State v. O'Donnell

255 N.J. 60

299 A.3d 700

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jason M. O'DONNELL, Defendant-Appellant.

A-17 September Term 2022

087023

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued April 24, 2023

Decided August 7, 2023

Leo J. Hurley, Jr., Jersey City, argued the cause for appellant (Connell Foley, attorneys; Leo J. Hurley, Jr., of counsel and on the briefs, and Alexa C. Salcito, Jersey City, and Brian K. Dempster, Roseland, on the briefs).

Angela Cai, Deputy Solicitor General, argued the cause for respondent ( Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Angela M. Cai, Jeremy M. Feigenbaum, Solicitor General, and Jennifer E. Kmieciak, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the briefs).

Lawrence S. Lustberg, Newark, argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Gibbons, attorneys; Lawrence S. Lustberg and William C. Martinez, on the brief).

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Defendant Jason O'Donnell was a candidate for mayor of Bayonne in 2018. During the campaign, he allegedly accepted $10,000 in cash in a paper bag from an individual. In exchange for the money, the State asserts, defendant promised to appoint the individual as tax counsel for the city.

The State charged defendant under the bribery statute. The relevant part of the law states it is a crime for any "person" to accept "[a]ny benefit as consideration for the performance of official duties." N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2(d).

Defendant did not win the election. He contends the law does not apply to him because it does not cover candidates who accept improper payments but are not elected. The plain words of the bribery statute, however, do not support that position.

The relevant language is not limited to public servants, party officials, or successful candidates, as defendant suggests. The law applies to any "person" who accepts an improper benefit -- incumbents, candidates who win, and candidates who lose. N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2. The statute also expressly states that it is no defense to a prosecution if a person "was not qualified to act." Ibid. So even if a candidate is unable to follow through on a corrupt promise, the language of the bribery statute makes it a crime to accept cash payments for a promise of future performance. Beyond the terms of the statute, commentary from the Model Penal Code, on which the law is modeled, supports that interpretation.

The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, and the Appellate Division properly reinstated the charge of bribery. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand the case for trial.

I.

A.

We draw the facts from the State's grand jury presentation. We make no findings about the allegations.

In February 2018, an individual who cooperated with law enforcement met with defendant Jason O'Donnell. ¹ At the time, defendant was a candidate for mayor of Bayonne. At the end of the evening, defendant asked for $10,000. Defendant said that he needed street money and that the individual would "be his tax guy." Candidates for office ordinarily use "street money" for get-out-the-vote efforts and related activities. See N.J.A.C. 19:25-12.6(a).

During the investigation that followed, the cooperator met with defendant, spoke with him on the phone, and recorded their conversations. The two met again on April 23, 2018 at defendant's campaign headquarters. During the recorded meeting, the cooperator said, "street. When do you need that, next week?" Defendant responded, "the weekend before [the race] is good." Defendant added, "Well it's gonna be easy because you'll be the tax attorney."

On May 3, 2018, investigators gave the cooperator $10,000 in cash to give to defendant. The money was inside a white Baskin-Robbins bag with pink lettering. During a recorded conversation at campaign headquarters later in the day, the cooperator said, "I just want to be your tax guy." Defendant responded, "Yeah done.

That's, that's easy but I need." A video of the meeting depicts defendant holding the Baskin-Robbins bag.

Defendant lost the election. A grand jury later charged him with bribery, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2, in a one-count indictment. The indictment alleges, in part, that defendant "knowingly did directly or indirectly solicit, accept, or agree to accept from another a benefit that is, funds in excess of $200, as consideration for the performance of official duties or the violation of official duties." The language tracks subsection (d) of the bribery statute.

B.

Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment prior to trial. The trial court granted the motion. In a written opinion, the court held that N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2(d) did not apply to defendant because "he was merely a candidate for public office with no real, actual, or apparent authority to perform any ‘official duties’ at the" "moment of [the] exchange."

