State v. Dixon

896 S.E.2d 169

STATE of North Carolina

v.Nathaniel E. DIXON, Defendant.

No. COA21-471

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed December 5, 2023

Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 16 July 2019 by Judge R. Gregory Horne in Buncombe County Superior Court. Originally heard in the Court of Appeals 20 September 2022. Buncombe County, Nos. 16 CRS 084811-12, 17 CRS 000106

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Sherri Horner Lawrence, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender James R. Grant, for defendant-appellant.

MURPHY, Judge.

Where a Defendant cannot demonstrate at the third step of Batson that the State acted on a discriminatory purpose with respect to race and that the trial court clearly erred in its ruling, we will not overturn the denial of a Batson ruling on appeal. Here, taking into account the whole Record as it existed before the trial court at the time of Defendant’s Batson objection, we are not persuaded that the State’s peremptory strike of one of only two African American prospective jurors in the jury pool was motivated by discriminatory intent, even where the State made a greater effort to rehabilitate other jurors who expressed reservations about the death penalty, because we cannot be confident the trial court was mistaken in its conclusion that reservations about the death penalty still explained the exercise of the strike.

Furthermore, given the high degree of discretion with which a trial court is entrusted in ruling on a motion for mistrial, we cannot say the trial court abused that discretion in denying Defendant’s. The trial court also permissibly ruled on all motions for mistrial, as the trial judge was not a witness in any associated hearing.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of Defendant Nathaniel E. Dixon’s appeal of his criminal convictions for first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and malicious maiming on 26 June 2019, following a high-profile jury trial that lasted several weeks and garnered significant media attention. During voir dire, the State struck an African American ¹ potential juror, R.D.,² who expressed reservations about the death penalty:

[R.D.]: Personally I have reservations about the death penalty. Simply because [it’s] disproportionate. Most people who know anything about the death penalty know[ ] that the statistics show that African American[s] receive it more than oth- ers. You know, this is weighed on me like quite a bit. Just back and forth. And … I wish I wasn’t here, honestly. I wish the reason that I’m here never occurred. And … that’s not a presumption of guilt or innocence for anyone. I just wish that what happened, that we know for sure never happened, so I was never in this courtroom. But what I … struggle with is, I’d rather my life not be interrupted. I’d rather be only thinking about what I have to do at work today and the plans that I have at the end of June. But then there’s another side of me that understands [ ] something tragic really did happen. And if this is the course for justice to be served, a part of me just wants to see that happen. So the law is the law, and whatever is decided, I would hope that the punishment fits the crime. I would hope that the Defense would be confident in doing their job, that they can present their case to where they believe what they’re doing is going to help their Defendant, and I would hope that the Prosecution is confident in that they can present their case, that justice would be served one way or another. And then whomever has to decide, decides the right thing. But it weighs heavily on me when just thinking that we might be part of this process. So the short answer is neither one of those penalties do I object to.

[THE STATE]: Okay. Well, I guess are your -- I believe the terms you used [were] you have reservations about the death penalty. And would your feelings about that be such -- are your feelings such that you could not under any circumstance vote for a death sentence?

[R.D.]: Well, it’s not that I couldn’t. I hoped to never put myself in a position where I’m on the other side of one of those tables. But my point is, if that’s what the law requires, then that’s what the law requires.

[THE STATE]: I guess --

[R.D.]: My reservation is, I don’t want to see anybody die. That’s my reservation.

[THE STATE]: I understand. Well, basically the trial would be divided into two parts. The first part would be one deter mining guilt or innocence on the charge -- particularly on the charge of first degree murder. There are other charges the jury would also consider. But as far as the penalty goes, the only one that potentially would go to a second phase would be the charge of first degree murder. So the first stage in any of this would be the jury would have to consider that. And do your -- again, you have some clearly heart-felt personal feelings about the death penalty. And because of those, would those affect your -- or prevent you from making an impartial decision based on the evidence about the Defendant’s guilt in the first part of the trial?

[R.D.]: No.

