State v. D. Carter

548 P.3d 935

STATE of Washington, Appellant,

v.Kimonti D. CARTER, Respondent.

State of Washington, Appellant,

v.Shawn Dee Reite, Respondent.

No. 101777-4 (consolidated w/ 101859-2)

Supreme Court of Washington, En Bane.

Argued September 14, 2023

Filed May 23, 2024

West Codenotes

Recognized as Unconstitutional

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.95.030(1)

Appeal from Pierce County Superior Court, Docket No:97-1-02261-6, Honorable Stanley J. Rumbaugh, Bryan E. Chushcoff, Judges

Teresa Jeanne Chen, Pierce County Pros. Attorney’s Office, 930 Tacoma Ave. S. Rm. 946, Tacoma, WA, 98402-2102, for Appellant.

Jeffrey Erwin Ellis, Law Office of Alsept & Ellis, 1500 Sw. First Ave. Ste. 1000, Portland, OR, 97201-5834, for Respondent.

Pamela Beth Loginsky, Pierce County Pros. Attorney’s Office, 930 Tacoma Ave. S. Rm. 946, Tacoma, WA, 98402-2171, for Appelllant/Cross-Respondent.

Jeffrey Erwin Ellis, Law Office of Alsept & Ellis, 1500 Sw. First Ave. Ste., 1000, Portland, OR, 97201-5834, for Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

Gregory Kennedy Ziser, Wash. State Attorney General’s Office, 1125 Washington St. Se., Olympia, WA, 98501-2283, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Wa Indeterminate Sentence Review Board.

Gregory Kennedy Ziser, Wash. State Attorney General’s Office, 1125 Washington St. Se, Olympia, WA, 98501-2283, for Other Parties.

MONTOYA-LEWIS, J.

¶1 Kimonti Dennis Carter and Shawn Dee Reite ask us to give depth to the sentiment that " ‘youth is more than a chronological fact.’ " Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 476, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1982)). While both committed devastating crimes in their very young adult years, neither Carter nor Reite come before us as young people today, having both served decades in prison. Today, as adults in their 40s and 50s, both ask this court to affirm their determinate sentences, after the superior courts recognized at resentencing that they demonstrated an ability to transform through deep reflection, accountability, and a commitment to change during their decades in prison. We affirm.

¶2 "[Youth] is a moment and ‘condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and psychological damage,’ " but "its ‘signature qualities’ are all ‘transient,’ " as youth are malleable and have a heightened capacity to transform who they are and how they walk through life. Id. (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115, 102 S.Ct. 869; Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 125 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1993)). In this case, we are presented with two individuals who demonstrate that power of transformation.

¶3 Carter and Reite were both originally sentenced to mandatory life without parole (LWOP) sentences for aggravated first degree murders they committed between the ages of 18 and 20. After they were sentenced, we held in In re Personal Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wash.2d 305, 307, 326, 482 P.3d 276 (2021) (plurality opinion), that such mandatory sentences were unconstitutional for their age group and that courts must consider a defendant’s youthfulness. Upon considering Carter’s and Reite’s mitigating qualities of youth and demonstrated commitment to change, the superior courts resentenced both to determinate sentences. The State appealed both resentencing decisions.

¶4 Primarily at issue is whether the superior court had the statutory authority to impose determinate sentences for aggravated first degree murder. In addition, at issue is whether the court had authority to resentence Carter’s other convictions, whether the court must vacate Caller’s original sentence, and whether the court could impose community custody on Reite.

¶5 Consistent with our precedent and recognition of youth’s heightened capacity for change, we hold that the superior courts had the statutory authority to impose determinate sentences for aggravated first degree murder for Carter and Reite, and with respect to Reite, that the superior court did not err, despite finding that her youth at the time did not substantially mitigate her crimes. We also hold that the superior court had the authority to resentence Carter on his other convictions and that the State may challenge the superior court’s decision to vacate Carter’s original sentence, but the superior court’s decision was not error. Last, we hold that the superior court improperly imposed three years of community custody on Reite because this was unauthorized by statute for the crime of conviction. Therefore, we affirm the superior court that sentenced Carter. We also affirm the superior court that sentenced Reite for all but the imposition of community custody; on that matter, we reverse and remand to the superior court only for purposes of striking the community custody term.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶6 In 1990, a jury convicted Reite of aggravated first degree murder. In 1998, again after a jury trial, Carter was also convicted of aggravated first degree murder.

