State v. Duttle

387 P.3d 885

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Sharon DUTTLE, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 33,514.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

May 11, 2016.

Certiorari Denied, August 8, 2016, S-1-SC-35993

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Margaret E. McLean, Assistant Attorney General, Joel Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, J.K. Theodosia Johnson, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

ZAMORA, Judge.

{1} Defendant Sharon Duttle was convicted of one count of dogfighting contrary to NMSA 1978, § 30–18–9 (2007) ; one count of conspiracy to commit dogfighting, contrary to NMSA 1978, § 30–28–2 (1979) and Section 30–18–9 ; ten counts of cruelty to animals, contrary to NMSA 1978, § 30–18–1(B) (2007) ; eight counts of extreme cruelty to animals, contrary to Section 30–18–1(E) ; and one count of owning or maintaining more than six dogs and/or cats without a multiple animal site permit contrary to Doña Ana County, N.M., Doña Ana County Animal Controls Ordinance ch. 134, 203–2002 § 4.2 (2002), repealed by Doña Ana County, N.M., Doña Ana Animal Controls Ordinance ch. 134, 266–2013 (2013). On appeal, Defendant does not challenge her convictions for dogfighting, conspiracy to commit dogfighting, or her violation of the Doña Ana County Animal Controls Ordinance.

{2} Defendant challenges her convictions for cruelty to animals and extreme cruelty to animals by raising ten issues. Three of the issues are addressed in this formal opinion, and the remaining seven issues have been addressed in a separate memorandum opinion. State v. Duttle, No. 33,514, mem. op., 387 P.3d 885, 2016 WL 2756604 (N.M.Ct.App.2016) (non-precedential).

{3} Defendant argues that (1) the animal cruelty statute is unconstitutionally vague; (2) her conduct is insufficient to support her convictions for extreme cruelty to animals; and (3) her convictions for cruelty to animals and extreme cruelty to animals are not supported by sufficient evidence.

{4} We hold that the animal cruelty statute is not unconstitutionally vague and that Defendant's behavior falls within the conduct the Legislature intended to punish as cruelty and extreme cruelty to animals under Section 30–18–1(B) and (E). We further hold that there was sufficient evidence to support her convictions for cruelty to animals and extreme cruelty to animals. As a result, we affirm Defendant's convictions.

I. BACKGROUND

{5} Doña Ana County Animal Control was contacted about numerous dogs kept on Defendant's property in a manner consistent with preparations for staged dogfighting. Doña Ana County Sheriff's Department Investigator Robyn Gojkovich, an animal cruelty specialized investigator, went to Defendant's property to conduct a welfare check on the dogs.

{6} Because of the outside conditions in which the dogs were kept, that numerous dogs were chained to stakes, the unknown number of dogs, and the lack of vaccination records, among other things, Investigator Gojkovich obtained a search warrant to check on the health and welfare of the dogs.

{7} The initial search of Defendant's property revealed seven dogs being kept inside Defendant's residence. The dogs were either gravely ill or had fresh wounds consistent with staged dogfighting. Investigator Gojkovich also found the presence of several other items in Defendant's residence that suggested Defendant was involved in organized dogfighting. Subsequently, a second search warrant was obtained broadening the search to include evidence of organized dogfighting.

{8} The dogs located outdoors were found in deplorable conditions, and many of them were also in poor physical condition. Animal Control officers assigned each dog a number and photographed them in the area where the dog was found. Before the dogs were removed from the property, the officers also photographed each dog's access to food, water, shade, shelter, body condition, and injuries.

{9} After their removal, the dogs were taken to the animal shelter where they were assessed by Animal Control officers and examined by the animal shelter veterinarian. Dr. Patricia Norris, a veterinarian with the Doña Ana County Sheriffs' Department, examined and photographed twenty-seven of those dogs. Of the thirty-eight dogs initially removed from Defendant's property, thirty-one had to be euthanized, and two died in the animal shelter as a result of severe heart worm disease and related complications.

