State v. Dyous

233 A.3d 1138

STATE of Connecticut

v.Anthony DYOUS

AC 42006

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 7, 2020

Officially released June 23, 2020

Richard E. Condon, for the appellant (defendant).

Michele C. Lukban, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Anne F. Mahoney, state's attorney, and Andrew J. Slitt, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

DiPentima, C. J., and Keller and Bear, Js.

DiPENTIMA, C. J.

The defendant, Anthony Dyous (acquittee),¹ appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the state's petition to extend his commitment to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board (board) for a period of four years. On appeal, the acquittee claims that the court improperly found that, at the time of the state's petition, he was mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The acquittee's psychiatric history and proceedings with the criminal court and the board have been detailed extensively in State v. Dyous , 307 Conn. 299, 53 A.3d 153 (2012) ( Dyous I ), and State v. Dyous , 153 Conn. App. 266, 100 A.3d 1004 (2014) ( Dyous II ), appeal dismissed, 320 Conn. 176, 128 A.3d 505 (2016) (certification improvidently granted). These opinions set forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. On March 22, 1985, the acquittee was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of two counts of kidnapping in the first degree, two counts of threatening in the second degree, and one count of carrying a dangerous weapon.² Dyous II , supra, at 268, 100 A.3d 1004. The trial court committed the acquittee to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health for a period not to exceed twenty-five years. Id. In March, 1985, the acquittee was transferred to the custody of the board pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-582. Id.³

Our Supreme Court set forth the details of the events that led to the acquittee's initial commitment to the custody of the board and subsequent events up to this third petition by the state for his continued commitment. "Between 1977 and the time of the incident [that] resulted in his criminal commitment, the [acquittee] was hospitalized three times in psychiatric facilities. Thereafter, in December, 1983, the [acquittee] hijacked a bus carrying forty-seven people, including a child. He threatened the driver with a bomb and nerve gas, and stated he had been asked by God to deliver a message. During and after this incident, the [acquittee] exhibited signs of delusional thinking and symptoms of psychosis. The [acquittee] was arrested, found not guilty by reason of [insanity] and committed ... for a period of twenty-five years. The [acquittee] was confined to the Whiting Forensic Institute [ (Whiting), a maximum security psychiatric facility] for a period of time and then transferred to ... Norwich State Hospital.

"On January 17, 1986, the [acquittee] escaped from Norwich [State Hospital] with a female peer, and they traveled to South Carolina, to Texas and, finally, to Mexico. When [the acquittee was] located in Mexico in September, 1986, [he] exhibited symptoms of psychosis. He was returned to Connecticut and, upon admission to Whiting, was found to be grossly psychotic and experiencing auditory and visual hallucinations as well as grandiose and persecutory delusions. While at Whiting, he was thereafter involved in a violent incident [that resulted in his own injuries, as well as injuries to staff members] and other patients.

"In 1989, based on his clinical stability, the [acquittee] was transferred to Norwich [State Hospital]. From [1990 through 1992], he was granted a series of temporary leaves [that] were terminated when he rendered a positive drug screen for cocaine. After a [period of] time, temporary leaves were reinstated, and, in July, 1995, he was granted a conditional leave. In June, 1996, the [acquittee] began to exhibit symptoms of psychosis and admitted that he had stopped taking his antipsychotic medication. He was admitted to Connecticut Valley Hospital but refused some of his medications. A few days later, he escaped from [that] hospital, and, several days thereafter, he was found ... [and] returned to Whiting. At that time, he was exhibiting psychotic and paranoid symptoms, as well as delusional thinking. He became violent and was placed in four point restraints for six hours.

"During the next several years, the [acquittee] remained at Whiting and was involved in a series of assaults. From 1996 [through] 2005, the [acquittee's] behavior at Whiting was characterized by chronic refusal to take medication, irritability, mood lability, grandiosity, paranoid ideation, rule breaking, physical altercations with peers and refusal to engage meaningfully in treatment.