A. Caller’s Original Sentence

¶7 In 1997, two months after Carter turned 18 years old, he was riding in the passenger seat of a car with fellow gang members, when he shot a gun at a car he believed held rival gang members. Instead, the car was occupied by five people, none of whom were gang members. Three people in the other car were injured, and Corey Pittman was killed.

¶8 In 1998, a jury convicted Carter of aggravated first degree murder of Pittman, four counts of first degree assault with firearm enhancements for each of the individuals in the car with Pittman, and unlawful possession of a firearm. 1 Clerk’s Papers (CP) (Carter) at 20-22. The superior court initially imposed the maximum sentence for all convictions to be served consecutive to each other, including mandatory LWOP on the aggravated first degree murder conviction as required under RCW 10.95.030.¹ Id. at 20-21, 26, 38-39.

B. Reite’s Original Sentence

¶9 In 1988, when Reite was 20 years old, she shot and killed her mother and her mother’s partner. Reite had been taking out credit cards in her mother’s name and incurring debt, and when her mother discovered this, she insisted that Reite tell Reite’s husband and that they pay off the debt. Reite wanted to avoid telling her husband because she was concerned that it would upset him and when he became upset, he tended to drink and become violent. Reite’s actions were an attempt to cover up the theft.

¶10 In 1990, a jury convicted Reite of two counts of aggravated first degree murder. 1 CP (Reite) at 680-81, 683. The superior court initially imposed a sentence of mandatory LWOP. Id. at 709-10, 712.

C. Our Decision in Monschke

¶11 In 2021, we held in Monschke that the life without release mandate from RCW 10.95.030 is unconstitutional when applied to 18-to 20-year-old offenders because it denies discretion to consider the mitigating qualities of youth in imposing sentences, in violation of constitutional cruel and unusual punishment principles. 197 Wash.2d at 306-07, 326, 482 P.3d 276.²

D. Carter’s Resentencing

¶12 Pursuant to Monschke, in 2021, Carter filed a CrR 7.8 motion asking the superior court to impose a determinate sentence on the basis that his youthfulness contributed to his offenses. After a hearing and oral ruling, the court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law, resentencing Carter on all of the 1998 convictions based on several mitigating factors of youth and his rehabilitation in prison.

¶13 First, the superior court found that Carter committed the crime impulsively rather than as a result of a long-term plan. The court noted that the drive-by shooting "was a spur-of-the-moment, somewhat opportunistic event" where Carter mistook the occupants of the car as rival gang members and began to shoot indiscriminately. 1 Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) (Carter) at 88; Suppl. CP (Carter) at 802. There was no evidence that Carter considered the risk this behavior posed to neighboring residents, nor did he take any steps to conceal himself or prevent identification of the car they were in. Consequently, the court found that "the entire circumstance reflects impetuosity, a clear failure to appreciate risks and consequences." 1 VRP (Carter) at 88; Suppl. CP (Carter) at 803.

¶14 Second, the court found that the nature of Carter’s surrounding environment "put him at great risk of juvenile crime and materially contributed to his conduct." 1 VRP (Carter) at 89-91; Suppl. CP (Carter) at 803-04. Carter was raised by a single mother in the Tacoma Hilltop neighborhood, surrounded by violence, poverty, drugs, and gang activity. He was initiated into a gang at just 11 or 12 years old and remained involved as a means of survival. When his mother pushed Carter to go to school at age 12, other gang members arrived at her doorstep and told her that he was coming with them and not going to school. Carter never had the opportunity to go to school and instead spent his teenage years in juvenile detention facilities, where he later earned his GED.

¶15 Third, the court found that peer pressure affected Carter’s culpability. As a gang member from the young age of 11, Carter was highly influenced by older members of the gang, which impacted his judgment and behavior.

¶16 The court also found that Carter has demonstrated "prodigious efforts and progress of rehabilitation, self-awareness and self-improvement" over the last quarter of a century. 1 VRP (Carter) at 93; Suppl. CP (Carter) at 805. For instance, he is a recognized leader among his peers as the President of the Black Prisoners’ Caucus, he has created educational programs where incarcerated individuals teach classes to other incarcerated individuals to obtain college credit, and he has organized youth summits to talk about crucial steps to build stronger relationships and support for justice-impacted youth. Carter’s commitment "to understanding and owning his own behavior and embarking on radical change was done at a time when there was no reason for him to...