State v. Coble

299 Neb. 434

908 N.W.2d 646

STATE of Nebraska, appellee,

v.Kaitlyn N. COBLE, appellant.

No. S-17-769.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Filed March 23, 2018.

Jennifer Gaughan and Marian G. Heaney, of Legal Aid of Nebraska, for appellant.

Marcee A. Brownlee, Assistant Lincoln City Attorney, for appellee.

Christopher L. Eickholt, of Eickholt Law, L.L.C., and Amy A. Miller, of American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Nebraska, for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Nebraska.

Ryan P. Sullivan, for amicus curiae University of Nebraska Civil Clinical Law Program.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, and Funke, JJ.

Funke, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Kaitlyn N. Coble filed a motion to seal the record of her citation for two misdemeanors which were subsequently dismissed. The county court overruled Coble’s motion, and the district court affirmed. We conclude that Coble’s motion was not authorized by statute and that thus, the county court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion. As a result, the district court and this court lack jurisdiction to review the merits of the county court’s order. We do not reach the merits of whether Coble would be entitled to have her record sealed were she to use a proper procedure. We vacate the county court and district court orders and dismiss this appeal.

II. BACKGROUND

In 2013, Coble, who was 18 years of age at the time, was issued a uniform complaint and citation for two misdemeanors. After completing a diversion program, the charges were dismissed on the city attorney’s motion.

In 2017, Coble filed a motion in the county court for Lancaster County, under the same case number as her criminal case, captioned as "Motion to Seal Records." It requested that the court issue an "[o]rder making all the records associated with this case ‘non-public’ pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3523." The county court issued an order overruling Coble’s motion.

In doing so, the county court concluded that the procedure utilized by Coble (filing a motion to seal in the criminal case), in spite of having no basis in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3523 (Reissue 2016), was authorized by the Nebraska Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Blair .¹

The court then concluded that Coble was seeking retroactive application of a recent statutory amendment to § 29-3523, but the court refused to apply it retroactively because it deemed the amendment to be a substantive change. The court then determined that under the version of the statute in effect at the time of the dismissal of Coble’s charges, the statute applied only to a "notation of arrest,"² not to records of citations. Thus, the court concluded that Coble was not entitled to the relief she sought.

Coble appealed to the district court, which generally agreed with the county court’s analysis and affirmed.

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Coble’s two assignments of error, restated and summarized, claim that the district court erred by affirming the county court’s order overruling her motion to seal.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Determination of a jurisdictional issue which does not involve a factual dispute is a matter of law which requires an appellate court to reach its conclusions independent from a trial court.³

V. ANALYSIS

1. JURISDICTION : FINAL ORDER

Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.⁴

The State argues that this court lacks appellate jurisdiction because the county court’s order was not a final, appealable order. While the county court’s order was a final order, we conclude that the county court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to review the merits of the county court’s order.

Final orders and judgments issued by a county court may be appealed to district court.⁵ A district court order affirming, reversing, or remanding an order or judgment of the county court is itself a final order that an appellate court has jurisdiction to review.⁶

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2016) defines three categories of final orders:

An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment, and an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding, or upon a summary application in an action after judgment, is a final order which may be vacated, modified or reversed, as provided in this chapter.⁷

An order "affecting a substantial right" that is issued "upon a summary application in an action after judgment" under § 25-1902 is "an order ruling on a postjudgment motion in an action."⁸

Coble sought to seal the record of her citation by filing a motion in the case in which she had been charged. However, Coble’s case had been dismissed years earlier, after she completed a diversion program. Because the case had already been dismissed, the county court’s order overruling Coble’s motion was an order ruling on a postjudgment motion.⁹

And the order affects a substantial right. A substantial right is an essential legal right, not a mere technical right.¹⁰ The right invoked by Coble was the statutory right to remove the record of her citation from the public record, no mere technical right. Thus, the county court’s order on Coble’s motion was a final order, because it affected a substantial right and was issued upon a summary application in an action after judgment.

2. LB. 505

Before addressing the dispositive jurisdictional issue in this case, we review the recent amendments to § 29-3523 in 2016 Neb. Laws, L.B. 505. Section 29-3523 generally protects certain criminal history record information and prohibits, subject to exceptions, the dissemination of this information.

In 2016, the Legislature enacted significant amendments to § 29-3523 in L.B. 505. The stated purpose of the enactment was to "strengthen the privacy provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3523" in order to "protect[ ] legally innocent Nebraskans from the stigma of a permanent public criminal record."¹¹

While the previous version of the statute applied only to a "notation of arrest,"¹² L.B. 505 amended the statute to provide that "in the case of an arrest, citation in lieu of arrest, or referral for prosecution without citation, all criminal history record information relating to the case shall be removed from the public record" as specified by the statute under certain circumstances, such as a dismissal or acquittal of the criminal charges.¹³

L.B. 505 also provides that when criminal charges are filed, but are then dismissed or the defendant is acquitted, the court must then "[o]rder that all records, including any information or other data concerning any proceedings relating to the case ..."¹⁴ be sealed and provide notice of the order to relevant criminal justice agencies.¹⁵

3. JURISDICTION : SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

In this case, we need not reach the merits of whether Coble is entitled to have the record of her case sealed, because we conclude that the county court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to reach that question. Coble’s motion to seal sought relief that went beyond the scope of the original criminal case in which it was filed, and the motion was not authorized by statute.

Where a lower court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of a claim, issue, or question, an appellate court also lacks the power to determine the merits of the claim, issue, or question presented to the lower court.¹⁶ When an appellate court is without jurisdiction to act, the appeal must be dismissed. However, an appellate court has the power to determine whether it lacks jurisdiction over an appeal because the lower court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order; to vacate a void order; and, if necessary, to remand the cause with appropriate directions.¹⁷

Because the county court lacked jurisdiction over Coble’s motion, the district court and this court lack jurisdiction to review the merits of the county court’s order.

(a) County Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The jurisdictional defect in this case is not, as the State argued, one of finality, but is one of subject matter jurisdiction. The problem stems from the fact that Coble sought relief by filing a motion in a case that had been dismissed years earlier—a procedure that has no basis in statute—rather than utilizing the procedure authorized by statute to enforce the rights created by § 29-3523 and surrounding sections.¹⁸

In a legal action, the function of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring before the court for ruling some material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed.¹⁹ Jurisdiction over a motion is therefore dependent upon the court’s having jurisdiction over the case in which the motion is filed.²⁰ A court has jurisdiction to issue orders on motions pertaining to incidental matters within the scope of the action over which the court has jurisdiction.²¹ But it necessarily follows that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear motions that seek an order granting relief beyond the scope of the action at hand unless the motion is authorized by statute.²² A litigant must file a new action when seeking such relief.²³

Of course, a motion that goes beyond those incidental matters contained within the scope of a case could be authorized by statute.²⁴ But in this case, § 29-3523 does not authorize the filing of a motion to make criminal history record information nonpublic. And the relief sought by a motion like Coble’s is an order directed to criminal justice agencies to seal the criminal history record information. Such relief goes beyond the scope of the original criminal case over which the county court had jurisdiction. The county court thus lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue an order on Coble’s motion to seal.

Not only is there no statutory basis for enforcing the privacy protections of § 29-3523 by filing a motion, but the Security,...