State v. Davis

96 N.E.3d 1280

2017 Ohio 7572

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Joshua B. DAVIS, Defendant–Appellant

No. 2016CA00143

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fifth District, Stark County.

September 11, 2017

JOHN D. FERRERO, PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, BY RENEE M. WATSON, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 110 Central Plaza S., Ste. 510, Canton, OH 44702, For Plaintiff–Appellee.

BARRY T. WAKSER, Stark County Public Defender, 201 Cleveland Ave. S.W., Ste, 104, Canton, OH 44702, For Defendant–Appellant.

JUDGES: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J., Hon. William B. Hoffman, J., Hon. John W. Wise, J.

OPINION

Gwin, P.J.{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Joshua Brewer Davis ["Davis"] appeals the June 21, 2016 Judgment Entry entered by the Stark County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to suppress. Plaintiff-appellee is the state of Ohio.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On March 16, 2016, Officer John Koehler of the Uniontown Police Department responded to a disturbance call at 1349 Sugarbush Avenue. The call reported two irate females knocking on doors in the early morning hours, claiming to have been abducted, injected with drugs and possibly chased.

{¶ 3} Officer Koehler met the females outside the residence of the caller. The females were identified as Ashley Hutchison and Kayla Hill. Officer Koehler observed the women appeared to be under the influence of either drugs or alcohol. The females claimed to have been abducted by a man, identified as "Josh," who "shot them up" with something. They maintained they were being chased by a man with a flashlight, and feared they would be raped or killed. Neighbors also reported seeing a man with a flashlight.

{¶ 4} Officer Koehler asked the females to direct him to the house. The women pointed to the residence at 13425 Sugarbush Avenue Northwest. The women told the officers they had gone to the residence in the evening to hang out and play pool with Davis.¹ After ingesting the methamphetamine, the women stated they felt paranoid and suffered from a headache. Ashley Hutchison showered, and afterwards heard Kayla Hill and Davis arguing over a purse Hill found. The purse contained a gun, and Hill told Davis the purse did not belong to her. The women further reported observing a shotgun inside the residence. Believing someone else was inside the house based upon the purse being found there and the shotgun, the women left carrying a knife with them.

{¶ 5} Chief Howard Britt of the Uniontown Police Department arrived on the scene. The officers together approached the front door of the residence and knocked numerous times. No answer was received. Davis's car was identified in the driveway. The officers then walked to the rear of the residence to attempt to make contact at a rear, sliding patio door. A light was on inside. The officers entered through a fenced in backyard, although they testified the gate was open.

{¶ 6} At the basement patio door, Officer Koehler again knocked, and received no answer. The patio sliding glass door was partially covered by a blanket. However, the officers could see the components of a meth lab inside. Officer Koehler noticed the door was unlocked and entered. Officer Koehler then observed Davis, unconscious on the couch.² Due to the nature of methamphetamine labs, the house was evacuated and the Stark County Metro Drug Unit and fire department arrived at the scene.

{¶ 7} Davis was indicted on one count of illegal manufacture of drugs, in violation of R.C. 2925.04(A)(C)(3) ; illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs, in violation of R.C. 2925.041(A) ; aggravated possession of drugs, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(1)(b) ; and possession of drug abuse instruments, in violation of R.C. 2925.12(A).

{¶ 8} On April 19, 2016, Davis filed a motion to suppress. The trial court conducted a suppression hearing on May 26, 2016.

{¶ 9} Via Judgment Entry of June 21, 2016, the trial court overruled the motion to suppress.

{¶ 10} Davis entered a plea of no contest to the charges. Via Judgment Entry of June 24, 2016, the trial court found Davis guilty on all counts and imposed sentence.³

Assignment of Error

{¶ 11} Davis presents one assignment of error for our consideration,

{¶ 12} "I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE."

Law and Analysis

{¶ 13} Davis' sole assignment of error challenges the trial court's overruling his motion to suppress. Specifically, Davis challenges the warrantless entry and subsequent seizure of evidence from the residence.

