State v. CSX Transp., Inc.

168 Ohio St.3d 543

200 N.E.3d 215

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee,

v.CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Appellant.

No. 2020-0608

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted April 28, 2021

Decided August 17, 2022

David W. Phillips, Union County Prosecuting Attorney, and Samantha M. Hobbs, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Winston & Strawn, L.L.P., and Andrew E. Tauber ; Mayer Brown, L.L.P., and Evan M. Tager ; and Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, L.L.P., Terrance K. Davis, and Nicholas T. Stack, Toledo, for appellant.

Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, and Zachery P. Keller, Deputy Solicitor General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost.

Gallagher Sharp, L.L.P., Joseph J. Santoro, and Richard C.O. Rezie, Cleveland, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Railroad Association.

Burns White, L.L.C., and Colleen A. Mountcastle, Cleveland; and Kathryn D. Kirmayer and Daniel Saphire, urging reversal for amicus curiae Association of American Railroads.

Kennedy, J., announcing the judgment of the court.

{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals, we are asked whether R.C. 5589.21 is preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (the "Termination Act"), 49 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., or the Federal Railroad Safety Act (the "Safety Act"), 49 U.S.C. 20101 et seq.

{¶ 2} With exceptions not applicable here, R.C. 5589.21 prohibits a stopped train from blocking a railroad crossing for more than five minutes; a violation of the statute is a first-degree misdemeanor, R.C. 5589.99. The General Assembly enacted this statute to enhance public safety by ensuring the unhindered flow of emergency responders across railroad crossings. R.C. 5589.20.

{¶ 3} The Termination Act created the Surface Transportation Board and grants the board exclusive jurisdiction over "transportation by rail carriers." 49 U.S.C. 10501. The Termination Act provides the exclusive remedies with respect to operating rules, practices, routes, services, and facilities of rail carriers and expressly preempts other federal and state laws in conflict with it. 49 U.S.C. 10501(b). Because R.C. 5589.21 regulates, manages, and governs rail traffic in this state by prescribing how long a train may stay stopped while blocking a crossing, it conflicts with and is expressly preempted by the Termination Act.

{¶ 4} The Safety Act provides a limited exception to the Termination Act's preemptive force, permitting the Secretary of Transportation and the states, where applicable, to regulate railroad safety. However, R.C. 5589.21 is a not a law related to railroad safety, because a limit on the amount of time that a train may occupy a crossing is not related to the safe operation of trains. Rather, "improper obstructions create uniquely different local safety problems by preventing the timely movement of ambulances, the vehicles of law enforcement officers and firefighters, and official and unofficial vehicles transporting health care officials and professionals." R.C. 5589.20. Although blocking a railroad crossing poses a threat to public safety, a statute prohibiting the blocking of a crossing does not fall under the federal Safety Act, because it does not affect the safety of railroad operations themselves or seek to reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents, see 49 U.S.C. 20101.

{¶ 5} In this case, the state charged appellant, CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX"), with violating R.C. 5589.21 on five occasions, but the trial court concluded that the Termination Act and the Safety Act preempted Ohio's antiblocking statute and dismissed the charges. The appellate court rejected the argument that federal law preempted R.C. 5589.21 and reversed the dismissal of the charges.

{¶ 6} However, because R.C. 5589.21 is preempted by federal law, we reverse the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's dismissal of the charges brought against CSX for violating R.C. 5589.21.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 7} In 2018, the state charged CSX with violating R.C. 5589.21 five times in Union County. CSX moved to dismiss the charges on the grounds that the Termination Act and the Safety Act preempt R.C. 5589.21. In support of its motion, CSX presented the affidavit of Blair Johnson, whose job duties include overseeing personnel responsible for moving trains in and out of the Honda plant near Marysville. He explained that CSX regularly delivers goods and supplies to the plant and that CSX's trains occasionally block grade crossings while loading and unloading at the plant and while entering and exiting it. He also noted that one of the alleged violations of R.C. 5589.21 occurred because a train had to block a crossing to allow another train using the same track to pass.

{¶ 8} The trial court granted CSX's motion, relying on state and federal cases holding that blocked-crossing statutes are preempted by federal law.

