State v. Copeland

380 S.W.3d 214

The STATE of Texas, Appellant,

v.Shirley COPELAND, Appellee.

No. 13–11–00701–CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi–Edinburg.

Aug. 9, 2012.

Discretionary Review Granted Nov. 7, 2012.

Rex Luther Easley, Asst. Crim. Dist. Atty., Stephen B. Tyler, Dist. Atty., Victoria, TX, for Appellant.

Micah Hatley, Victoria, TX, for Appellee.

Before Chief Justice VALDEZ and Justices GARZA and VELA.

OPINION

Opinion by Chief Justice VALDEZ.

The State appeals from the trial court's granting of a motion to suppress filed by appellee, Shirley Copeland. We affirm.

I. Background

The trial court's findings of fact provide the following background. On March 18, 2011, Deputy Jesse Garza was on routine patrol. He had received information from neighbors that people were frequently coming and going from a house located on Coleto Drive in Victoria County, Texas. Deputy Garza parked his patrol car down the street from the house with his lights off to observe the house. Deputy Garza noticed a vehicle arrive at the house, stay for a few minutes and then drive away. Deputy Garza followed the car. At the corner of Royal Oak and Coleto Drive, the car did not signal a turn or come to a complete stop at the stop sign.

Deputy Garza effected a traffic stop for the violations of failure to signal and failure to stop at a stop sign. Deputy Garza contacted the driver, Wayne Danish, and asked him to step out of the vehicle. The vehicle was registered to the driver. After some preliminary questions about where the driver had been and where he was going, Deputy Garza asked for permission to search the vehicle. The driver consented.

The passenger, appellee, asserted that she was the driver's common law spouse. The driver made the same assertion. Then, appellee, who was still sitting in the passenger seat, unequivocally refused permission to search the vehicle. Deputy Garza again requested permission from the driver. The driver consented, but appellee continued to protest.

The deputy then searched the vehicle. During his search of the vehicle, the deputy recovered two pills identified as Tramadol, a prescription drug, which were located in the middle console underneath some papers. Appellee was arrested and charged by information with the offense of possession of a dangerous drug, a Class A misdemeanor. SeeTex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 483.041 (West 2010).

In its conclusions of law, the trial court stated in relevant part:

1. [Appellee] has standing to challenge the search because she had a possessory interest in the vehicle as community property of the common law marriage between Wayne Danish and [appellee].

2. There was probable cause to stop the vehicle based on the traffic violations that the Deputy observed.

3. There was no probable cause to search the vehicle.

4. [Appellee] clearly and without ambiguity denied consent to search the vehicle.

5. [Appellee] had equal authority to grant or refuse consent to search the vehicle as per Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 114–115 [126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208] (2005) and State v. Bassano, 827 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref'd).

6. When two people have authority to consent or refuse a search and both are present, the refusal by one such person negates the consent of the other.

7. Deputy Garza did not have consent to search the vehicle, therefore his search of the vehicle without probable cause or consent violated the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution.

II. Analysis

By three issues, the State contends that the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion to suppress.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion, using a bifurcated standard. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88–89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). Generally, with respect to a suppression ruling, the trial court's findings of historical fact supported by the record, as well as mixed questions of law and fact that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, are given “almost total deference.” Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. A de novo standard is applied to a trial court's determination of the law and its application of law to the facts that do not turn upon an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. We will uphold a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress if the ruling is reasonably supported by the record, and the ruling is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex.Crim.App.2006).

B. Applicable Law

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Consent to search is “one of a few well-delineated exceptions” to the warrant requirement. See Johnson v. State, 226 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). To establish the reasonableness of a search, the State is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974).

The Supreme Court's reasoning in Matlock has been extended to apply to consensual vehicle searches. See Welch v. State, 93 S.W.3d 50, 52 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (applying [Matlocks ] “less common variation of ... third-party consent” in context of vehicle search); see also United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir.2008) (same). Specifically, a third party's consent is valid if he has mutual use of the property, with joint access to or control of the area for most purposes. Harris, 526 F.3d at 1339;see also United States v. Loya, 528 F.3d 546, 554 (8th Cir.2008) ( “Consistent with the notion of common authority as defined by the Supreme Court in Matlock, a passenger may have common authority to consent to a full search of a vehicle.”); Houston v. State, 286 S.W.3d 604, 609 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2009, pet. ref'd) (“[T]he voluntary consent of a third party to a search of property under joint control is valid against the defendant.”).

C. Discussion1. Common–Law Marriage

In its first issue, the State contends that the trial court erred in concluding that a common-law marriage existed between appellee and the driver of the vehicle, who was the registered owner of the vehicle. The parties agree on the three elements of a common-law marriage: (1) an agreement to be husband and wife; (2) living together as husband and wife; and (3) a holding out to the public that the couple are husband and wife. See Hightower v. State, 629 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). The State concedes the third element, but it maintains that the record does not support the first and second elements.

At the outset of the hearing, the parties agreed to “a stipulation that this was a warrantless arrest and search,” which according to the trial court, “puts the burden on the State.” The State made no objection to assuming the burden and told the trial court, “[T]he State will prove that the owner-driver of the vehicle was present, that the vehicle was registered to that owner-driver, not to the [appellee] in this case, that there was no evidence of a common-law marriage, that the parties had different last names.”

The State then called Deputy Garza as the only witness to testify at the hearing. According to his testimony, the fact that the driver and passenger of the vehicle had different last names was the only basis he had for questioning the existence of their common-law marriage. He told the trial court that he had no other “way of knowing whether that's true or not based on a traffic stop.”

Based on the foregoing, it was reasonable for the trial court to accept the testimony given by Deputy Garza, to rely on that as evidence of a common-law marriage, and to reject the State's contention that there was no common law marriage for the stated reason that the couple had different last names. See Hereford v. State, 339 S.W.3d 111, 118 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) (“In its review, the appellate court does not perform its own fact-finding mission, but limits the scope of its factual review to determining whether the trial court's findings were reasonable in light of the evidence presented. If these findings are reasonable, the appellate court must defer to the trial court.”); Manzi v. State, 88 S.W.3d 240, 243 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (“[A]ppellate courts should review a trial court's determination of historical facts under a deferential standard, even if that determination was not based upon an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.”).

The State's first issue is overruled.

2. Standing

In its second issue, the State contends that appellee has no standing to challenge the search. See Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (“Any defendant seeking to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must first show that he personally had a reasonable expectation of privacy that the government invaded.”). The State argues that appellee has no standing to challenge the legality of the search because she was merely a passenger in the vehicle. See United States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641, 657 (8th Cir.2008) (“The general rule is that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in an automobile belonging to another.”); Hughes v. State, 24 S.W.3d 833, 838 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (holding appellant suffered “no infringement of any right ensuring freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures” where “appellant claims no possessory interest in the vehicle itself or in those items seized from within it”).

This contention is insupportable given that: (1) the trial court specifically found that appellee had a possessory interest in the vehicle based on her common-law marriage; and (2) we have overruled the State's first issue...