State v. Davis

232 W.Va. 398

752 S.E.2d 429

STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Respondent

v.Ronald C. DAVIS, Defendant Below, Petitioner.

No. 11–1445.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted Oct. 2, 2013.

Decided Nov. 21, 2013.

Syllabus by the Court

1. “In reviewing challenges to findings and rulings made by a circuit court, we apply a two-pronged deferential standard of review. We review the rulings of the circuit court concerning a new trial and its conclusion as to the existence of reversible error under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the circuit court's underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review.” Syl. pt. 3, State v. Vance, 207 W.Va. 640, 535 S.E.2d 484 (2000).

2. “To trigger application of the ‘plain error’ doctrine, there must be (1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Syl. pt. 7, State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995).

3. “A preliminary examination conducted pursuant to Rule 5.1 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure serves to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it; the purpose of such an examination is not to provide the defendant with discovery of the nature of the State's case against the defendant, although discovery may be a by-product of the preliminary examination.” Syl. pt. 1, Desper v. State, 173 W.Va. 494, 318 S.E.2d 437 (1984).

4. “In challenging probable cause at a preliminary examination conducted pursuant to Rule 5.1 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant has a right to cross-examine witnesses for the State and to introduce evidence; the defendant is not entitled during the preliminary examination to explore testimony solely for discovery purposes. The magistrate at the preliminary examination has discretion to limit such testimony to the probable cause issue, and the magistrate may properly require the defendant to explain the relevance to probable cause of the testimony the defendant seeks to elicit.” Syl. pt. 2, Desper v. State, 173 W.Va. 494, 318 S.E.2d 437 (1984).

5. “ ‘ “ ‘Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are largely within a trial court's sound discretion and should not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion.’ State v. Louk, 171 W.Va. 639 [643,] 301 S.E.2d 596, 599 (1983).” Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Peyatt, 173 W.Va. 317, 315 S.E.2d 574 (1983).' Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Shrewsbury, 213 W.Va. 327, 582 S.E.2d 774, 213 W.Va. 327 (2003).” Syl. pt. 1, State v. Kaufman, 227 W.Va. 537, 711 S.E.2d 607 (2011).

6. “When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court should construe all facts in the light most favorable to the State, as it was the prevailing party below. Because of the highly fact-specific nature of a motion to suppress, particular deference is given to the findings of the circuit court because it had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and to hear testimony on the issues. Therefore, the circuit court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error.” Syl. pt. 1, State v. Lacy, 196 W.Va. 104, 468 S.E.2d 719 (1996).

7. “On appeal, legal conclusions made with regard to suppression determinations are reviewed de novo. Factual determinations upon which these legal conclusions are based are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. In addition, factual findings based, at least in part, on determinations of witness credibility are accorded great deference.” Syl. pt. 3, State v. Stuart, 192 W.Va. 428, 452 S.E.2d 886 (1994).

8. “A trial court's determination of whether a custodial interrogation environment exists for purposes of giving Miranda warnings to a suspect is based upon whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have considered his or her freedom of action curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest.” Syl. pt. 1, State v. Middleton, 220 W.Va. 89, 640 S.E.2d 152 (2006), overruled on other grounds by State v. Eilola, 226 W.Va. 698, 704 S.E.2d 698 (2010).

9. “The factors to be considered by the trial court in making a determination of whether a custodial interrogation environment exists, while not all-inclusive, include: the location and length of questioning; the nature of the questioning as it relates to the suspected offense; the number of police officers present; the use or absence of force or physical restraint by the police officers; the suspect's verbal and nonverbal responses to the police officers; and the length of time between the questioning and formal arrest.” Syl. pt. 1, State v. Middleton, 220 W.Va. 89, 640 S.E.2d 152 (2006), overruled on other grounds by State v. Eilola, 226 W.Va. 698, 704 S.E.2d 698 (2010).

