State v. Copley

374 N.C. 224

839 S.E.2d 726

STATE of North Carolina

v.Chad Cameron COPLEY

No.195A19

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed April 3, 2020

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Joseph L. Hyde, for the State.

Massengale & Ozer, Chapel Hill, by Marilyn G. Ozer, for defendant.

HUDSON, Justice.

Here we must determine whether the Court of Appeals erred by holding that the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled defendant's objections during the prosecutor's closing argument. Because we conclude that the trial court rulings did not constitute prejudicial error, we reverse and remand.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On 6 August 2016, Jalen Lewis threw a party while his parents were out of town. Lewis lived in Neuse Crossing, a quiet neighborhood in Raleigh with no sidewalks. Defendant lived on the same street, two or three houses down on the same side of the road.

Around midnight, the victim, Kourey Thomas, arrived at Lewis's party with two friends, David Walker and Chris Malone, and parked at the end of the street. Thomas was wearing a red NC State hat and a red shirt.

Some time later, a group of about twenty people arrived at the party. The hosts did not know them and asked them to leave. The group walked uneventfully back to their cars which were parked in front of defendant's house. They stood on the curb discussing where to go next. According to the State's witnesses, no one was being loud or disruptive.

Defendant testified that he was upset from having a bad day. He heard people arguing outside and yelled at them from his window. He yelled, "keep it the f--- down." The group yelled back, "shut the f--- up; f--- you; go inside, white boy." Defendant testified that he saw multiple people in the group with guns. Other witnesses testified that they did not see anyone with a gun at the party. Defendant's two young daughters were in the house.

Defendant called 911. Before the operator answered, defendant was recorded saying "I'm going to kill him." In his testimony, defendant admitted to having falsely reported there were "hoodlums racing up and down the street." He said he was "locked and loaded" and going to "secure the neighborhood." Defendant was not a police officer and there was no neighborhood watch. After the 911 call ended, defendant loaded his gun.

Defendant believed his son was part of the rowdy group outside and went to get him. When he got to his garage, which was furnished like a den, he found his son there. From his garage defendant yelled at the group to "leave the premises."

According to witnesses who were at the scene that night, Kourey Thomas and his friends saw police blue lights from an unrelated traffic stop down the street. Thomas had a weed grinder on his person and did not want any trouble with the police, so he ran from Lewis's house back to his friend's car.¹ He cut across a small part of defendant's yard on the way. Defendant saw a man running in his yard. Thomas was shot before he made it to his car. The force from the shot caused him to fall on the curb next to defendant's mailbox. Someone screamed, "he just shot him through the window!" Defendant's house was dark, his garage was closed, and one of the garage windows was broken. Thomas was African American. Defendant is white.

When Deputy Barry Carroll arrived, he saw a group of ten to fifteen people in the street. He saw broken glass in defendant's driveway from the broken garage door window. When the deputy approached the house, he shined a flashlight into the garage and saw defendant step into the garage from the house. The deputy asked defendant if he shot someone and defendant said he had. The deputy asked where the gun was, and defendant indicated that it was in the house. Defendant let the deputy into his house where the deputy observed a shotgun leaning against a stairwell banister. Defendant indicated it that was the gun he had fired.

Thomas died at the hospital from the gunshot wound. The bullet went through his right arm and entered his right side just below the rib cage.

Defendant was charged with first-degree murder. His case went to trial in February 2018. During closing arguments at trial, the prosecutor made the following statements which are at issue here:

MR. LATOUR [prosecutor]: I have at every turn attempted to not make this what this case is about. And at every turn, jury selection, arguments, evidence, closing argument, there's been this undercurrent, right? What's the undercurrent? The undercurrent that the defendant brought up to you in his closing argument is what did he mean by hoodlums? I never told you what he meant by hoodlums. I told you he meant the people outside. They presented the evidence that he's scared of these black males. And let's call it what it is. Let's talk about the elephant in the room.

MR. POLK [defense counsel]: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

MR. LATOUR: Let's talk about the elephant in the room. If they want to go there, consider it. And why is it relevant for you? Because we talked about that self-defense issue, right, and reasonable fear. What is a reasonable fear? You get to determine what's reasonable. Ask yourself if Kourey Thomas and these people outside were a bunch of young, white males walking around wearing N.C. State hats, is he laying dead bleeding in that yard?