[THE STATE]: So you think you could sit through that part?

[R.D.]: Certainly.

[THE STATE]: Okay. And if the Defendant is guilty -- found guilty of first degree murder, we would then move into a second or a sentencing phase of the trial. And that phase as well as the first phase, the burden is on the State and that’s always proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But in the second phase, the first part of that is the State would produce -- present evidence of what are called aggravating circumstances. And that would be things that would tend to suggest that the appropriate penalty is a death sentence.

[R.D.]: Sure.

[THE STATE]: And again, the jury would have to consider those and find them -- any one of them exists beyond a reasonable doubt. The second part of that, the Defense then would have the ability to present evidence of what are called mitigating circumstances. And again, that would be evidence that would tend to show that the appropriate sentence is one of life in prison. And there the burden is different on the Defense. It’s not beyond a reasonable doubt. It’s the lower burden of preponderance of the evidence. And in that -- also for the mitigating circumstances there doesn’t have to be unanimity. Any juror who felt like -- particular mitigating circumstance applied, had been proven to themselves could consider that. Whether or not every- one else agreed on that. So the mitigating is more of an individual juror decision.

[R.D.]: Yes, sir.

[THE STATE]: And again, if aggravating circumstances have been found, the next step the jury would be asked to weigh those. And the standard there is -- and the question the jury would have to ask is, are the mitigating circumstances insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. Which is kind of a backwards question --

[R.D.]: I understand.

[THE STATE]: -- the way it’s asked; but basically weighing. And again, that’s beyond a reasonable doubt and mitigating insufficient to outweigh the aggravating. And if the jury finds that, then the final question is, are the aggravating circumstances when taken into account the mitigating, are they sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of a death sentence. And again, that’s a beyond a reasonable doubt question as well. And given that -- and that’s the framework the jury would have to do that. And in your case -- and again, you’re the only one -- and again, you’ve clearly given a lot of thought to this. There’s no question. But if the Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder, would your feelings about the death penalty substantially impair your ability to vote at the sentencing hearing to impose a death sentence no matter what the evidence or aggravating circumstances that were proved?

[R.D.]: No.

[THE STATE]: So you think if the -- if you felt like it was appropriate, you would be able to vote for a death sentence?

[R.D.]: If that’s what the law required, yes.

[THE STATE]: Again --

[R.D.]: I get it.

[THE STATE]: The laws requires --

[R.D.]: I understand nuances. I’m a [p]aster. I understand backwards questions, too. I use them all the time, but I understand what you’re saying.

[THE STATE]: And again --

[R.D.]: I understand the framework.

[THE STATE]: The law requires you to consider --

[R.D.]: Yes.

[THE STATE]: The law doesn’t require a vote one way or the other. That’s a juror’s decision about how to vote.

[R.D.]: I would not --

[THE STATE]: You would not --

[R.D.]: I would not have any reservations.

[THE STATE]: Okay. Likewise, if you felt like the evidence called for it, would you be able to vote for a sentence of life in prison?

[R.D.]: Certainly.

Defendant raised an objection to the State’s peremptory strike of R.D. under Batson v. Kentucky, which the trial court overruled during the following exchange in open court:

[DEFENDANT]: [ ] [Y]our Honor, at the appropriate time, we do enter a Batson challenge as to Alternate Number One, [R.D.].

….

Your Honor, in regards to [R.D.], and I tried to be very careful … to write down everything that he said. Certainly there was nothing indicated on his questionnaire … that indicated that he could not follow the law, that he was not available, that he could not make the time. He certainly hadn’t formed any opinions. He understood clearly the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt theories that we all deal with. And I was especially struck[]when he was asked questions about his views on the death penalty. … [O]ne of the reasons why we feel like the District Attorney’s peremptory strike against him, that there are some racial undertones to it, because what he said was he didn’t want to be here. He didn’t want to be in this position. He would do it. And he made the statement that if anybody is familiar with personal statistics, they do show that there are more African Americans that receive the death penalty. But then h...