State v. Danielson

1

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. SABRA KAYE DANIELSON, Appellant.

No. 57675-9-II

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2

October 22, 2024

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Veljacic, A.C.J.

Sabra Danielson became eligible to have her drug possession conviction and her legal financial obligations (LFOs) reimbursed when our Supreme Court issued its decision in State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021). However, the trial court only refunded her for the portion of her LFOs that she paid in cash, but denied her reimbursement for community service hours she completed to pay off the LFOs pursuant to an LFO payment plan approved by the court. Danielson appeals the court's decision. We hold that (1) CrR 7.8 is the exclusive procedural means for seeking a refund and cancellation of Blake LFOs, (2) the State was not unjustly enriched at Danielson's expense, and (3) Danielson has not shown that denial of her request for reimbursement for community service hours violated due process or equal protection. We affirm.

FACTS

In 2003, Danielson pled guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced her to 58 days of confinement with credit for 28 days served. The remaining 30 days were converted to 240 community service hours. The court found her to be indigent and imposed $1,060 in LFOs.^[1]

Two years later, Danielson had completed her community service but still had to pay off the remainder of her LFOs. The trial court believed that Danielson completed a total of 243.5 community service hours, and converted the excess 3.5 hours to satisfy $25.06 toward her LFOs. Because of her financial situation, the court allowed her to pay off the LFOs with additional community service time worth $7.16 per hour. Ultimately, Danielson worked for an additional 15.5 hours for a total of $110.98 toward her LFOs.

In 2021, our Supreme Court decided Blake, which held that Washington's strict liability drug possession statute was unconstitutional. 197 Wn.2d at 183. In light of this decision, Danielson moved to vacate her conviction under CrR 7.8. She also requested a refund for her LFOs, including compensation for the community service work she completed toward paying those LFOs.

The trial court found that Danielson was entitled to reimbursement for the cash payments. However, it found that she was not entitled to reimbursement for the excess community service, reasoning that work could not form the basis of a claim for restitution for unjust enrichment. The court's order reads:

1. The conviction for unlawful possession of controlled substance is void and should be vacated.

2. Pursuant to Nelson v Colorado, 581 U.S. [128] 137 S.Ct. 1249, 197 L.Ed.2d 611 (2017)[], the defendant is entitled to recovery from the state of all payments made towards LFO[]s imposed as a result of the vacated conviction . . .

3. When a criminal conviction is invalidated by a reviewing court and no retrial will occur, is the State obliged to refund fees, court costs, and restitution exacted from the defendant upon, and as a consequence of, the conviction? Our answer is yes.

4. However, consistent with RAP 12.8 and State v Hecht, 2 [Wn. App. 2d] 359, 367, 409 P.3d 1146 (2018) this applies only to "property transferred between the parties[."]

Clerk's Papers (CP) at 9.

Danielson appeals.

ANALYSIS

I. CrR 7.8

As an initial matter, the State argues that Danielson's claim may not be raised in a CrR 7.8 motion to vacate. It asserts that the "return of property in the form of cash for cash paid as recognized at common law and RAP 12.8, a claim for monetary compensation (or restitution based upon unjust enrichment) is civil in nature and may not be raised in a criminal case as relief from judgment or order under CrR 7.8." Br. of Resp't at 9 (footnote omitted). Danielson responds that CrR 7.8 is the sole mechanism by which the superior courts provide for relief from a criminal judgment or order. We agree with Danielson that CrR 7.8 is the correct and exclusive procedural means for asserting her claim for relief.

CrR 7.8 is the mechanism by which the superior courts provide relief from a criminal judgment or order. CrR 7.8 allows vacation of judgments on "[a]pplication . . . made by motion stating the grounds upon which relief is asked, and supported by affidavits setting forth a concise statement of the facts or errors upon which the motion is based." CrR 7.8(c)(1). Division One of this court recently held that CrR 7.8 is the exclusive procedural means by which to seek refund and cancellation of superior court imposed Blake LFOs. Civil Survival Project v. State, 24 Wn.App. 2d 564, 578, 520 P.3d 1066 (2022), review denied, 2 Wn.3d 1011 (2023).

