State v. Coyle

2018 Ohio 3194

STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee v. JAMES F. COYLE Defendant-Appellant

Appellate Case No. 27800

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

August 10, 2018

Trial Court Case No. 2017-CR-670

(Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)

OPINION

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by MICHAEL J. SCARPELLI, Atty. Reg. No. 0093662, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor's Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee

JAMES P. FLEISHER, Atty. Reg. No. 0059509, 6 North Main Street, 400 National City Center, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

TUCKER, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, James F. Coyle, appeals from his conviction on one count of abduction, a third degree felony in violation of R.C. 2905.02(A)(2). Raising a single assignment of error, Coyle argues that his conviction should be overturned because the State failed to prove each element of the offense, or in the alternative, because the jury drew unwarranted conclusions from the evidence it received. We find that the evidence justified the jury's verdict, and therefore, we affirm Coyle's conviction.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On February 1, 2017, Coyle's wife, Erin Coyle, filed a report with the Butler Township Police Department in which she alleged that, the night before, Coyle had physically abused and forcibly restrained her in their residence during a protracted marital dispute; she also alleged that, during a previous dispute on January 23, 2017, Coyle had destroyed a laptop computer belonging to her employer. Appellant's Br. 2-6; Appellee's Br. 1-4. The report led to the issuance of an indictment against Coyle by a Montgomery County grand jury on March 14, 2017, charging Coyle with one count of abduction in violation of R.C. 2905.02(A)(2); one count of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A); and one count of vandalism—related to the destruction of the laptop computer—in violation of R.C. 2909.05(B)(1)(a). Coyle's case proceeded to trial on September 11, 2017.

{¶ 3} At the conclusion of the trial two days later, the jury found Coyle guilty on the counts of abduction and vandalism, and not guilty on the count of domestic violence. Regarding the count of vandalism, the jury found that the laptop computer allegedly destroyed by Coyle had a monetary value of less than $1,000. Coyle had been indicted, however, for violating R.C. 2909.05(B)(1)(a), which states in relevant part that "[n]o person shall knowingly cause physical harm to property that is owned or possessed by another" if "the value of the property * * * is one thousand dollars or more." Citing the jury's determination that the computer was worth less than $1,000, Coyle moved for acquittal on the charge of vandalism, and the trial court sustained his motion in its verdict entry of September 15, 2017.

{¶ 4} On October 11, 2017, Coyle appeared for sentencing, and the court imposed community control sanctions for a term of no more than five years and ordered Coyle to pay a supervision fee of $250.00, as well as court costs. Coyle timely filed his notice of appeal to this court on November 8, 2017.

II. Analysis

{¶ 5} For his single assignment of error, Coyle contends that:

APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR ABDUCTION UNDER R.C. 2905.02(A)(2) IS BASED UPON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND/OR IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

{¶ 6} Coyle argues, first, that the jury's verdict of not guilty on the charge of domestic violence should be construed as a factual determination that his actions on the night of January 31, 2017, neither posed a risk of physical harm to his wife, nor caused her to experience fear. See Appellant's Br. 8. Second, Coyle argues that the State failed to prove, for any of three "potential incident[s] of abduction," that his conduct otherwise satisfied the elements of the offense. See id. at 9-13. He concludes, in the alternative, that even if the State offered nominal proof of each element of abduction, the jury's verdict on the charge cannot be reconciled with its verdict on the charge of domestic violence, demonstrating that the jury clearly lost its way in evaluating the evidence. See id. at 13.

