State v. DeLaCruz, A15–1177.

884 N.W.2d 878

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Armando DELACRUZ, Jr., Appellant.

No. A15–1177.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Aug. 1, 2016.

Lori M. Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Brenda Miller, Waseca County Attorney, Alex Saumer, Assistant County Attorney, Waseca, MN, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.

Considered and decided by REYES, Presiding Judge; SCHELLHAS, Judge; and BRATVOLD, Judge.

OPINION

BRATVOLD, Judge.

Appellant, Armando DeLaCruz, Jr., appeals from his convictions of 20 offenses, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in denying his amended new-trial motion, which asserted that the state committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose critical impeachment evidence regarding the complaining witness. We hold that the district court erred by concluding it lacked discretion to consider appellant's amended new-trial motion. First, we reject the state's claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the amended new-trial motion. Second, we conclude the district court abused its discretion by failing to decide the merits of the amended new-trial motion because appellant's first new-trial motion was timely served and appellant offered satisfactory reasons for asserting new grounds in the amended motion. We reverse and remand for a hearing on the merits of the amended new-trial motion.

FACTS

This appeal arises from Armando DeLaCruz, Jr.'s convictions of first-degree burglary, kidnapping, false imprisonment, terroristic threats, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, second-degree criminal sexual conduct, and fifth-degree assault. In the late evening of September 13, 2013, C.O. was at home with two of her four children. Once her children were asleep, C.O. heard noises in the house, opened her bedroom door, and saw a man in the hallway wearing her son's pajamas over his head. C.O. later identified the man to police as DeLaCruz.

C.O. attempted to lock herself in her bedroom, but DeLaCruz prevented her from shutting the door and forced his way into the room. He began to wrestle with her and, at one point, choked her. To defend herself, C.O. twice bit DeLaCruz's arms. DeLaCruz instructed C.O. to remove her clothing and threatened to harm her children if she did not comply. C.O. removed her clothing, which DeLaCruz used to bind her: he blindfolded her, bound her arms behind her back, and bound her feet. Once she was bound, DeLaCruz touched C.O.'s breasts and buttocks. DeLaCruz forcefully penetrated C.O.'s vagina three separate times, causing pain. During the assault, C.O. was able to see DeLaCruz's face and recognized him.

At some point, C.O. escaped and fled to a neighbor's home with her two children. The neighbor later testified that C.O. pounded on the door, “screaming at the top of her lungs” and frantically reported that she had just been raped. According to the neighbor's account, C.O. was naked except for a small bath towel. Once the police arrived at the neighbor's home, they transported C.O. to a nearby hospital, where she underwent a sexual-assault examination. A pelvic exam revealed that C.O.'s vagina was reddened.

Police officers investigated C.O.'s home and determined that DeLaCruz had entered through an unlocked window. The officers found C.O.'s shirt knotted on the floor of her bedroom and saw that her pants were turned inside out on the floor, intertwined with her underwear.

Police officers arrested DeLaCruz on September 14. When the police detained him, DeLaCruz had scratches on his nose, a bite mark on his left forearm, a bloody scrape on his wrist, a mark on his right forearm, and a scratch on his right elbow. The officers concluded that his injuries were consistent with C.O.'s description of her attempts to defend herself.

The Waseca County Attorney's office later charged DeLaCruz with 30 offenses: four counts of first-degree burglary, see Minn.Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(a), (c) (2012) ; one count of kidnapping, see Minn.Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(2) (2012) ; one count of false imprisonment, see Minn.Stat. § 609.255, subd. 2 (2012) ; two counts of terroristic threats, see Minn.Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2012) ; ten counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, see Minn.Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(c), (e)(i) (2012) ; eleven counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, see Minn.Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(c), (e)(i) (2012) ; and one count of fifth-degree assault, see Minn.Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1(1) (2012). The state later dismissed two first-degree burglary charges, ultimately trying DeLaCruz for 28 offenses.

The district court held a jury trial from October 6 to October 14, 2014, at which numerous witnesses testified for the state and the defense. The jury deliberated for over two days. On October 17, the jury found DeLaCruz guilty of 20 counts (including two counts of first-degree burglary and six counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct) and not guilty of eight counts.