MR. POLK: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

MR. LATOUR: Think about it. I'm not saying that's why he shot him, but it might've been a factor he was considering. You can decide that for yourself. You've heard all the evidence. Is it reasonable that he's afraid of them because they're a black male outside wearing a baseball cap that happens to be red? They want to make it a gang thing. The only evidence in this case about gangs is that nobody knows if anybody was in a gang. That's the evidence. They can paint it however they want to paint it, but you all swore and raised your hand when I asked you in jury selection if you would decide this case based on the evidence that you hear in the case, and that's the evidence. Now, reasonableness and that fear, a fear based out of hatred or a fear based out of race is not a reasonable fear, I would submit to you. That's just hatred. And I'm not saying that's what it is here, but you can consider that. And if that's what you think it was, then maybe it's not a reasonable fear.

The prosecutor continued his closing argument for several more minutes and then the trial judge instructed the jury on the applicable law.

In less than two hours the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder by premeditation and deliberation and/or by lying in wait. Defendant appealed his conviction.

Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to sustain his objections to the prosecutor's comments about race during closing argument. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed prejudicial error by overruling defendant's objections and by failing to instruct the jury to disregard the prosecutor's comments or to declare a mistrial. The Court of Appeals awarded defendant a new trial. The dissenting judge would have held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant's objections to the prosecutor's comments in closing argument.

The State now appeals. The issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion by overruling defendant's objections to the State's closing argument. We hold that the trial court did not commit prejudicial error and that the Court of Appeals erred by awarding defendant a new trial.

II. Analysis

"A challenge to the trial court's failure to sustain a defendant's objection to a comment made during the State's closing argument is reviewed for an abuse of discretion ...."

State v. Fletcher , 370 N.C. 313, 320, 807 S.E.2d 528, 534 (2017) (citing State v. Walters , 357 N.C. 68, 101, 588 S.E.2d 344, 364, cert. denied , 540 U.S. 971, 124 S.Ct. 442, 157 L.Ed. 2d 320 (2003) ). "In order to assess whether a trial court has abused its discretion when deciding a particular matter, this Court must determine if the ruling ‘could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.’ " State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 131, 558 S.E.2d 97, 106 (2002) (quoting State v. Burrus, 344 N.C. 79, 90, 472 S.E.2d 867, 875 (1996) ).

We conduct a two-part analysis to determine whether the trial court committed prejudicial error in overruling defendant's timely objection to the prosecutor's reference to race during the State's closing argument. See, e.g. , Fletcher , 370 N.C. at 320, 807 S.E.2d at 534 ; Jones, 355 N.C. at 131, 558 S.E.2d at 106. We " ‘first determine if the remarks were improper’ and then ‘determine if the remarks were of such a magnitude that their inclusion prejudiced [the] defendant.’ " Fletcher , 370 N.C. at 320, 807 S.E.2d at 534 (quoting Walters , 357 N.C. at 101, 588 S.E.2d at 364 ) (alteration in original). "Assuming that the trial court's refusal to sustain the defendant's objection was erroneous, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have acquitted him had the challenged argument not been permitted." Fletcher , 370 N.C. at 320, 807 S.E.2d at 534 (citing State v. Ratliff , 341 N.C. 610, 617, 461 S.E.2d 325, 329 (1995) ).

Here, we need not conduct the two-part analysis in its entirety. Because we determine that the analysis of prejudice is ultimately dispositive, we focus our attention there. See State v. Murrell , 362 N.C. 375, 392, 665 S.E.2d 61, 73 (2008) ("Even assuming, arguendo , the impropriety of the prosecutor's reference to Dr. Kramer, defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice."). See also State v. Peterson , 361 N.C. 587, 606–07, 652 S.E.2d 216, 229 (2007) ("Because we assume the argument was improper, we must determine whether the argument prejudiced defendant to the degree that he is entitled to a new trial.").² Thus, we assume without deciding that the prosecutor's comments about race were improper.

Neither the majority nor the...