State v. Douglas

1

State of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Raenard Romalle Douglas, Respondent.

No. A24-0385

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

September 23, 2024

Scott County District Court File No. 70-CR-19-18076

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant County Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota (for appellant)

Anders J. Erickson, Johnson Erickson Criminal Defense, Minneapolis Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Johnson Judge; and Kirk, Judge. ^[*]

SYLLABUS

Before the supreme court's opinion in State v Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d 164 (Minn. 2023), this court's caselaw authorized a law-enforcement officer to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle based solely on the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle, so long as the officer had probable cause to believe that more than 1.4 grams of marijuana was in the vehicle. Evidence obtained in such a search conducted before Torgerson need not be suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule because, at that time, a well-trained law-enforcement officer would have acted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent.

OPINION

JOHNSON, JUDGE

Raenard Romalle Douglas was charged with unlawful possession of ammunition by an ineligible person and driving after cancellation as inimical to public safety. He moved to suppress evidence of the ammunition and to dismiss the ammunition-possession charge on the ground that a police officer found the ammunition in a warrantless search of a vehicle that was not supported by probable cause. The district court granted Douglas's motion and dismissed the ammunition-possession charge. We conclude that the district court erred by not applying the Lindquist exception to the exclusionary rule because, in October 2019, a well-trained law-enforcement officer would have had an objectively reasonable belief, based on binding appellate precedent, that the odor of marijuana alone established probable cause for a warrantless search of a vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Therefore, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

Late at night on October 27, 2019, a City of Savage police officer stopped a vehicle because it did not have a front license plate and had an object hanging from the rear-view mirror. After approaching the driver's window, the officer smelled the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the vehicle. The driver, Douglas, identified himself. The officer learned that Douglas's driver's license was canceled because his driving had been deemed inimical to public safety. The officer asked Douglas and a passenger to step out of the vehicle so that it could be searched. During the search, the officer found several burnt marijuana roaches throughout the vehicle and a safe in the back seat, which the officer suspected to contain drug packaging. Douglas told the officer that he did not know the combination of the safe's lock. The officer pried open the safe and found ammunition but no drugs or drug packaging.

The state charged Douglas with unlawful possession of ammunition by an ineligible person, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 2(b) (2018), and driving after cancellation as inimical to public safety, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5 (2018). The case was tried in November 2021, with the result being a hung jury. A new trial was scheduled for March of 2022 but was continued numerous times due to the unavailability of witnesses, a failure to appear by Douglas, a substitution of counsel, and possibly other reasons that are not apparent from the record.

In September 2023, the supreme court released its opinion in State v. Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d 164 (Minn. 2023), in which it held that "the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle, alone, is insufficient to create the requisite probable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement." Id. at 166. The supreme court explained that "the probable cause analysis calls for the odor of marijuana to be one of the circumstances considered as part of the totality of the circumstances in assessing whether there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Id. at 173 (emphasis omitted).

In November 2023, Douglas moved to suppress evidence of the ammunition and to dismiss the ammunition-possession charge. At an evidentiary hearing in December 2023, the officer who stopped and searched the vehicle driven by Douglas testified that he searched the vehicle for only one reason: the odor of burnt marijuana. In a post-hearing memorandum, Douglas argued that, in light of Torgerson, the officer did not have probable cause to search the vehicle. In response, the state argued that evidence of the ammunition should not be suppressed because of the exception to the exclusionary rule for an officer's objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent. See State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863 (Minn. 2015). The district court rejected the state's argument, granted Douglas's motion, suppressed evidence of the ammunition, and dismissed the ammunition-possession charge. The state appeals.

ISSUE

Did the district court err by not applying the Lindquist exception to the exclusionary rule for a law-enforcement officer's objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent?

ANALYSIS

The state argues that the district court erred by granting Douglas's motion to suppress and to dismiss. Specifically, the state argues that, when the Savage police officer searched the vehicle driven by Douglas in October 2019-approximately four years before the supreme court issued its Torgerson opinion-the officer would have had an objectively reasonable belief, based on binding appellate precedent, that the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle, by itself, established probable cause for a warrantless search of the vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

We begin by noting that, as a general matter, the state may obtain appellate review of a pre-trial order only if the order, if not reversed, would have a "critical impact on the outcome of the trial." State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476, 481 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04, subds. 1(1), 2(2)(b). A challenged ruling has a critical impact if it "'completely destroys' the state's case" or "'significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution.'" State v. McLeod, 705 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn. 2005) (quoting State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 551 (Minn. 1987)). In this case, the state contends that the dismissal of the ammunition-possession charge would have a critical impact on the state's case. Douglas does not disagree. We agree with the state that the critical-impact requirement is satisfied. Thus, the state may proceed with its appeal.

A.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Minnesota Constitution contains substantially the same language. See Minn. Const. art. I, § 10.

A search conducted without a warrant generally is presumed to be unreasonable and, thus, a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011); State v. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512, 517 (Minn. 2018). But a warrantless search may be deemed reasonable if there is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148-49 (2013); State v. Rohde, 852 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn. 2014); State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 798-99 (Minn. 2012); State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 250 (Minn. 2003). Certain exceptions exist because "the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (quotation omitted).

One exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception. Under that exception, "police may search a car without a warrant, including closed containers in that car, if there is probable cause to believe the search will result in a discovery of evidence or contraband." State v. Barrow, 989 N.W.2d 682, 685 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). The underlying rationale of the automobile exception is that, if there is probable cause to believe that contraband may be found in a vehicle, it frequently is "not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).

As stated above, the supreme court recently held that the odor of marijuana, by itself, is insufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless search of a motor vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception. Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d at 170-74. Rather, "the odor of marijuana should be considered along with the totality of any other circumstances to determine whether there is a fair probability that a search will yield contraband or other evidence that marijuana is being used in a criminally illegal manner." Id. at 173.^[1]

B.

Under federal law, if a law-enforcement officer conducts a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the evidence obtained in the search generally may not be introduced at trial. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 655 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1...