHESTER J.^*

AC 41403

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 9, 2020

Officially released April 27, 2021

Trent A. LaLima, with whom, on the brief, was Hubert J. Santos, Hartford, for the appellant (defendant).

Ronald G. Weller, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state's attorney, and Elena Pelermo, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Lavine, Moll and Sheldon, Js.^**

MOLL, J.

The defendant, Chester J., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered against him following a jury trial, of one count each of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) (1), sexual assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-71 (a) (4), sexual assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-72a (a) (2), sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A), and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court improperly denied his challenge to the jury panel on the grounds that (A) the panel did not reflect a fair cross section of the community in violation of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution¹ and (B) the process by which the panel was summoned violated his right to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution,² (2) pursuant to our

supervisory authority, this court should require the collection and/or maintenance of a jury panel's demographic data, and (3) the trial court erred in barring the defense from inquiring about certain Probate Court matters related to the victim's bias or motive in asserting the underlying allegations against the defendant.

While the defendant's appeal was pending, our Supreme Court issued its decision in State v. Moore , 334 Conn. 275, 278, 221 A.3d 40 (2019).³ On the basis of that decision, this court ordered the parties to file simultaneous supplemental briefs addressing the impact of Moore on this appeal. After the parties submitted their supplemental briefs, this court heard oral argument. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The victim was born in Jamaica and, in 1995 or 1996, when she was seven or eight years old, arrived in the United States following her adoption by the defendant and his wife, H, who resided in Waterbury.⁴ Shortly after the move, and for many years thereafter, the defendant sexually assaulted the victim. The incidents occurred frequently when the victim would sleep in her parents’ bed during the winter months. The defendant would place his hand in her underwear and touch her clitoris.

The victim and her parents moved to another location in Waterbury in 1999. When the victim was thirteen years old, the defendant began having sexual intercourse with her, which continued until she was approximately twenty-one years of age. Throughout her high school years, the defendant forced the victim to have sexual intercourse with him approximately twice a week. In connection with the defendant's sexual advances, the defendant would threaten withholding from the victim basic necessities, such as clothing or money for participation in school activities, if she did not cooperate. The

victim's grades began to suffer during her sophomore year in high school, and she became suicidal. The defendant employed various measures to conceal his conduct from H.

Following her graduation from high school in 2007, the victim was accepted into a college in upstate New York, but the defendant refused to allow her to attend there, instead requiring that she enroll in a college closer to home. The defendant continued to have sexual intercourse with the victim until she married in 2009, and moved out of her parents’ home. Shortly thereafter, the victim disclosed the abuse for the first time, initially to her mother, H, and several years later, in or about 2015, to her sister. After her disclosure to her sister, the victim eventually contacted the police.

Once the victim made an initial complaint to the police, she recorded two conversations between herself and the defendant regarding the abuse she had suffered. In the first conversation, the defendant expressed his sorrow and asked for forgiveness. In the second conversation, which took place in or about June, 2015, the defendant, after having been contacted by the police, shouted at the victim, repeatedly apologized, and expressed concern that his conduct would "shame the family" and would be "all over the news." The defendant also conveyed to the victim his desire to "get rid of this whole case" and asked her what she wanted in exchange for retracting her complaint. The victim explained that she wanted to be able to stay in the familial home and take care of H, who was suffering from dementia at the time, and she wanted the defendant out of the house. The defendant indicated he wanted H's pension. Amenable to the foregoing terms, the defendant reduced them to writing, and both he and the victim signed the document embodying the agreement. Unbeknownst to the defendant, the victim had no intention of withdrawing her

complaint, and she turned over the recordings to the police.

The defendant subsequently was arrested, and the state charged him by way of a substitute information with one count each of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-71 (a) (1), sexual assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-71 (a) (4), sexual assault in the third degree in violation of § 53a-72a (a) (2), sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A), and risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2). A jury thereafter convicted the defendant of all counts and, in accordance with the verdict, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of thirty-three years of imprisonment, execution suspended after eighteen years, followed by fifteen years of probation. This appeal followed. We will set forth additional facts and procedural history where necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly denied his challenge to the jury panel on the grounds that (1) the panel did not reflect a fair cross section of the community in violation of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution, and (2) the process by which the panel was summoned violated his right to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. Specifically, the defendant contends that there was an underrepresentation of African-Americans and Hispanics in the jury array. Although "[w]e recognize the importance of fairness in our judicial system, and particularly as to our jury selection procedures"; State v. Gibbs , 254 Conn. 578, 585, 758 A.2d 327 (2000) ; we conclude that the defendant's constitutional rights were not violated.

The following additional facts, as set forth in the trial court's memorandum of decision or as undisputed in the record, and procedural history are relevant to our

resolution of these claims. Jury selection took place over the course of three days, specifically, on November 7, 9, and 13, 2017. Six jurors, plus two alternates, were selected from three venire panels of thirty members each. On the second day of jury selection, the defendant orally objected to the composition of the venire panel. On the third day, November 13, 2017, the defendant filed a written objection to the racial and ethnic composition of the November 7 and 9 venire panels, contending that African-Americans and Hispanics were underrepresented. On November 16, 2017, the defendant filed a motion for the state and the defense to have immediate access to the jury lists and juror questionnaires, which the court granted that same day with respect to the panel assignment lists and the juror questionnaires for the three venire panels.

On November 20 and 30, 2017, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's objection to the venire panels. Eight witnesses testified. Among them, Attorney Philip Miller, as the duly authorized designee of then Attorney General George Jepsen, testified that, since December, 2012, the Office of the Attorney General had not initiated a civil enforcement proceeding, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-237,⁵ to seek imposition of a fine against any nonappearing juror. He explained that the Judicial Branch provides a list of nonappearing jurors to the Office of the Attorney General either on a monthly or a quarterly basis. Those lists

do not include, among other things, the race of the nonappearing jurors. When questioned about the lack of enforcement, Attorney Miller stated, in part, that the legislature had not provided any appropriations to accomplish that task. Attorney Miller also testified that, prior to pursuing a civil penalty against a nonappearing juror, the Office of the Attorney General would first have to investigate the reasons for the nonappearance.

Shari DeLuca, the jury outreach coordinator for the Judicial Branch, testified that she engages in community outreach for the purpose of educating the public about jury duty and that her goal is to increase public responsiveness to jury summonses. To effectuate that goal, she has given presentations at high schools, colleges, and community events. DeLuca also has appeared on Hispanic radio stations.

Girvan Dinnall, an information technology analyst for the Judicial Branch, testified that he compiles data from the Department of Revenue Services, the Department of Motor Vehicles, voter registration rolls, and the Department of Labor to create a master list for the purpose of summoning potential jurors. The information collected from those sources includes names, addresses, dates of birth, and social security numbers, if available. A compilation process—whereby the data, through a series of mostly...