{¶ 14} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 154–155, 797 N.E.2d 71, 74, 2003-Ohio-5372 at ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness credibility. See State v. Dunlap , 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 314, 652 N.E.2d 988 (1995) ; State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). Accordingly, a reviewing court must defer to the trial court's factual findings if competent, credible evidence exists to support those findings. See Burnside, supra ; Dunlap, supra. However, once an appellate court has accepted those facts as true, it must independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met the applicable legal standard. See Burnside, supra, citing State v. McNamara , 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539 (4th Dist. 1997) ; See, also, United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) ; Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). That is, the application of the law to the trial court's findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review. Ornelas , supra . Moreover, due weight should be given "to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." Ornelas , supra at 698, 116 S.Ct. at 1663.

{¶ 15} In the case at bar, it is beyond dispute that the officers could lawfully walk upon walkways, driveways, or access routes leading to the residence and attempt to speak with Davis, just as any other member of the public would or could do. "A presumption of unreasonableness attaches to all warrantless home entries." State v. Young , 2015-Ohio-1347, 31 N.E.3d 178, ¶ 17, citing Welsh v. Wisconsin , 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984). However, "[w]hen law enforcement officers who are not armed with a warrant knock on a door, they do no more than any private citizen might do." Kentucky v. King , 563 U.S. 452, 469, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011). A "knock and talk" by law enforcement is a "permissible warrantless intrusion" that does not require "any objective level of suspicion."

Young at ¶ 24, quoting Pritchard v. Hamilton Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 424 Fed.Appx. 492, 499 (6th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred in this case when the officers approached the front door of Davis' residence and knocked in an attempt to speak with him.

{¶ 16} Where a legitimate law enforcement objective exists, a warrantless entry into the curtilage is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, if the intrusion upon one's privacy is limited. See United States v. Raines , 243 F.3d 419, 421 (8th Cir. 2001). For example, in Raines , the officer came to the defendant's residence to serve civil process on a person reasonably believed to be present, which the court characterized as a "legitimate objective." Id. After getting no response at the front door but seeing several cars in the driveway, the officer believed that the inhabitants might be in the back yard enjoying the summer evening, so the officer passed through an ungated, ten-foot-wide opening in a makeshift fence to enter the yard, which the court considered a limited intrusion. Id. at 420–21. Upon entry, the officer saw marijuana plants in plain view. Id. at 421. The seizure of the contraband was upheld because the officer was pursuing a legitimate law enforcement objective and made a limited intrusion upon the defendant's privacy interests. Id.

{¶ 17} As recently as 2014, the United States Supreme Court held that there is no clearly established Fourth Amendment violation if police officers conducting a knock and talk attempt to make contact by approaching the back or sides of a dwelling. Carroll v. Carman, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 348, 350–52, 190 L.Ed.2d 311 (2014). The Court held that officers who went through a person's yard and up to her back door in order to speak with a person did not violate clearly established law and thus were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 352.

{¶ 18} In State v. Young, the appellant argued that a Detective's presence on the back patio without a warrant or a legitimate basis for a warrantless search was a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the back patio was part of the home's curtilage. 2015-Ohio-1347, 31 N.E.3d 178, ¶15. In Young, Detective Wetzel received an alert that Ashley had purchased pseudoephedrine at a Walgreens in Lebanon, Ohio. A week later, on September 25, the detective received an alert that Ashley had unsuccessfully tried to purchase pseudoephedrine at a Kroger in Lebanon, Ohio. Minutes later, the detective received an alert that appellant had purchased pseudoephedrine at that Kroger. Believing that appellant and Ashley might try to manufacture methamphetamine that evening, Detective Wetzel and a police officer went to appellant's home to try to make contact with appellant and Ashley. Id. at ¶3. In finding that the Detective could go to the backdoor after knocking repeatedly on the front door to no avail, the Court reasoned,

As stated earlier, the testimony of the duplex property owner and photographs of the back patio show that the back patio was completely enclosed by a six-foot sight-obscuring wooden fence on September 25, 2013. The fence marked the back patio as a contiguous part of the home. Ingress

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