State v. D.L.H.

327 P.3d 573

761 Utah Adv. Rep. 46

STATE of Utah, in the interest of D.L.H., a person under eighteen years of age.State of Utah, Appellee,

v.D.L.H., Appellant.

No. 20120890–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

May 22, 2014.

Scott L. Wiggins, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.

Matthew T. Johnson, for Appellee ¹.

Judge STEPHEN L. ROTH authored this Opinion, in which Judge JOHN A. PEARCE and Senior Judge RUSSELL W. BENCH concurred.²

Opinion

ROTH, Judge:

¶ 1 D.L.H. appeals from the juvenile court's denial of his petition for expungement of his juvenile record. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In 2009, D.L.H. admitted to allegations of serious child abuse against three very young children. The juvenile court committed D.L.H. to juvenile detention for thirty days but suspended that commitment in favor of probation, which required D.L.H. to, among other things, submit to psychological evaluations and attend counseling. At a review hearing in February 2010, the court set a July completion date for all of D.L.H.'s probation obligations. D.L.H. performed well enough on probation that in May, his probation officer recommended that the court consider terminating probation early: D.L.H. “has completed his therapy and all obligations to the court” and “has demonstrated through his behavior that he is no longer in need of the supervision of the probation department.” On that recommendation, the juvenile court released D.L.H. from probation early, terminating its continuing jurisdiction.

¶ 3 In 2012, after D.L.H. turned eighteen, he petitioned the juvenile court for expungement of his juvenile record. A person who was adjudicated as a minor is eligible for expungement of the juvenile record upon that person's eighteenth birthday and the passage of one year since the termination of the juvenile court's jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 78A–6–1105(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2012). At the expungement hearing, D.L.H. testified that he had successfully completed probation two years before and had not had any subsequent contact with law enforcement. In the meantime, he had completed high school and was attending college. He also held part-time employment. D.L.H. submitted a report recently prepared by a licensed clinical social worker (the Report). The Report detailed the conduct for which D.L.H. had been placed on probation three years earlier and, based on D.L.H.'s response to treatment and subsequent good behavior, concluded that, from a clinical perspective, his risk of recidivism was then as low as it would ever be. Though they had been notified, none of the victims or their parents appeared at the expungement hearing or otherwise filed any objection. The county prosecutor confirmed that D.L.H. had not had any subsequent contact with law enforcement and that he understood that the Report predicted a low risk of D.L.H. repeating his earlier conduct. Ultimately, however, the prosecutor expressed no opinion and deferred to the juvenile court judge on whether D.L.H's record ought to be expunged, stating, “[W]e'll just submit it to your honor.”

¶ 4 The judge denied the petition for expungement. In doing so, the judge orally explained his reasoning:

Well, first of all, you know, I commend you for going through your ... treatment ... and doing well in school and those kinds of things; but one of the things that the Court takes into consideration is the nature and seriousness of the offense.

In this particular incident, there were three victims, so we're talking about multiple victims, multiple abuses with at least one of the victims, and we're talking about very young victims as well; a one-year-old infant, a two-year-old boy, and [a third victim] two or three years old.

Given those factors, I'm not going to grant your petition for expungement. I'm denying that based upon the ... serious nature of the offense and the multiplicity of the offense, and the multiplicity of the victims. So that will be the order. Your petition for expungement will be denied.

D.L.H. appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 5 D.L.H. argues that the juvenile court misinterpreted the statutory requirements for granting a petition for expungement.D.L.H. also contends that the juvenile court failed to consider significant evidence that weighed in favor of granting his petition. The juvenile court's “interpretation ... of a statute is a question of law that we review for correctness.” In re A.M., 2009 UT App 118, ¶ 6, 208 P.3d 1058 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, when a juvenile court has properly interpreted and applied the statute, we will disturb its denial of an expungement petition only for abuse of discretion. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 78A–6–1105(2)(b) (explaining that a juvenile court may grant a petition for expungement only if “the rehabilitation of the petitioner has been attained to the satisfaction of the court”); cf. Horgan v. Sandy City, 2012 UT App 210, ¶ 2, 283 P.3d 1079 (per curiam) (explaining that decisions regarding expungement of an adult's record of arrest, investigation, or detention will not be set aside unless the district court abuses its broad discretion).

