State v. Coble

536 P.3d 519

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Christopher Cory COBLE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A-1-CA-39110

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Filing Date: July 17, 2023

Certiorari Denied, October 5, 2023, No. S-1-SC-40060

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General, Emily Tyson-Jorgenson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, MJ Edge, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant

ATTREP, Chief Judge.

{1} Defendant Christopher Coble appeals his conviction for escape from a community custody release program, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-8.1(C) (1999). Defendant challenges the validity of the conviction, raising two claims of error relating to the jury instructions in this case. Defendant argues the jury should have been instructed on willfulness as an essential element of escape from a community custody release program. Because we conclude that willfulness is not an element of the charged offense, this claim of error fails. Defendant additionally asserts that his escape was occasioned by duress and that the absence of a duress instruction was the result of his trial counsel's ineffectiveness or, alternatively, amounted to fundamental error. Because escape from a community custody release program is a continuing offense and any alleged duress subsided during the period of time Defendant was at large, Defendant was not entitled to a duress instruction. Thus, trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to request a duress instruction, nor did the district court commit fundamental error. We accordingly affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} During the course of a separate criminal proceeding, Defendant's continued release from jail was conditioned on his enrollment in a community custody release program. As part of that program, Defendant was released into the custody of Bo Johnson, a former coworker of Defendant's father, and placed on electronic monitoring. Defendant was required to comply with terms outlined in both a court order releasing him to Mr. Johnson's custody and a contract between Defendant and his community custody release program officer, Officer Daniel Valdespino of the Otero County Detention Center. Those terms required Defendant to reside at the Johnson residence, where Mr. Johnson and his wife also lived. As part of the program, Defendant wore an electronic ankle monitor and was required to stay within a certain perimeter of the Johnson home, unless given permission by Officer Valdespino to be elsewhere.

{3} A couple of months after Defendant was released into Mr. Johnson's custody, Defendant and Mrs. Johnson confessed to Mr. Johnson that they were having an affair. Upset by the revelation, Mr. Johnson physically attacked Defendant. Defendant fought back, gained the upper hand, and then fled the Johnson residence. The electronic system connected to Defendant's ankle monitor alerted Officer Valdespino that Defendant had left the approved perimeter.

{4} Defendant never returned to the Johnson residence. Officer Valdespino went to the residence and otherwise tried to contact Defendant by phone, but failed to locate him. Several days after Defendant fled, he called Officer Valdespino, who told Defendant to return the ankle monitor and to "get with his attorney on this matter." An individual other than Defendant returned the ankle monitor to the detention center. Eighteen days after Defendant fled, Officer Valdespino filed a criminal complaint charging Defendant with escape from a community custody release program. Defendant was arrested approximately two weeks later—some thirty-four days after he had fled the Johnson residence. Ultimately, a jury found Defendant guilty as charged, and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

{5} Defendant argues that (1) willfulness is an essential element of escape from a community custody release program; and (2) he was entitled to a duress instruction. Defendant's arguments require us to construe the escape from a community custody release program statute, Section 30-22-8.1, and, to that extent, are reviewed de novo. See State v. Farish , 2021-NMSC-030, ¶ 11, 499 P.3d 622 (providing that questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo).

I. Willfulness Is Not an Essential Element of Escape From a Community Custody Release Program

{6} We first address Defendant's argument that willfulness is an essential element of the crime of escape from a community custody release program, and that the district court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury accordingly. At the time of Defendant's trial, there was no uniform jury instruction defining the crime of escape from a community custody release program.¹ The district court therefore fashioned an instruction based on the relevant statute, Section 30-22-8.1. See UJI-Criminal General Use Note ("For a crime for which no uniform instruction on essential elements is provided, an appropriate instruction stating the essential elements must be drafted."); State v. Luna , 2018-NMCA-025, ¶ 21, 458 P.3d 457 (providing that "the district court was required to give an instruction that substantially follows the language of the statute" (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). Relying on the uniform jury instruction for escape from an inmate-release program, UJI 14-2228 NMRA (2022) (recompiled as UJI 14-2228A NMRA), Defendant requested the district court to include the following element related to mens rea: "The defendant's failure to return [to custody] was willful, without sufficient justification or excuse." See UJI 14-2228(4) (2022). The court declined to do so, and instructed the jury using the general criminal intent instruction alone, see UJI 14-141 NMRA.² On appeal, Defendant contends that it was error not to instruct the jury that it had to find he "acted willfully when he violated the conditions of the community custody [release] program."³ We disagree.