"In 2005, there was a reduction in the [acquittee's] aggression, an improvement in his participation in treatment and increased cooperation with his treatment team. Based on [these improvements], in mid-2006, the [acquittee] was transferred to Dutcher [Hall of Connecticut Valley Hospital], a less secure [area] on the hospital campus. Treatment records after the transfer show that the [acquittee exhibited] episodic irritability, mood instability, grandiosity, paranoid ideation and [that] he refused to take his medication, claiming [that] he could control his behavior. Ultimately, the treatment team convinced him to take ... mood stabilizing medication, but [he then] changed his mind and refused. A treatment impasse ensued, and the [acquittee] was transferred to another unit. In the new unit, his psychiatrist noted mood lability and ongoing conflicts with peers. After working closely with the [acquittee], the psychiatrist was able to convince him to take the mood stabilizing medication, Trileptal. Even after starting Trileptal, however, the [acquittee] had another altercation with a peer and was again transferred. In December, 2009, he was transferred to yet another unit following problems with another patient.

"During his twenty-five year term of commitment to the jurisdiction of the board, the [acquittee] filed two applications for discharge, the first in 2003 and the second in 2007. The trial court dismissed both applications. In dismissing the more recent application, the trial court observed that [t]here is little or no dispute that the [acquittee] suffers from a long-standing mental illness. ... [O]n January 31, 2007, the [acquittee's] diagnosis included delusional disorder, grandiose and persecutory type, and, most recently, the [acquittee] has been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. The trial court also observed that [t]he evidence is undisputed that, if the [acquittee] is released [into] the community, he would require supervision and treatment and that, without such services, he would be a danger to himself or others. The court further noted that [t]he [acquittee's] history belies his representation that he will continue to engage in supervision and treatment in the community or that he is ready to be discharged without mandatory supervision. The records are replete with evidence of substance abuse, noncompliance with treatment recommendations and repeated failures to meaningfully engage in treatment. Moreover, throughout his commitment, the [acquittee] has demonstrated little insight into his illness and, instead, has sought to justify or rationalize his behavior. Additionally, despite a history of psychotic episodes, the [acquittee] remains steadfast in his opposition to taking antipsychotic medication [even] [t]hough medication has been shown to ameliorate [the acquittee's] symptoms .... Finally, the court observed that, even in the controlled environment of his inpatient hospitalization, the [acquittee] has repeatedly demonstrated behavior [that] has put others at risk of harm.

"In 2009, approximately one year before the end of the [acquittee's] term of commitment, the state filed a petition for an order of continued commitment, arguing that the [acquittee] remained mentally ill and that his discharge would constitute a danger to himself or others." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dyous I , supra, 307 Conn. at 304–307, 53 A.3d 153. Our Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting the state's petition to extend the acquittee's commitment for an additional three years. Id., at 302, 304, 53 A.3d 153.

On April 24, 2012, the state filed a second petition for continued commitment on the bases that the acquittee remained mentally ill and that his discharge from the custody of the board would constitute a danger to himself or others. Dyous II , supra, 153 Conn. App. at 270, 100 A.3d 1004. After a two day hearing, the court summarized the acquittee's history. Id., at 270–71, 100 A.3d 1004. It then set forth, in greater detail, the relevant facts that had occurred subsequent to the first extension of the acquittee's commitment. Id., at 271, 100 A.3d 1004. "In March, 2010, the [acquittee] described himself as a [prisoner of war], who was being held in violation of human rights standards. On April 26, 2010, he assaulted another patient by hitting the patient with a radio, leading to his conviction on April 8, 2011, of assault in the third degree. Chemical tests administered at about that time revealed that for more than two years, the [acquittee] falsely had indicated that he was taking his medication; he surreptitiously was spitting out the pills.

"The court found the following events outlined in the board's report. On December 29, 2010, the [acquittee] pushed another patient to the floor and grabbed the patient by the throat. The incident ended only when hospital police intervened. In March, 2011, a female patient complained of the [acquittee's] behavior, which was characterized as sexual harassment and unwelcome (but not, apparently, criminal) touching. Between March, 2010, and June, 2012, the [acquittee's] posture toward the medical staff...