State v. Courtney

478 N.J. Super. 81

311 A.3d 516

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. LADOHN E. COURTNEY, ERIADNA V. MENTOR, AND TOMMIE S. NEWSOME, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

DOCKET NO. A-3844-22

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division

Argued January 24, 2024—Decided February 23, 2024

On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment Nos. 23-02-0084, 23-02-0085, 23-02-0086 and 23-02-0087.

Before Judges Currier, Susswein and Vanek.

Milton Samuel Leibowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Milton Samuel Leibowitz, of counsel and on the brief).

Peter Thomas Blum, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent Ladohn E. Courtney (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Peter Thomas Blum, of counsel and on the brief).

Ruth Elizabeth Hunter, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for respondent Eriadna V. Mentor (Joseph E, Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Ruth Elizabeth Hunter, on the brief).

Ehrlich, Petriello, Gudin, Plaza & Reed, PC, attorneys for respondent Tommie S. Newsome, join in the briefs of respondents Ladohn E. Courtney and Eriadna V. Mentor.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SUSSWEIN, J.A.D.

[1] Under Article 1, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution—our State’s counterpart to the Fourth Amendment—police cannot conduct a search pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement once a vehicle has been towed away and impounded. State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 448-49, 126 A.3d 850 (2015). This appeal requires us to probe the scope and rationale of that restriction, presenting the novel question of whether police may conduct a search under the automobile exception when they are required to impound a vehicle pursuant to John’s Law,¹ but the vehicle has yet to be removed from the scene of the stop.

By leave granted, the State appeals from a June 29, 2023 Law Division order suppressing a loaded handgun found during a warrantless, non-consensual search of a vehicle that was pulled over for multiple traffic violations and erratic driving. The driver was arrested for DWI. The trial court ruled that because the vehicle was required to be impounded under John’s Law, "[t]here was no additional emergency or exigent circumstances that would have required a search on the side of the road." The trial court thus concluded the officers were required to obtain a search warrant even though the search occurred roadside.

After carefully reviewing the record in light of the plain language and underlying rationale of our Supreme Court’s pivotal decision in Witt, we reverse the suppression order. So long as police satisfy the foundational requirements of probable cause, spontaneity, and unforeseeability, the authority to conduct an automobile-exception search lapses only after the vehicle has been removed to a secure location, not in anticipation of such removal. We decline defendants’ request to create a new bright-line rule making vehicles subject to John’s Law categorically ineligible for an on-scene search under the automobile exception.

I.

We discern the pertinent facts from the suppression hearing record.² On the night of September 20, 2022, Cranford Police Officer Antonio Bellomo observed a white Dodge Durango travelling westbound on North Avenue towards the northbound ramp of the Garden State Parkway. The vehicle swerved from the northernmost lane that accesses the ramp and came to an abrupt stop in the right lane. The vehicle then crossed over the solid, white line and began heading towards the southbound ramp of the Parkway. Before the vehicle entered the ramp, Bellomo saw it swerving within the right lane of travel. Bellomo initiated a motor vehicle stop. The vehicle travelled slowly on the shoulder before coming to a complete stop.

Bellomo exited his patrol car and approached the passenger side of the Durango. He smelled alcohol emanating from the vehicle’s cabin. Bellomo asked the driver, Tommie S. Newsome,³ for his driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. Newsome provided his license and proof he rented the car at Newark airport.

While speaking to Newsome, Bellomo saw a half-empty bottle of cognac on the passenger-side floor. He ordered Newsome out of the car and asked him if he had anything to drink. Newsome said he had a drink at a restaurant. Bellomo smelled alcohol on Newsome’s breath. He administered sobriety tests, which New-some failed. Bellomo arrested Newsome for DWI.

Ladohn E. Courtney was in the rear passenger-side seat. Patrol Officer Folinusz, who came to provide backup, saw Courtney was not wearing a seatbelt. Folinusz ordered Courtney to present his driver’s license. A warrant check revealed an outstanding municipal court warrant. Courtney was placed under arrest and issued a summons for not wearing a seatbelt.