{¶ 7} Sufficiency of the evidence "is the legal standard applied to determine whether * * * the evidence [in a given case] is [adequate] as a matter of law to support the jury['s] verdict." State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 113, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997), citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). On review of a challenge to a conviction based upon the sufficiency of the evidence, the " 'relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Id., quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶ 8} By contrast, in a challenge based on the weight of the evidence, an "appellate court acts as a 'thirteenth juror.' " State v. Jackson, 2015-Ohio-5490, 63 N.E.3d 410, ¶ 49 (2d Dist.), quoting Thompkins at 387. Accordingly, the appellate court must review the record; weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences; consider the credibility of witnesses; and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice warranting a new trial. Thompkins at 387, citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983); State v. Hill, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25172, 2013-Ohio-717, ¶ 8. A trial court's "judgment should be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence 'only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.' " Hill at ¶ 8, quoting Martin at 175.

{¶ 9} Although the appellate court "must defer to the factfinder's decisions whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses," the court nevertheless "may determine which of several competing inferences suggested by the evidence should be preferred." (Citation omitted.) State v. Cochran, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27023, 2017-Ohio-216, ¶ 6. A determination that a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence is also dispositive of the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence, because "a finding that a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a finding of sufficiency." (Citation omitted.) State v. McCrary, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-881, 2011-Ohio-3161, ¶ 11; State v. Miller, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25504, 2013-Ohio-5621, ¶ 48, citing McCrary at ¶ 11.

{¶ 10} In the first part of his argument, Coyle maintains that the jury's verdict of not guilty on the charge of domestic violence precluded the possibility that he had committed any act which would constitute the crime of abduction. See Appellant's Br. 8. A conviction for domestic violence under R.C. 2919.25(A) requires proof that the defendant knowingly caused, or attempted to cause, physical harm to a member of the defendant's family or household. Pursuant to R.C. 2905.02(A)(2), a conviction for abduction requires proof that the defendant—lacking any legal immunity, license or right—knowingly: (1) used force or made threats directed at another person; (2) restrained the other person's liberty; and (3) either created a risk that the other person would thereby suffer physical harm, or caused the other person to experience fear. By finding him not guilty of causing or attempting to cause physical harm to his wife, Coyle posits that the jury "effectively" indicated that "it did not believe" that he did anything to create a risk that his wife would be harmed, or to cause her to feel afraid. Appellant's Br. 8.

{¶ 11} Coyle's proposition lacks merit. A risk, according to R.C. 2901.01(A)(7), is "a significant possibility, as contrasted with a remote possibility, that a certain result may occur or that certain circumstances may exist."¹ Thus, to find Coyle guilty of abduction pursuant to R.C. 2905.02(A)(2) for creating a risk of physical harm to his wife, the jury did not have to believe that Coyle harmed her or even that he tried to harm her; instead, the jury simply had to find that Coyle put his wife in a position in which she faced "a significant possibility" of suffering injury, including the possibility that she might injure herself while attempting to escape from a restraint on her liberty.² See, e.g., People v. Sumler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123381, 30 N.E.3d 383, ¶ 26, 28-29, and 55-60 (finding that a defendant "created a significant danger" to another person by "forcing the [person] to ride in a vehicle at a high rate of speed through city streets," which created the possibility, among others, "that [the person] could have injured herself in attempting to escape from the speeding vehicle"). Likewise, to find Coyle guilty of abduction for inducing his wife to feel fear, the jury did not need to believe that he actually caused or attempted to cause her physical harm. Compare Wilson v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21443, 2007-Ohio-178, ¶ 21 (noting elements of a claim for civil assault); Vandiver v. Morgan Adhesive Co., 126 Ohio App.3d 634, 638, 710 N.E.2d 1219 (9th Dist.1998) (same).

{¶ 12} In the second part of his argument, Coyle maintains that the State failed to prove that his actions met the elements of R.C. 2905.02(A)(2) during any of the "threesituations" or incidents "that constitute[d] the abduction in this case," each of which occurred in the detached garage of the Coyles' residence. Appellant's Br. 9-13; Tr. 9:10-10:4, 22:2-22:20 and 305:2-305:19. The garage itself had a standard "pedestrian" entrance along with two bays for vehicles, one of which could be opened with a motorized door-opener and the other of which had to be manually opened. Tr. at 48:1-48:6 and...