Following the verdict, DeLaCruz made a series of motions. DeLaCruz, through counsel, orally moved for a judgment of acquittal. Then, acting pro se on October 20, DeLaCruz served a motion and supporting memorandum that alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, which the district court took under advisement. On October 22, the district court issued a written order, stating that DeLaCruz's motion would be “reserved and addressed at the sentencing hearing as part of [his] right to allocution.”

Next, on October 29, DeLaCruz served a pro se motion for a new trial, which raised several grounds: the interests of justice required a new trial because of ineffective assistance of counsel, an “order of discretion” deprived DeLaCruz of a fair trial, prosecutorial and jury misconduct occurred, and the guilty verdict was not justified by the evidence.

At a November 10 “informational” hearing, the trial judge addressed some of these motions. First, he announced the denial of DeLaCruz's motion for a judgment of acquittal, stating a written order and supporting memorandum would be filed. Second, he reiterated that DeLaCruz's pro se motions would be “addressed by the court at sentencing as part of his right to allocution.”

Third, the trial judge told the parties that, immediately before the jury returned its verdict, he received a court file that contained a police report indicating that C.O. made unsubstantiated allegations of sexual assault against a police officer in the course of a 2006 misdemeanor arrest.¹ We rely on the district court's summary of the police report because it was never made part of the trial court record. See Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 110.01 (“The documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases.”). According to the district court, the police report stated that C.O. accused the arresting officer of raping her, claimed that he had “touched her punanny,” and screamed that the officer was “going down for touching her p-ssy.” The arresting officer denied C.O.'s claim. No charges resulted from C.O.'s allegations.

On November 20, ten days after the district court revealed C.O.'s prior false sexual-assault allegations and more than 30 days after the verdict, DeLaCruz again moved for a new trial, this time through counsel. After a December 11 hearing to address the new-trial motion, the trial judge recused himself and the case was reassigned. The newly assigned judge heard arguments on the new-trial motion on January 29, 2015.

At the January hearing, DeLaCruz argued that the state committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose the police report underlying C.O.'s 2006 arrest. The defense argued that the Waseca County Attorney's office prosecuted C.O. for the 2006 misdemeanor offenses. Although the state disclosed C.O.'s 2006 conviction to the defense in the course of pretrial discovery, it did not disclose the police report pertaining to C.O.'s allegations against the officer.

The state countered that DeLaCruz's November 20 new-trial motion was untimely because he served it more than 15 days after the jury issued its verdict, see Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.04, subd. 1(3), and no exception applied to allow the court to consider the motion on its merits. Alternatively, the state argued that no Brady violation had occurred because it did not have the 2006 police report and had no duty to investigate.

The newly assigned judge denied DeLaCruz's new-trial motion as time-barred and refused to consider it on the merits. In a footnote, the district court noted it had informed DeLaCruz that his pro se motions would be addressed at sentencing as part of his right of allocation. DeLaCruz was later sentenced for the convicted offenses. This appeal follows.

ISSUE

Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying DeLaCruz's amended new-trial motion as time-barred?

ANALYSIS

On appeal, DeLaCruz raises one issue: whether the district court erred by refusing to grant a new trial based on the alleged Brady violation.² The state responds that the district court did not err because DeLaCruz's November 20 new-trial motion was untimely. The state also asserts, “[i]t appears that when a motion for a new trial is filed after the 15–day window in these unique post-verdict but pre-sentencing situations that district courts lack jurisdiction to hear such motions.”

This case requires us to apply the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, the interpretation of which presents a question of law subject to de novo review. See Ford v. State, 690 N.W.2d 706, 712 (Minn.2005). Also, the state raises a jurisdictional challenge. “Questions concerning the authority and jurisdiction of the lower courts are legal issues,” which we also review de novo. State v. Pflepsen, 590 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Minn.1999). Ultimately, we review the denial of a new-trial motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Green, 747 N.W.2d 912, 917 (Minn.2008).

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