State v. Dosh

1

STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MAXWELL ALEXANDER DOSH, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 50089

Court of Appeals of Idaho

March 12, 2024

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Patrick J. Miller, District Judge.

Judgment for trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine trafficking in heroin, possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia resisting or obstructing an officer, unlawful possession of a firearm, and being a persistent violator of the law affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Amy J. Lavin, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

MELANSON, Judge Pro Tem

Maxwell Alexander Dosh appeals from his judgment of conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine, trafficking in heroin, possession of a controlled substance (fentanyl) with the intent to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, resisting or obstructing an officer, unlawful possession of a firearm, and being a persistent violator of the law. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Boise police officers were investigating a drug trafficking operation that they believed used Airbnb and Uber rentals to avoid police detection. They were investigating a specific rental house looking for a male person of interest in the investigation. A driver arrived and picked up three passengers from the rental-two men and one woman-who all sat in the back seat. The officers did not know at the time whether either of the men was the person of interest. Police followed the Uber and stopped the vehicle for failure to signal before changing lanes. Dosh was identified as the person sitting in the middle of the back seat. During the stop, an officer saw Dosh put his hands near a backpack at his feet. The officer instructed Dosh to stop and he complied. When an officer questioned the female passenger, she admitted that she had an Oxycontin/Oxycodone (Oxy) pill in her possession which she placed on the roof of the vehicle. After the passengers had been removed from the vehicle, the officers searched it, including the backpack that had been at Dosh's feet. The backpack contained methamphetamine, heroin, at least 100 fentanyl pills, baggies, a digital scale, and a glass pipe. Dosh fled the scene on foot before officers could take him into custody. He was later arrested and, after a jury trial, was found guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine, I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4)(A); trafficking in heroin, I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(6)(B); possession of a controlled substance (fentanyl) with the intent to deliver, I.C. § 37-2732(a); possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2732A; and resisting and/or obstructing an officer, I.C. § 18-705.

Prior to trial, Dosh filed a motion to suppress evidence and argued that the police did not have a reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop, the scope of the stop was unlawfully expanded, and the police did not have probable cause to search his backpack. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion, finding that the stop was justified by the traffic infraction, it was not unlawfully extended, and the search of Dosh's backpack was lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

At trial, an officer testified that he processed the items of evidence, including the fentanyl pills found in Dosh's backpack, and sent them to the Idaho State Laboratory for testing. The officer testified that he estimated there were over 100 fentanyl pills. The State then asked, "Is that amount significant to you?" The officer responded "yes." Dosh's counsel requested a bench conference. After a discussion off the record, the State asked whether the number of pills was "more than what you'd expect to see as a user amount?" Dosh objected, citing his "prior objection on foundation and disclosure of expert witness." The objection was overruled, and the officer testified that the "amount is more than I would typically find on a user." A jury found Dosh guilty of all charges.

Dosh appeals, challenging the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. He also argues the district court erred in the admission of the officer's testimony during the trial, the district court's denial of discovery sanctions for failure to disclose the officer as an expert witness, and the subject matter of his testimony.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Suppress

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).

On appeal, Dosh argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. He contends that his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when officers searched his backpack after the female passenger admitted to possession of an Oxy pill. He argues that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not allow the search of his backpack and that officers had no other justification for the search.

The Idaho Supreme Court has explained the automobile exception to the warrant requirement as follows:

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable unless they fall within one of several narrowly drawn exceptions. State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 897, 821 P.2d 949, 952 (1991). One of those exceptions, the "automobile exception," allows police to search a vehicle without a warrant when there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 800, 964 P.2d 660, 667 (1998). Probable cause is established when the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the search would give rise-in the mind of a reasonable person-to a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790, 792-93, 852 P.2d 1387, 1389-90 (1993). Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard, and a practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is present is all that is required. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L.Ed.2d 502, 513-14 (1983).

State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012). The automobile exception also extends to containers in the vehicle. If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982); State v. Maloney, 168 Idaho 936, 941, 489 P.3d 847, 852 (2021). However, the scope of a search under the automobile exception is limited to where officers have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991); State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898, 821 P.2d 949, 953 (1991).

The district court, in denying Dosh's motion to suppress, relied upon Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999), which held that police officers with probable cause to search a car may search a passenger's belongings found in the carthat are capable of concealing the object of the search. Dosh argues that the female passenger's possession of one Oxy pill did not give officers probable cause to search the entire vehicle and the containers therein. Dosh frames the issue as follows: "Whether probable cause related to one passenger justifies search of another passenger's belongings in the car." However, the more accurate description of the issue in this case is whether one passenger's possession of an Oxy pill while in the vehicle provides probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. Cases involving the automobile exception to the warrant requirement focus on the presence of contraband in the vehicle, not on whether the contraband is found on the person of one of the occupants as compared to any other particular place in the vehicle. Once officers possess probable cause to believe a lawfully stopped vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime, they may search every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search, including all containers within a vehicle, without qualification as to ownership or the nature of the container and without a showing of individualized probable cause for each container. State v. Easterday, 159 Idaho 173, 175, 357 P.3d 1281, 1283 (Ct. App. 2015); see also Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300; Ross, 456 U.S. at 825.

Dosh argues that this case is similar to Sossamon v State, 576 S.W.3d 520 (Ark. Ct. App. 2019). In that case, the defendant was the driver of a vehicle but not the owner. The vehicle was stopped by a police officer for speeding. The owner, who was a passenger, consented to a search of the vehicle but did not want her bags searched so the officer allowed her to remove her bags. The officer found methamphetamine in the...