{¶ 9} The Third District Court of Appeals reversed, explaining that

it is our view that if any Ohio court is going to adopt and incorporate the judicial determination of other jurisdictions as the law of Ohio that under the [Termination Act], a railroad company has untrammeled discretion to block any rail crossing in any community in the state for any purpose, for any amount of time, regardless of its reasons or operational necessity, and regardless of the jeopardy to the public health, safety and welfare of the citizens caused by that blocked crossing; and that any legislation enacted by the duly elected state legislature to address those specific public health, safety and welfare concerns in terms which even remotely appear designed to influence or dissuade the behavior of the railroad company at such a crossing, is null and void ab initio , then the court making that ruling should be the Supreme Court of Ohio.

2020-Ohio-2665, 154 N.E.3d 327, ¶ 32.

{¶ 10} We accepted CSX's appeal to review two propositions of law:

1. R.C. 5589.21 is preempted by the [Interstate Commerce Commission] Termination Act.

2. R.C. 5589.21 is preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act.

See 159 Ohio St.3d 1486, 2020-Ohio-4232, 151 N.E.3d 635.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Standard of Review

{¶ 11} Federal preemption is a question of law.

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht , ––– U.S. ––––, –––, 139 S.Ct. 1668, 1680, 203 L.Ed.2d 822 (2019). We review questions of law de novo. State v. Codeluppi , 139 Ohio St.3d 165, 2014-Ohio-1574, 10 N.E.3d 691, ¶ 9.

B. Ohio's Antiblocking Statute

{¶ 12} R.C. 5589.21 provides:

(A) No railroad company shall obstruct, or permit or cause to be obstructed a public street, road, or highway, by permitting a railroad car, locomotive, or other obstruction to remain upon or across it for longer than five minutes, to the hindrance or inconvenience of travelers or a person passing along or upon such street, road, or highway.

(B) At the end of each five minute period of obstruction of a public street, road, or highway, each railroad company shall cause such railroad car, locomotive, or other obstruction to be removed for sufficient time, not less than three minutes, to allow the passage of persons and vehicles waiting to cross.

(C) This section does not apply to obstruction of a public street, road, or highway by a continuously moving through train or caused by circumstances wholly beyond the control of the railroad company, but does apply to other obstructions, including without limitation those caused by stopped trains and trains engaged in switching, loading, or unloading operations.

C. Federal Preemption of State Law

{¶ 13} The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties constitute "the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. Constitution, Article VI, cl. 2. "It is well established that within constitutional limits Congress may preempt state authority by so stating in express terms." Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm. , 461 U.S. 190, 203, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983).

D. The Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act

{¶ 14} The Termination Act abolished the Interstate Commerce Commission and created the Surface Transportation Board, 109 Stat. 803, to allow competitive rates for rail transportation, to minimize regulatory control, and to promote efficiency, without detriment to public health and safety, 49 U.S.C. 10101. The Termination Act grants the board exclusive jurisdiction over "transportation by rail carriers" and sets forth remedies with respect to operating rules, practices, routes, services, and facilities of rail carriers. 49 U.S.C. 10501(b)(1). "Transportation" is broadly defined in the Act to include the movement of "a locomotive, car, * * * or equipment of any kind related to the movement of passengers or property, or both, by rail." 49 U.S.C. 10102(9)(A). The board also has exclusive jurisdiction over the "construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, or facilities." 49 U.S.C. 10501(b)(2). The Act states, "Except as otherwise provided in this part [ 49 U.S.C. 10101 et seq. ], the remedies provided under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State law." 49 U.S.C. 10501(b).

{¶ 15} When construing the Termination Act, we have explained that the board has "exclusive jurisdiction over all physical instrumentalities possessed and all services provided by rail carriers that are related to the movement of passengers and/or property. This broad, sweeping language shows Congress's intent to preempt any state effort to regulate rail transportation." Girard v. Youngstown Belt Ry. Co. , 134 Ohio St.3d 79, 2012-Ohio-5370, 979 N.E.2d 1273, ¶ 22. The Act displaces " ‘ "regulation," i.e., those state laws that may reasonably be said to have the effect of "manag[ing]" or "govern[ing]" rail...