The court relied in part on a federal ruling that interpreted the statute in the same way, United States v. Manzo, 851 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D.N.J. 2012). In Manzo, a thoughtful federal judge predicted how this Court would interpret New Jersey's bribery statute and reached a different conclusion than we have. The Federal District Court found the statute did not extend to candidates for office who are not elected. Id. at 811.

The Appellate Division reversed the state trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the plain language of the bribery statute "reveals an intent to render unlawful what defendant is alleged to have done and that the statute imposes criminal liability on ... unsuccessful candidates for public office" who accept bribes. State v. O'Donnell, 471 N.J. Super. 360, 363, 273 A.3d 458 (App. Div. 2022). The court explained that the statute's broad text is not limited to "the acceptance of bribes only by public officials and public servants." Id. at 363, 367, 273 A.3d 458. The court also observed that "[t]here is nothing in the statute to suggest the State is required to prove a bribe receiver's present ability to perform." Id. at 368-69, 273 A.3d 458.

The Appellate Division reviewed the statute's common law roots, recent precedent, and commentary in the Model Penal Code, and found that those sources supported a broad reading of the bribery statute. Id. at 365-73, 273 A.3d 458. The court also explained its disagreement with Manzo’s reasoning, id. at 371-74, 273 A.3d 458, and concluded that the rule of lenity did not apply because the bribery statute is not ambiguous, id. at 374-75, 273 A.3d 458.

C.

We granted defendant's petition for certification limited to questions related to the scope of the bribery statute -- namely, whether it "applies to a candidate for political office who is not an incumbent and is ultimately not elected." 252 N.J. 171, 283 A.3d 1221 (2022). We also granted the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL) leave to appear as amicus.

II.

Defendant argues the language of the bribery statute is unambiguous and does not explicitly apply to a candidate running for political office who is not an incumbent and is not elected. He contends that the law's "no-defense" provision, which we discuss later, does not apply to him. Alternatively, he presents two arguments in the event the statute is found to be ambiguous: (1) the legislative history and proposed amendments to the law confirm that the Legislature excluded candidates for office from the statute's reach; and (2) the rule of lenity should apply. Defendant also argues that the Appellate Division's "expansion of the scope and reach of" the statute violates his due process rights and operates as an ex post facto law.

The ACDL supports defendant's position and argues that the bribery statute, if applied to unelected political candidates, violates the Due Process Clause's prohibition against vague criminal laws.

The Attorney General argues that the text of the bribery statute plainly proscribes defendant's alleged conduct. Pointing to the language of the statute, the Attorney General argues that "any individual who accepts bribes in consideration for performing official duties if elected to office violates" the bribery law. Defendant's sole defense that he was not qualified to act, according to the Attorney General, is "no defense" under the text of the law. The Attorney General also contends that extrinsic evidence and precedent confirm the above reading of the statute; that neither the rule of lenity nor "alleged legislative inaction" supports a contrary result; and that defendant's constitutional arguments lack merit.

III.

This is a case of statutory interpretation, for which our review is de novo. Malanga v. Township of West Orange, 253 N.J. 291, 311, 290 A.3d 1212 (2023).

To interpret the meaning of a statute, courts attempt "to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent." State v. A.M., 252 N.J. 432, 450, 286 A.3d 660 (2023) (quoting State v. Lopez-Carrera, 245 N.J. 596, 612, 247 A.3d 842 (2021) ). The plain language of a statute "is typically the best indicator of intent." Ibid. (quoting State v. McCray, 243 N.J. 196, 208, 233 A.3d 523 (2020) ).

When a criminal statute "is modeled after the" Model Penal Code, courts may consider the Code and its "commentary to interpret the intent of the statutory language." State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 606, 92 A.3d 656 (2014). Commentary from the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission can similarly provide guidance. See id. at 606 n.4, 92 A.3d 656.

A.

We begin with the text of the bribery statute:

A person is guilty of bribery if he directly or indirectly offers, confers or agrees to confer upon another, or solicits, accepts or agrees to accept from another:

a. Any benefit as consideration for a decision, opinion, recommendation, vote or exercise of discretion of a public servant, party official or voter on any public issue or in any public election; or

b. Any benefit as consideration for a decision, vote, recommendation

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