10. “When the State had or should have had evidence requested by a criminal defendant but the evidence no longer exists when the defendant seeks its production, a trial court must determine (1) whether the requested material, if in the possession of the State at the time of the defendant's request for it, would have been subject to disclosure under either West Virginia Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 or case law; (2) whether the State had a duty to preserve the material; and (3) if the State did have a duty to preserve the material, whether the duty was breached and what consequences should flow from the breach. In determining what consequences should flow from the State's breach of its duty to preserve evidence, a trial court should consider (1) the degree of negligence or bad faith involved; (2) the importance of the missing evidence considering the probative value and reliability of secondary or substitute evidence that remains available; and (3) the sufficiency of the other evidence produced at the trial to sustain the conviction.” Syl. pt. 2, State v. Osakalumi, 194 W.Va. 758, 461 S.E.2d 504 (1995).

11. “When the government performs a complicated test on evidence that is important to the determination of guilty, and in doing so destroys the possibility of an independent replication of the test, the government must preserve as much documentation of the test as is reasonably possible to allow for a full and fair examination of the results by a defendant and his experts.” Syl. pt. 4, State v. Thomas, 187 W.Va. 686, 421 S.E.2d 227 (1992).

12. “A prosecution that withholds evidence which if made available would tend to exculpate an accused by creating a reasonable doubt as to his guilt violates due process of law under Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution.” Syl. pt. 4, State v. Hatfield, 169 W.Va. 191, 286 S.E.2d 402 (1982).

13. “A trial court's instructions to the jury must be a correct statement of the law and supported by the evidence. Jury instructions are reviewed by determining whether the charge, reviewed as a whole, sufficiently instructed the jury so they understood the issues involved and were not mislead by the law. A jury instruction cannot be dissected on appeal; instead, the entire instruction is looked at when determining its accuracy. A trial court, therefore, has broad discretion in formulating its charge to the jury, so long as the charge accurately reflects the law. Deference is given to a trial court's discretion concerning the specific wording of the instruction, and the precise extent and character of any specific instruction will be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.” Syl. pt. 4, State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995).

14. “Instructions must be based upon the evidence and an instruction which is not supported by evidence should not be given.” Syl. pt. 4, State v. Collins, 154 W.Va. 771, 180 S.E.2d 54 (1971).

15. “A trial court exercising appropriate judicial concern for the constitutional right to testify should seek to assure that a defendant's waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent by advising the defendant outside the presence of the jury that he has a right to testify, that if he wants to testify then no one can prevent him from doing so, that if he testifies the prosecution will be allowed to cross-examine him. In connection with the privilege against self-incrimination, the defendant should also be advised that he has a right not to testify and that if he does not testify then the jury can be instructed about that right.” Syl. pt. 7, State v. Neuman, 179 W.Va. 580, 371 S.E.2d 77 (1988).

Herbert L. Hively, Jr., Esq., Charleston, WV, Kennand L. Skeen, II., Esq., Ripley, WV, for the Petitioner.

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General, Christopher S. Doddrill, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, WV, for the Respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner Ronald C. Davis appeals his jury conviction for first degree murder and first degree arson involving a fire that killed his girlfriend, Cathy Parsons (“Ms. Parsons”). He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility for parole on the murder conviction and a determinate term of 20 years in prison for the arson conviction. After a careful review of the record submitted for review, the briefs of counsel, the arguments of counsel and the law on these matters, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 23, 2010, the mobile home in which Cathy Parsons and the petitioner lived was engulfed in flames. On the day of the fire Ms. Parsons' daughter, Eltina Harper, and son-in-law, Allen Michael Harper, who lived 15 to 25 feet from Ms. Parsons' residence, heard pounding, loud talk and a scream emanating from the neighboring mobile home. Mrs. Harper looked toward her mother's home and saw the petitioner bending over on the front porch, and then saw a ball of flame erupt above him. Mr. Harper ran outside to help after hearing the noises. He found the door to the burning mobile home barricaded and the windows blocked. Although the Harpers and others tried to get...