State v. Deangelo Child M.

360 P.3d 1151

2015 NMSC 033

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Petitioner,

v.DeANGELO M., Child–Respondent.

No. S–1–SC–34995.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Oct. 15, 2015.

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Kenneth H. Stalter, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

Robert E. Tangora, L.L.C., Robert E. Tangora, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.

OPINION

CHÁVEZ, Justice.

{1} DeAngelo M. (Child) was thirteen years and eight days old when during a custodial interrogation by three law enforcement officers, he made inculpatory statements regarding a burglary, which connected Child to a murder. Had Child made his statements nine days earlier, his statements would not have been admissible against him in any delinquency proceedings. NMSA 1978, § 32A–2–14(F) (2009). Had Child been fifteen years old at the time of his statement, his statement would be admissible if the prosecution proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Child's statement was elicited after his knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his constitutional and statutory rights. Section 32A–2–14(D), (E); State v. Martinez,1999–NMSC–018, ¶ 14, 127 N.M. 207, 979 P.2d 718. However, because Child was thirteen years old and his statement was given to a person in a position of authority, there is a rebuttable presumption that his statement is inadmissable in any delinquency proceedings. Section 32A–2–14(F).

{2} How does the prosecution rebut this presumption? The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution must prove by clear and convincing evidence, through expert testimony, that “Child had the maturity and intelligence of an average fifteen-year-old child to understand his situation and the rights he possessed.” State v. DeAngelo M.,2015–NMCA–019, ¶¶ 21, 23–24, 344 P.3d 1019. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress because the prosecution did not meet this burden and remanded for a new trial. Seeid.¶¶ 23, 24. We granted the State's petition for certiorari, State v. DeAngelo M.,2015–NMCERT–002, 346 P.3d 371, to consider the following issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred by holding that the State can only rebut the presumption of inadmissibility by showing that the thirteen- or fourteen-year-old child has the intellectual capacity of an average fifteen-year-old; (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred by holding that the State must rebut the presumption of inadmissibility by clear and convincing evidence rather than by a preponderance of the evidence; and (3) whether the Court of Appeals erred by holding that the State can only rebut the presumption of inadmissibility through expert testimony.

{3} We hold that Section 32A–2–14(F)requires the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that at the time a thirteen- or fourteen-year-old child makes a statement, confession, or admission to a person in a position of authority, the child (1) was warned of his constitutional and statutory rights, and (2) knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived each right. To prove the second element, the recording of the custodial interrogation which resulted in the statement, confession, or admission must prove clearly and convincingly that the child's answer to open-ended questions demonstrated that the thirteen-or fourteen-year-old child has the maturity to understand each of his or her constitutional and statutory rights and the force of will to insist on exercising those rights. Expert testimony may assist the fact-finder in understanding the evidence or determining the facts necessary to satisfy this requirement, but it is not essential. We conclude that the evidence in this case does not prove that Child knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived each right. Therefore, his statement should be suppressed.

I. Section 32A–2–14(F)requires the State to rebut the presumption of inadmissibility by clear and convincing evidence

{4} The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides individuals a constitutional right against self-incrimination by providing that an individual shall not “be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself [or herself].” U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda v. Arizona,the United States Supreme Court articulated warnings that law enforcement must give to a suspect before the suspect can be subjected to a custodial interrogation without compromising his or her privilege against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The Court explained that:

Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he [or she] has a right to remain silent, that any statement he [or she] does make may be used as evidence against him [or her], and that he [or she] has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.

Id.at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. “After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him [or her], the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement.” Id.at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602. “Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he [or she] wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” Id.at 473–74, 86 S.Ct. 1602.

{5} “[W]hile the federal constitution provides a minimum level of protection below which the states may not descend, states remain free to provide greater protection.” State v. Javier M.,2001–NMSC–030, ¶ 24, 131 N.M. 1, 33 P.3d 1(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Hence, it is completely within the Legislature's authority to provide greater statutory protection than accorded under the federal Constitution.” Id.The New Mexico Legislature did just that by its enactment of the Delinquency Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 32A–2–1to –33 (1993, as amended through 2009).

{6} The Delinquency Act provides children with “greater protections than those constitutionally afforded [to] adults with regard to the admissibility of a child's statements or confessions.” State v. Adam J.,2003–NMCA–080, ¶ 3, 133 N.M. 815, 70 P.3d 805(citing § 32A–2–14(C)–(G)). Relevant to our inquiry in this case, Section 32A–2–14(F)provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary, no confessions, statements or admissions may be introduced against a child under the age of thirteen years on the allegations of the petition. There is a rebuttable presumption that any confessions, statements or admissions made by a child thirteen or fourteen years old to a person in a position of authority are inadmissible.

{7} What is not clear from the text is how the prosecution is expected to rebut the presumption. What is the prosecution's burden of proof? What evidence will overcome the presumption? This case requires us to construe Section 32A–2–14(F). “Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo.” State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Djamila B.(In re Mahdjid B.), 2015–NMSC–003, ¶ 12, 342 P.3d 698, 702(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “We look first to the plain language of the statute.” N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n,2007–NMSC–053, ¶ 20, 142 N.M. 533, 168 P.3d 105. “However, we look not only to the language used in the statute, but also to the purpose to be achieved and the wrong to be remedied.” Djamila B.,2015–NMSC–003, ¶ 25, 342 P.3d 698(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In doing so, we examine the plain language of the statute as well as the context in which it was promulgated, including the history of the statute and the object and purpose the Legislature sought to accomplish.” State v. Office of the Pub. Def. ex rel. Muqqddin,2012–NMSC–029, ¶ 13, 285 P.3d 622(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{8} One of the express purposes of the Delinquency Act is “to remove from children committing delinquent acts the adult consequences of criminal behavior, but to still hold children committing delinquent acts accountable for their actions to the extent of the child's age, education, mental and physical condition, background and all other relevant factors.” Section 32A–2–2(A). This express purpose is consistent with the overarching legislative goals of the Children's Code, NMSA 1978, §§ 32A–1–1to –24–5 (1993, as amended through 2009), which ensures that children's constitutional and statutory rights are recognized and enforced:

The Children's Code shall be interpreted and construed to effectuate the following legislative purposes:

A. first to provide for the care, protection and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming within the provisions of the Children's Code ...; [and]

B. to provide judicial and other procedures through which the provisions of the Children's Code are executed and enforced and in which the parties are assured a fair hearing and their constitutional and other legal rights are recognized and enforced....

Section 32A–1–3(A)–(B).

{9} Prior to 1993 no confession, statements or admissions made by a child under the age of fifteen could be introduced against the child. NMSA 1978, § 32–1–27(F) (1992). The legislative rationale for categorically excluding such statements was because

[c]hildren of tender years lack the maturity to understand constitutional rights and the force of will to assert those constitutional rights. Children are encouraged to respect and obey adults and should not be expected to assert their constitutional rights even under the most perfunctory questioning by any adult, particularly an adult of authority. By prohibiting the admission of statements made by children under age fifteen, Section 32–1–27(F) encourages children to freely converse with adults without fear that their statements will be used against them at a later date. In contrast, an adult or a child over age fifteen is unlikely to make an involuntary statement in a noncustodial, noncoercive atmosphere or after

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