Bellomo ordered the front-seat passenger, Eriadna V. Mentor, to step out of the vehicle because it needed to be towed pursuant to John’s Law. Bellomo searched the vehicle while it was still on the side of the road and found a handgun loaded with six rounds under the front passenger seat. After securing the handgun, Bellomo continued searching the vehicle and found another open bottle of cognac.

Courtney, Newsome, and Mentor were charged by indictment with unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1). They were also charged with certain persons not to have a firearm based on prior convictions, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1).

Newsome filed a motion to suppress the handgun, which Courtney and Mentor joined. Following a suppression hearing, supplemental briefing, and oral argument, the trial court granted the motion to suppress. The court issued an oral ruling, concluding:

The [c]ourt believes that based on this … particular set of factual circumstances that has been presented, from the moment that Mr. Newsome was being arrested for [DWI] John’s Law kicked in, and as a result of John’s Law kicking in, [t]he [c]ourt reads [State v. Witt] to include when vehicles are towed and impounded. So it was immediately apparent at that moment, upon his removal from the vehicle, the smell of alcoholic beverages emanating from … Mr. Newsome, that was detected, his failure of the … balancing test, and then his subsequent. [.18 blood alcohol test level] when taken to the station, when he was arrested for [DWI,] at that point John's Law was triggered …. [I]t is the opinion of [t]he [c]ourt that because John’s Law was triggered [and] when vehicles are towed and impounded—and I'm expanding upon [Witt] in this respect, by just adding the following—when you know a vehicle is going to be towed and impounded, absent some exigency, a warrant must be secured …. I don’t even need to get there. When vehicles are towed and impounded that should have flipped the switch that required a warrant to be obtained for the search of anything else. It does not matter to [t]he [c]ourt where the vehicle was at this point, whether it was on the side of the Parkway, whether it was on the side of a residential street, whether it was anywhere. What is of import to [t]he [c]ourt is the fact that [Witt] specifically says towed and impounded vehicles must be searched only when a warrant [is] secured. This would be an entirely different conversation if this was not a situation where John's Law came into play. But I read these statutes in pari materia and I find that they are, for the purposes of this motion—again, a very fact-specific set of circumstances—are to be read together.

The trial court added:

[The officers] did not have the discretion to decide whether to impound and tow the vehicle. Rather, the vehicle was being towed as a matter of law. There was no additional emergency or exigent circumstances that would have required a search on the side of the road. It is the opinion of [t]he [c]ourt that based on the totality of the circumstances presented, in this particular matter, that the officers should have obtained a warrant for the search.

We granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal. The State raises the following contention for our consideration:

THE TRIAL COURT ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT[S’] MOTION TO SUPPRESS MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT IS BASED UPON AN INCORRECT INTERPRETATION OF [Witt].

II.

[2–4] We begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles governing this appeal. As a general matter, "[o]ur standard of review on a motion to suppress is deferential." State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 526, 267 A.3d 449 (2022). "[A]n appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court’s decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609, 252 A.3d 968 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243, 927 A.2d 1250 (2007)). We "defer[ ] to those findings in recognition of the trial court’s ‘opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.’ " Nyema, 249 N.J. at 526, 267 A.3d 449 (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244, 927 A.2d 1250); see also State v. Cohen, 254 N.J. 308, 318-19, 296 A.3d 480 (2023).

[5] In contrast to the deference owed to a trial court’s factual and credibility findings, we review a trial court’s legal conclusions de novo. State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 380, 162 A.3d 1058 (2017). We regard the trial court’s interpretation of Witt’s on-scene search requirement to be a legal conclusion to which we owe no special deference. Accordingly, we review the contours of the automobile-exception reform announced in Witt with a fresh set of eyes. See ibid.

[6–8] Turning to substantive legal principles, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution "protect against unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156, 164, ...