State v. Daw

904 S.E.2d 765

STATE of North Carolina

v.Phillip Brandon DAW

No. 174PA21

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed August 23, 2024

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 277 N.C. App. 240, 860 S.E.2d 1 (2021), affirming an order entered 15 June 2020 by Judge Craig Croom in Superior Court, Wake County, summarily denying defendant’s application for writ of habeas corpus. Heard in the Supreme Court on 13 February 2024.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Heidi M. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

W. Rob Heroy, Charlotte, for defendant appellee.

Daniel K. Siegel and Ivy Johnson for American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation, North Carolina Advocates for Justice, Disability Rights North Carolina, and the Cato Institute, amici curiae.

BERGER, Justice.

Petitioner Phillip Brandon Daw was sentenced to multiple consecutive terms of imprisonment in the fall of 2019. On 15 June 2020, Daw filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was "unlawfully and illegally detained" because the North Carolina Department of Public Safety was "incapable of ensuring that [he would] not be exposed to COVID-19." According to petitioner, his continued confinement violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution. The trial court denied petitioner’s request, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, but we allowed discretionary review to determine whether the decision below altered the plain language of our habeas corpus statutes. We modify and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals for the reasons set forth herein.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner pleaded guilty and was found guilty of multiple counts of obtaining property by false pretenses in September and November 2019. He was ultimately sentenced to a total prison term of between forty-one and 107 months for these convictions.

On 15 June 2020, petitioner filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court, Wake County, arguing that he was "unlawfully and illegally detained" and that his continued incarceration violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution. According to petitioner, the potential viral spread of COVID-19 within the correctional institution, combined with petitioner’s medical history and condition, rendered his continued confinement cruel and/or unusual. Petitioner’s application did not contest the competency of the trial court’s criminal jurisdiction. Instead, petitioner relied on a Court of Appeals opinion, State v. Leach, 227 N.C. App. 399, 742 S.E.2d 608 (2013), to argue that competent jurisdiction did not compel summary denial of his application for habeas relief.

The trial court denied the application that same day, noting that N.C.G.S. § 17-4(2) requires that "[a] petition for a writ of habeas corpus shall be denied where a person is held pursuant to a valid final judgment in a criminal case entered by a court with proper jurisdiction," and that petitioner’s "judgments are valid final judgments entered by a court with proper jurisdiction." Petitioner sought certiorari from the Court of Appeals, and his petition for writ of certiorari was allowed on 9 July 2020.

The Court of Appeals heard oral argument in this matter on 9 February 2021, but petitioner was released from prison six days later under the Department of Public Safety’s Extended Limits of Confinement Program. State v. Daw, 277 N.C. App. 240, 243, 860 S.E.2d 1 (2021). The Court of Appeals acknowledged that because petitioner had "received the relief requested in his petition … this case is moot," id. at 244, 860 S.E.2d 1, but nevertheless held that "the public in- terest exception to the mootness doctrine applie[d]" and proceeded to the merits of the case, id. at 245, 860 S.E.2d 1. The Court of Appeals repudiated the trial court’s basis for its decision, holding that the discharge provision in N.C.G.S. § 17-33(2) provided an exception to the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 17-4(2). Id. at 260, 860 S.E.2d 1. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary denial on the basis that petitioner’s application "did not demonstrate … colorable claims for violations of his rights." Id. at 269, 860 S.E.2d 1.

[1] This Court allowed the State’s petition for discretionary review on 3 March 2023 to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that subsection 17-33(2) provides an exception to subsection 17-4(2). As this question involves issues of statutory interpretation, we review the decision of the Court of Appeals de novo. Morris v. Radeberg, 385 N.C. 405, 409, 895 S.E.2d 328 (2023).

II. Analysis

A. Mootness

[2] Our State Constitution provides that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review upon appeal any decision of the courts below, upon any matter of law or legal inference." N.C. Const. art. IV, § 12. In addition, the General Assembly has provided that this Court has "jurisdiction to review upon appeal decisions of the several courts of the General Court of Justice and of administrative agencies, upon matters of law or legal inference." N.C.G.S. § 7A-26 (2023). "While the federal constitution limits the federal ‘Judicial Power’ to certain ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, our Constitution, in contrast, has no such case or controversy limitation to the ‘judicial power.’ " Comm. to Elect Dan Forest v. Emps. Pol. Action Comm., 376 N.C. 558, 591, 853 S.E.2d 698 (2021).

[3, 4] "A case is moot when a determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy." Chavez v. McFadden, 374 N.C. 458, 467, 843 S.E.2d 139 (2020) (cleaned up). While this Court generally "do[es] not decide moot cases," id., resolution of an underlying issue does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction where there remains an unresolved matter of law.

[5] For example, the public interest exception applies where "[e]ven if moot," the case implicates "a question that involves a matter of public interest, is of general importance, and deserves prompt resolution." N.C. State Bar v. Randolph, 325 N.C. 699, 701, 386 S.E.2d 185 (1989) (per curiam); see also Harper v. Hall, 383 N.C. 89, 113-14, 881 S.E.2d 156 (2022) (denying a party’s request "to dismiss their own appeal in order to avoid a ruling by this Court" because "th[e] issue is of great significance to the jurisprudence of our state and is squarely and properly before this Court"), reh’g allowed, 384 N.C. 1, 882 S.E.2d 548, and opinion withdrawn and superseded on other grounds on reh’g, 384 N.C. 292, 886 S.E.2d 393 (2023).

[6] Here, both parties agree that this case is moot. But petitioner now asks this Court to refrain from invoking the same public interest exception relied upon by the Court of Appeals in reaching this issue. Petitioner contends that "[b]ecause the [p]andemic is over, there is no need for this Court to exercise its discretion to unsettle the Court of Appeals[’] decision."

[7, 8] But the mootness doctrine is not a shield which prevents this Court from engaging in meaningful review of decisions from the Court of Appeals that, if left undisturbed, would be contrary to established law. First, although the Court of Appeals’ decision to proceed to the merits may have been influenced by COVID-19, its expansive interpretation of this State’s habeas corpus statutes was not limited to the COVID-19 context. Second, because the Court of Appeals chose to issue a published opinion in this matter, its interpretation of these statutes is not limited to this singular case; rather, the decision below has precedential effect and is binding on other Court of Appeals’ panels and all trial courts in this State. Finally, because the decision below relied on prior decisions of the Court of Appeals interpreting the habeas corpus statutes, dismissing this case and vacating the decision below would not resolve the tension that exists between the plain language of these statutes and the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the same.¹

For more than five centuries, the writ of habeas corpus has served an essential function of providing relief for those unlawfully restrained of their liberty. See generally Dallin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court—Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 451, 459-61 (1966). The writ predates the founding of this State and has been enshrined in our Constitution from the outset. Its function and the procedures under which it may issue are therefore matters of public interest, of general importance, and of great significance to the jurisprudence of this state. Questions regarding these topics, especially those involving direct conflict between decisions of the Court of Appeals and established law, must be resolved, and we therefore proceed to the merits.

B. Habeas Corpus

1. The Writ’s Origin and Development

Our founding fathers understood that "the practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny," and that the writ of habeas corpus was "a remedy for this fatal evil." The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). Thus, the writ was enshrined as a fundamental protection of individual liberty against government abuse by the ratification of the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").

The Supreme Court of the United States initially recognized the writ’s historically limited function such that "[a] perceived error in the judgment or proceedings, under and by virtue of which the party is imprisoned, constituted no ground for relief," and that "a habeas court could examine only the power and authority of the court to act," i...