{7} We review Defendant's claim for reversible error. See State v. Benally , 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134 ("If the error has been preserved we review the instructions for reversible error."). Reversible error occurs if the jury was not instructed on all the elements essential to a defendant's conviction. See State v. Ellis , 2008-NMSC-032, ¶ 12, 144 N.M. 253, 186 P.3d 245. The question before us thus is whether willfulness is an essential element of escape from a community custody release program—a matter we review de novo. See State v. Lefthand , 2015-NMCA-117, ¶ 6, 362 P.3d 174. To answer this question, we review Section 30-22-8.1, the statute defining the crime, to effectuate the Legislature's intent regarding the crime's elements. See State v. Swick , 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 56, 279 P.3d 747. To that end, "[w]e begin with the plain language of the statute, which is the primary indicator of legislative intent." State v. Suazo , 2017-NMSC-011, ¶ 16, 390 P.3d 674 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). "Under the plain meaning rule, when a statute contains clear and unambiguous language, we will heed that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation." State v. Trujillo , 2009-NMSC-012, ¶ 11, 146 N.M. 14, 206 P.3d 125.

{8} Section 30-22-8.1 provides in relevant part:

Escape from a community custody release program consists of a person, excluding a person on probation or parole, who has been lawfully committed to a judicially approved community custody release program, including a day reporting program, an electronic monitoring program, a day detention program or a community tracking program, escaping or attempting to escape from the community custody release program.

Section 30-22-8.1(A). Defendant acknowledges that the word "willful," or any variation of that concept, does not appear in Section 30-22-8.1(A). He does not contend that the statutory text is ambiguous; nor do we perceive any ambiguity. The plain language of Section 30-22-8.1(A) indicates the Legislature did not intend to include willfulness as an element of escape from a community custody release program. We thus must give effect to this clear and unambiguous meaning unless there is some basis to depart from it. See State v. Bennett , 2003-NMCA-147, ¶ 6, 134 N.M. 705, 82 P.3d 72 ("If the meaning of the statutory language is clear and without ambiguity, we apply the statute as it is written.").

{9} Defendant has advanced no reasoned basis to depart from the plain language of Section 30-22-8.1(A). Instead, Defendant asserts only that where, as in his case, escape involves the failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the community custody release program, "[w]illfulness [is] an inherent and essential element of such an allegation."

Defendant's argument essentially ends there. It lacks analysis and citation to supportive authority,⁴ and we therefore decline to consider it further. See State v. Candelaria , 2019-NMCA-032, ¶ 48, 446 P.3d 1205 (declining to review an undeveloped claim because "we will not review unclear arguments, or guess at what a party's arguments might be" (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); State v. Casares , 2014-NMCA-024, ¶ 18, 318 P.3d 200 ("We will not consider an issue if no authority is cited in support of the issue, because absent cited authority to support an argument, we assume no such authority exists.").

{10} We are otherwise satisfied, based on well-established canons of statutory construction, that willfulness is not an essential element of escape from a community custody release program. To accept Defendant's position, we would have to read "willful" into Section 30-22-8.1(A). This we will not do. See State v. Elliott , 2001-NMCA-108, ¶ 14, 131 N.M. 390, 37 P.3d 107 ("We do not read words into the statutes, particularly when the [L]egislature has seen fit not to include them."); see also id. (providing that "[i]t is the role of the [L]egislature to define crimes"). The Legislature was well aware of...