State v. Derstine

State of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Angela Joy Derstine, Respondent.

A19-1594

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

February 10, 2020

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

Reversed and remanded

Smith, John, Judge^*

Clay County District Court

File No. 14-CR-19-2297

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Tara B. Nagel, Assistant County Attorney, Moorhead, Minnesota (for appellant)

Brian P. Toay, Wold Johnson P.C., Fargo, North Dakota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Smith, John, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SMITH, JOHN, Judge

We reverse the district court's order suppressing evidence and dismissing charges against respondent, Angela Joy Derstine, because: 1) the district court erred in applying the protections of the "Good Samaritan Law," Minn. Stat. § 604A.05 (2018); and 2) the information in the search warrant established a substantial basis to support the issuing judge's probable cause determination. We remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

The state charged respondent Angela Joy Derstine with fifth-degree drug possession under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2018). The complaint alleged that law enforcement executed a search warrant at a mobile home (the residence) and found Derstine and S.K. there. Law enforcement found "numerous bags of methamphetamine packaged for sale, cash, drug paraphernalia [and] marijuana." The total weight of the methamphetamine, which was found in S.K.'s bedroom, was 132.8 grams. There were eight tablets of a schedule IV controlled substance (Clonazepam) in Derstine's purse, and Derstine admitted to police that she had been regularly purchasing methamphetamine from S.K. The state charged Derstine with possession of the Clonazepam.

Derstine filed a motion to suppress the fruits of the search conducted pursuant to the warrant referenced in the complaint and to dismiss the charge against her. Derstine argued that the circumstances described in the warrant application did not establish probable cause to search the residence. She also argued that some information in the warrant affidavit—specifically, information relating to an April 2019 medical call related to a drug overdose—should not have been included because it falls within the immunity protection outlined in Minn. Stat. § 604A.05. Derstine maintained that if that information were properly excised from the warrant affidavit, the affidavit would not establish probable cause. The state argued that it was not improper for law enforcement to use the information and that the affidavit established probable cause to search the residence.

The warrant affidavit included information about suspected drug activity of persons connected to the residence, and a search of garbage set out for collection near the residence that revealed drug paraphernalia with drug residue, and the suspected drug activity of a third person who had arranged to deliver methamphetamine to a police informant. At the time that the person had agreed to deliver methamphetamine to the police informant, a third person was driving a vehicle that had been seen outside the residence, but the third person was arrested before any transaction took place.

The information that Derstine alleged to be improperly included in the warrant affidavit concerned a previous incident at the residence in April 2019 when police had responded to the residence regarding a drug overdose. The victim admitted to overdosing on narcotics. S.K. told police that the victim uses methamphetamine daily. Police learned that the owner of the residence allowed S.K. to live there. Police observed "in plain view on a shelf inside the [residence] a clear plastic coin sized zipseal bag with a small white crystal consistent with methamphetamine." The warrant applicant did not specify whether the substance was ever chemically tested.

The district court granted Derstine's motion to suppress and dismiss. The district court concluded that Minn. Stat. § 604A.05 precluded law enforcement from includinginformation about the April 2019 incident in their search warrant affidavit. Setting aside this information, the district court determined that the affidavit lacked information to establish probable cause for the search, and it consequently suppressed the evidence and dismissed the charge against Derstine.

DECISION

The state argues that the district court erred in concluding that Minn. Stat. § 604A.05 precluded law enforcement from including the information about the April 2019 overdose in the warrant affidavit that led to the search and charges against Derstine. The state also argues that the district court erred in determining that the warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause.

As a preliminary matter, in an appeal by the state of a pretrial order, this court will reverse only if the state "demonstrates clearly and equivocally that the district court erred in its judgment and, unless reversed, the error will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial." State v. Trei, 624 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Minn. App. 2001), review dismissed (Minn. June 22, 2001). "Dismissal of a complaint satisfies the critical impact requirement." Id. Because the district court suppressed the evidence that formed the basis of the charge against Derstine and then dismissed the charge for lack of probable cause, this appeal meets the critical impact test. See State v. Mike, 919 N.W.2d 103, 107 (Minn. App. 2018) (indicating that the critical impact requirement was met where the district court suppressed critical evidence and then dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2019).

I. The district court erred in determining that the information learned in the overdose incident was improperly included in the warrant affidavit.

The state first argues that the district court erred in determining that Minn. Stat. § 604A.05 precluded law enforcement from using the information learned through the April 2019 overdose incident in applying for a warrant to search the residence, and erred in determining that the validity of the warrant should be analyzed without consideration of the information at issue. We must interpret Minn. Stat. § 604A.05. We interpret a statute de novo. Dupey v. State, 868 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Minn. 2015). An appellate court's goal in interpreting a statute is to "ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature." Id. (quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2014)). "The first step is to examine the language of the statute to determine if it is ambiguous." Id. "If the statutory language is unambiguous, we must enforce the plain meaning of the statute and not explore the spirit or purpose of the law." Id. "But if the statutory language is ambiguous, we may look beyond the language of the statute to ascertain the Legislature's intent." Id.

At issue in this appeal are subdivisions one and four of section 604A.05:

Subdivision 1. Person seeking medical assistance; immunity from prosecution. A person acting in good faith who seeks medical assistance for another person who is experiencing a drug-related overdose may not be charged or prosecuted for the possession, sharing, or use of a controlled substance under section 152.023, subdivision 2, clauses (4) and (6), 152.024, or 125.025, or possession of drug paraphernalia. A person qualifies for the immunities provided in this subdivision only if:

(1) the evidence for the charge or prosecution was obtained as a result of the person's seeking medical assistance for another person; and(2) the person seeks medical assistance for another person who is in need of medical assistance for an immediate health or safety concern, provided that the person who seeks the medical assistance is the first person to seek the assistance, provides a name and contact information, remains on the scene until assistance arrives or is provided, and cooperates with the authorities.

Good faith does not include seeking medical assistance during the course of the execution of an arrest warrant or search warrant or a lawful search.

. . . .

Subd. 4. Effect on other criminal prosecutions.

(a) The act of providing first aid or other medical assistance to someone who is experiencing a drug-related overdose may be used as a mitigating factor in a criminal prosecution for which immunity is not provided.

(b) Nothing in this section shall:

(1) be construed to bar the admissibility of any evidence obtained in connection with the investigation and prosecution of other crimes or violations committed by a person who otherwise qualifies for limited immunity under this section;

(2) preclude prosecution of a person on the basis of evidence obtained from an independent source;

(3) be construed to limit, modify, or remove any immunity from liability currently available to public entities, public employees by law, or prosecutors; or

(4) prevent probation officers from conducting drug testing of persons on pretrial release,probation, furlough, supervised release, or parole.

The parties offer competing interpretations of section 604A.05. The state contends that the statute is unambiguous and does not preclude law enforcement from using information learned while responding to an overdose-emergency call to obtain a search warrant. The state also maintains that the immunity provided by section 604A.05 does not extend to Derstine because she was not a "person seeking medical assistance," as she was not involved in the overdose incident. Derstine argues that because the statute provides that the immunity prevents the person seeking medical assistance from being "charged or prosecuted" for certain crimes, that the legislature intended to prevent law enforcement from using information gained in an overdose-emergency call in any investigation.

We hold that the statute is unambiguous regarding the scope of immunity related to information learned in a...