In Civil Survival Project, the court reasoned that CrR 7.8 "clearly applies to the reconsideration of constitutionally invalid convictions" because it "explicitly contemplates being used to address precisely this sort of issue: 'A defendant is entitled to relief under subsection (i) where the person . . . is serving a sentence for a conviction under a statute determined to be void, invalid, or unconstitutional by [the courts].'" Id. at 578 (emphasis in original) (quoting CrR 7.8(c)(2)). We agree with the reasoning in Civil Survival Project and adopt it here.

We hold that CrR 7.8 is the correct and exclusive procedural means by which to seek refund and cancellation of superior court imposed Blake LFOs.^[2]

II. Unjust Enrichment

Danielson argues that she should be reimbursed because the State was unjustly enriched at her expense. She alleges that because she performed labor to satisfy a judgment, that labor conferred a benefit on her community and the State. We disagree.

In denying reimbursement to Danielson for her community service hours, the trial court based its decision on Hecht, 2 Wn.App. 2d 359. In that case, the defendant was convicted of patronizing a prostitute and felony harassment. Id. at 361-62. As part of his sentence, Hecht was required to attend an educational intervention,^[3] pay LFOs, obtain an human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) test, and perform community service. Id. at 362. However, his conviction was reversed due to prosecutorial misconduct. Id. Hecht filed a motion under RAP 12.8^[4] for restitution of court imposed financial obligations as well as his legal fees, deterioration of his emotional and physical health, and unwarranted community service and community supervision. Id. The trial court concluded that he was not entitled to the requested restitution. Id. at 363. Hecht challenged the decision on appeal. Id. at 366.

On appeal, Division One of this court applied principles from the Restatement of Restitution in analyzing the applicability of RAP 12.8 to Hecht's claim.^[5] Id. at 367. RAP 12.8 reads:

If a party [seeking restitution] has voluntarily or involuntarily partially or wholly satisfied a trial court decision which is modified by the appellate court, the trial court shall enter orders and authorize the issuance of process appropriate to restore to the party any property taken from that party, the value of the property, or in appropriate circumstances, provide restitution.

In analyzing the meaning of this provision, as well as other Restatement principles, the court concluded that Hecht was entitled to reimbursement for the amount he paid in satisfaction of his judgment and sentence: the LFOs, cost of the blood draw, and educational intervention tuition. Id. at 368. Relying on Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. 128, 135-36, 137 S.Ct. 1249, 197 L.Ed.2d 611 (2017), the court reasoned that a party unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution, and when a criminal conviction is overturned, the State is obliged to refund fees and court costs as a consequence of that conviction because the State no longer has a legal claim to this property. Id. The court also concluded that this was the extent of the restitution owed:

[Hecht] is not entitled to recover his legal fees, compensation for his community service and community supervision, or compensation for emotional and physical deterioration. While Hecht may have suffered these losses as consequences of his convictions, they were not paid in satisfaction of his judgment and the State was not unjustly enriched by them. Hecht's entitled restitution is the amount he paid, not the amount he claims to have lost as a result of his convictions.

Id. (emphasis added).

Here, while allowing reimbursement for cash Danielson paid, the trial court denied her reimbursement for community service hours worked. The court reasoned that the State is obliged to refund fees, court costs, and restitution exacted from the defendant upon and as a consequence of an invalidated conviction, but "consistent with RAP 12.8 and [Hecht, 2 Wn.App. 2d 359], this applies only to 'property transferred between the parties.'" CP at 9.

RAP 12.8 aside, the trial court denied the defendant in Hecht reimbursement for community service hours because (1) "they were not paid in satisfaction of his judgment" and (2) "the State was not unjustly enriched by them." 2 Wn.App. 2d at 368. The second criteria is not satisfied when applied to Danielson's case.

Unjust enrichment typically involves: "a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and the acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without the payment of its value." Young v. Young, 164 Wn.2d 477, 484, 191 P.3d 1258 (2008).

Conferring a benefit is when a person "gives to the other possession of or some other interest in money, land chattels, or choses in action, performs services beneficial to or...