{10} Defendant was indicted on one count of dogfighting, one count of conspiracy to commit dogfighting, ten counts of cruelty to animals, nine counts of extreme cruelty to animals, one count of owning or maintaining more than six animals without a multiple animal site permit, and forty counts of maintaining an unsterilized dog or cat without a permit. The latter forty counts were dismissed prior to trial. A jury convicted Defendant of one count of dogfighting, one count of conspiracy to commit dogfighting, ten counts of cruelty to animals, eight counts of extreme cruelty to animals, and one count of owning more than six animals without a multiple animal site permit. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Animal Cruelty Statute Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague

{11} Defendant contends that the extreme cruelty and cruelty to animals statute, as applied, is void for vagueness. She argues that Section 30–18–1(B) and (E) failed to provide her notice that her conduct was prohibited, and that the statutory provisions are overbroad, thereby allowing for subjective, ad hoc applications. Specifically, Defendant argues that the terms "necessary sustenance" and "torture" are unconstitutionally vague.

{12} "[T]he vagueness doctrine is based on the principle of fair notice in that no one may be held criminally responsible and subject to criminal sanctions for conduct without fair warning as to the nature of the proscribed activity." State v. Lovato, 2011–NMCA–065, ¶ 14, 150 N.M. 39, 256 P.3d 982(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[A] statute denies constitutional due process if it is so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{13} "We review a vagueness challenge de novo in light of the facts of the case and the conduct[,] which is prohibited by the statute." State v. Smile, 2009–NMCA–064, ¶ 17, 146 N.M. 525, 212 P.3d 413 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "A strong presumption of constitutionality underlies each legislative enactment, and the party challenging constitutionality has the burden of proving a statute is unconstitutional beyond all reasonable doubt." State v. Laguna, 1999–NMCA–152, ¶ 24, 128 N.M. 345, 992 P.2d 896. Appellate courts "have a duty to construe a statute in such a manner that it is not void for vagueness if a reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language." State v. Segotta, 1983–NMSC–092, ¶ 5, 100 N.M. 498, 672 P.2d 1129. When analyzing a vagueness challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, this Court applies a two-part test. State v. Tsosie, 2011–NMCA–115, ¶ 31, 150 N.M. 754, 266 P.3d 34. We consider whether the statute "(1) fails to provide persons of ordinary intelligence using ordinary common sense a fair opportunity to determine whether their conduct is prohibited, or (2) fails to create minimum guidelines for ... enforcement ... and thus encourages subjective and ad hoc application of the law." Id. (omissions in original) (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted); State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Shawna C., 2005–NMCA–066, ¶ 32, 137 N.M. 687, 114 P.3d 367 (noting that due process also requires that the statute not encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement). A vagueness claim "cannot succeed if the statute clearly applied to [the defendant's] conduct." Smile, 2009–NMCA–064, ¶ 17, 146 N.M. 525, 212 P.3d 413 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).

{14} In determining the prohibited conduct, we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. See State v. Trujillo, 2012–NMCA–112, ¶ 7, 289 P.3d 238, cert. quashed, 2015–NMCERT–003, 346 P.3d 1163. "[The appellate courts'] ultimate goal in statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature." State v. Smith, 2004–NMSC–032, ¶ 8, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We begin "by looking first to the words chosen by the Legislature and the plain meaning of the Legislature's language." State v. Davis, 2003–NMSC–022, ¶ 6, 134 N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "When a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, [the appellate courts] must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation." State v. Johnson, 2001–NMSC–001, ¶ 6, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because of the factual complexity of this case, we address Defendant's constitutional arguments concerning Section 30–18–1(B) and (E), in turn.

1. Section 30–18–1(B) —Cruelty to Animals

{15} Defendant challenges Section 30–18–1(B) as unconstitutionally vague as applied to her conduct in this case. Section 30–18–1(B) defines "cruelty to animals" as "(1) negligently mistreating, injuring, killing without lawful justification[,] or tormenting an animal; or (2) abandoning or failing to provide necessary sustenance to an animal under that person's custody or control." Defendant argues that the statutory language failed to provide her notice that her conduct was prohibited and is overbroad thereby allowing for subjective, ad hoc application of this subsection. Specifically, Defendant contends that under Section 30–18–1(B), she would not comprehend that her failure to provide adequate shelter and medical care to her dogs constitutes a failure to provide "necessary sustenance" under the statute. In so arguing, Defendant...