State v. Copeland

1

STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. TRISHA D. COPELAND, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 49920

Court of Appeals of Idaho

December 21, 2023

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District State of Idaho, Elmore County. Hon. Jonathan Medema, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, Interim State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon Raul R. Labrador, Attorney General; Amy J. Lavin, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

MELANSON, JUDGE PRO TEM

Trisha D. Copeland appeals from her judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Copeland was the subject of a burglary investigation. During the execution of a search warrant at her home, officers found a large amount of controlled substances. Officers conducted a traffic stop on a person leaving the home and found marijuana in the car. The driver admitted to purchasing the drugs from Copeland. The investigation then expanded to encompass controlled substances as well as burglary. Copeland admitted to police officers that she had purchased methamphetamine from a drug supplier on a regular basis. Through a confidential informant, law enforcement performed two controlled buys of methamphetamine from Copeland at her residence. The confidential informant told law enforcement that Copeland purchased drugs from the supplier and traveled to Boise to sell the drugs.

After these purchases, law enforcement set up a controlled buy through a confidential informant at Copeland's residence to purchase a pound of methamphetamine from Copeland's supplier.^[1] Law enforcement then conducted a traffic stop of the supplier and found several pounds of methamphetamine in his vehicle. This supplier admitted to having regularly sold methamphetamine to Copeland and having recently supplied her with a pound of methamphetamine just prior to the stop. The supplier admitted to providing drugs to Copeland which she would sell and then give the supplier money from the sales. The supplier told law enforcement he expected Copeland to be traveling to Boise within the next day to sell the methamphetamine.

Law enforcement performed a traffic stop of Copeland later that afternoon. An officer asked Copeland to exit the vehicle for the officer's safety and waited for another officer to arrive. According to officers, during the traffic stop Copeland admitted to having methamphetamine in her vehicle which officers could see in plain view in a plastic bag inside of her purse.^[2]

Copeland was charged with three counts of trafficking in methamphetamine and one count of delivery of a controlled substance. Copeland moved to suppress the evidence found in her vehicle, arguing that it was obtained in violation of her Fourth Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure. The district court denied the motion. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Copeland entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A), and the remaining charges were dismissed. Copeland appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).

III. ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290, 900 P.2d 196, 198 (1995). The State may overcome this presumption by demonstrating that a warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. Id. One such exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception. State v. Maloney, 168 Idaho 936, 941, 489 P.3d 847, 852 (2021). This exception allows police to search a vehicle without a warrant when there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012). Probable cause is a flexible, commonsense standard, and a practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is present is all that is required. Id. Probable cause is established when the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the search would give rise--in the mind of a reasonable person--to a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Id.

Copeland argues that the search of her car was done without probable cause. Copeland's argument is two-fold: (1) the supplier's veracity and reliability were not sufficiently established because he was part of the "criminal milieu," and (2) law enforcement lacked probable cause that Copeland had drugs in her vehicle at the time she was pulled over. The State argues that law enforcement did not solely rely on the supplier's information but also relied on Copeland's previous admissions to obtaining drugs from the supplier and the controlled buys from Copeland. Additionally, the State argues that the information law enforcement had provided probable cause that Copeland's vehicle contained drugs at the time she was stopped.

A. Reliability of Informant

Information given by tip to law enforcement by a citizen informant is presumptively reliable because his or her reputation may be assessed and, if the informant is untruthful, he or she may be subject to criminal liability for making a false report. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 812, 203 P.3d 1203, 1211 (2008). However, when a confidential informant is part of the criminal milieu, more information will be necessary to show the informant's veracity and reliability. See State v. Peterson, 133 Idaho 44, 47, 981 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Ct. App. 1999). Copeland asserts that, because the supplier was part of the "criminal milieu," more information was required to prove his veracity and reliability.

In Peterson, this Court noted that the veracity of a citizen informant can ordinarily be proven by disclosure of the person's name and address. However, Peterson requires something more when an informant is part of the criminal milieu. This Court stated that the additional evidence of reliability may come from the informant's acknowledgment that he or she has participated in criminal activity. This Court noted that, while such admissions may not be dispositive of reliability and credibility, the admissions may support a finding of probable cause when coupled with other indicia of reliability. Id. Further, this Court noted that, when the informant's identity is known to the police, it reduces the measure of corroboration necessary. State v. Chandler, 140 Idaho 760, 764, 101 P.3d 704, 708 (2004). Additionally, corroboration may come from information obtained from other confidential informants.

In Chandler, law enforcement received information from three informants (all of whom were known to police and all corroborated a single fact) that Chandler sold methamphetamine out of his home. One informant admitted to purchasing methamphetamine from Chandler. A criminal history search revealed that Chandler had previously been convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent the to deliver. A search warrant was issued for Chandler's home. The district court granted a motion to suppress the evidence found during the execution of the search warrant, and the State contended on appeal that the district court erroneously believed that information from one confidential informant could not corroborate information supplied by another. This Court agreed and held that the district court erred in that the informants had a reliable basis of knowledge, having gained the knowledge through direct contact with Chandler, and were capable of corroborating information from the...