ANALYSIS

¶ 6 The Juvenile Court Act (the Act) permits “[a] person who has been adjudicated” by the juvenile court to “petition the court for the expungement of the person's juvenile court record” once he or she “reach[es] 18 years of age” and at least “one year has elapsed from the date of termination of the [juvenile court's] continuing jurisdiction.” Utah Code Ann. § 78A–6–1105(1)(a). Once a petition has been filed, the court must notify the county attorney as well as any victims and provide them an opportunity to testify at a hearing on the petition. Id. § 78A–6–1105(1)(f)(i)(B), (f)(ii), (2)(a). The Act then sets out what the court must consider in deciding whether to grant the petition:

In deciding whether to grant a petition for expungement, the court shall consider whether the rehabilitation of the petitioner has been attained to the satisfaction of the court, taking into consideration the petitioner's response to programs and treatment, the petitioner's behavior subsequent to adjudication, and the nature and seriousness of the conduct.

Id. § 78A–6–1105(2)(b).

I. Interpretation of the Statute

¶ 7 D.L.H. first asserts that the juvenile court misinterpreted the provision of the expungement statute that identifies the factors the court must consider in determining whether an expungement ought to be granted. Specifically, D.L.H. contends that the court erred in giving more weight to the third factor—“the nature and seriousness of the conduct”—than the other two because, according to D.L.H., “[t]he evident intent of the statute is that the juvenile court ... consider each of these specifically stated elements or factors ... [without giving] any one element or factor ... greater weight than any of the other elements or factors.”

¶ 8 When interpreting a statute, our first goal is to give effect to the statute's plain language. Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 08, ¶ 36, 322 P.3d 728. In doing so, we “presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and read each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.” In re J.M.S., 2011 UT 75, ¶ 13, 280 P.3d 410.

¶ 9 The language of the expungement statute suggests that a juvenile court has considerable discretion: “[I]n deciding whether to grant a petition for expungement, the court shall consider whether the rehabilitation of the petitioner has been attained to the satisfaction of the court.... ” Utah Code Ann. § 78A–6–1105(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2012) (emphasis added); cf. Black's Law Dictionary 1398–99 (9th ed.2009) (defining “rehabilitation” as “[t]he process of seeking to improve a criminal's character and outlook so that he or she can function in society without committing other crimes”). The expungement statute then identifies three factors that the court must consider in making that determination: “the petitioner's response to programs and treatment, the petitioner's behavior subsequent to adjudication, and the nature and seriousness of the conduct.” Utah Code Ann. § 78A–6–1105(2)(b). In light of the juvenile court's responsibility to determine whether the evidence demonstrates that petitioner has been rehabilitated “to the satisfaction of the court,” id., those factors must be subject to balancing, with each factor being afforded the weight the court deems appropriate. Cf. State v. Newland, 2010 UT App 380, ¶ 26, 253 P.3d 71 (noting that in applying a balancing test, a court should consider all of the factors but that the factors are not necessarily of “mathematically equal importance”); State v. Perkins, 2014 UT App 60, ¶¶ 19–20, 322 P.3d 1184 (explaining that while imposition of consecutive sentences requires consideration of a number of statutory factors, including the nature of the crime and the number of victims, along with the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant, the court's “discretion [in balancing those factors] is not to be surrendered to a mathematical formula by which numbers of circumstances rather than weight of circumstances are determinative” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶ 10 Our conclusion that the expungement statute requires the juvenile court to weigh and balance the described factors rather than simply add them up seems compelled by the nature of the second and third factors. Unlike the first factor—“the petitioner's response to programs and treatment,” Utah Code Ann. § 78A–6–1105(2)(b)—which is usually fixed by the time an expungement petition is filed, the second factor—“the petitioner's behavior subsequent to adjudication,” id.—is dynamic. Thus, in many circumstances, the weight to be given the second factor in determining whether a petitioner has been rehabilitated depends to a significant degree on the passage of time since the juvenile court's jurisdiction terminated. For instance, a short period of good behavior may be less significant than a prolonged one...