State v. Edinburgh

State of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Miles David Edinburgh, Appellant.

A10-421

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

Filed June 27, 2011

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2010).

Affirmed

Muehlberg, Judge^*

Kandiyohi County District Court

File No. 34-CR-08-1539

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, James B. Early, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,

Minnesota; and

Jennifer Fischer, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)

David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Stauber, Judge; and Muehlberg, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MUEHLBERG, Judge

On appeal from his conviction of second-degree intentional murder and second-degree felony murder, appellant Miles David Edinburgh argues that the district court abused its discretion when it ruled he opened the door to cross-examination about his character; allowed the state to inquire about a specific instance of conduct on cross-examination; and permitted the state to present rebuttal testimony on the specific instance of conduct. Appellant also claims that the district court's jury instructions constituted plain error requiring reversal of his conviction; that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the revival of an aggressor's right of self-defense; that the district court denied appellant a fair trial by admitting excessive "spark-of-life" evidence; and that the district court committed error by failing to sequester the jury. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant went with friends to a party hosted by four football players from Ridgewater College at an apartment on the night of July 19, 2008. The hosts of the party did not know appellant or his friends and asked them to leave. After they left, one of the young men hosting the party, W.R., saw appellant and his friends in the apartment's parking lot, standing around W.R.'s car. W.R. was concerned because his car's lock was broken and he kept his wallet, GPS, and money in the car. W.R., L.F., J.M., and the victim, A.M., went outside and once again asked appellant and his friends to leave. The two groups began arguing. L.F. then hit appellant and appellant ran away. A.M. ran after appellant. L.F. and J.M. followed. A.M. caught appellant and as the two began towrestle, appellant pulled out a knife and stabbed A.M. By the time L.F. reached A.M. a few seconds later, A.M. was down on one knee, bleeding and holding his ribs. Appellant ran away. Police arrived and found appellant hiding underneath a car parked in the driveway of a nearby residence. A.M. was taken to the hospital where he died of multiple stab wounds.

The Kandiyohi County Attorney's Office charged appellant with one count of intentional second-degree murder. This court affirmed the district court's order certifying appellant to be tried as an adult. In re Welfare of M.D.E., Child, No. A08-1924 (Minn. App. Apr. 21, 2009). Appellant entered a plea of not guilty, claiming self-defense. A jury found appellant guilty of second-degree intentional murder and second-degree felony murder. At the sentencing hearing, appellant moved the district court for a judgment of acquittal, a new trial, and a downward-durational departure. The district court denied his motions and sentenced him to 360 months in prison, with credit for 501 days served. This appeal followed.

DECISION

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion when it ruled appellant opened the door to cross-examination about his character; allowed the state to inquire about a specific instance of conduct in its cross-examination of appellant; and allowed the state to present rebuttal testimony on the specific instance of conduct. Appellant also claims that the district court's jury instructions constituted plain error requiring reversal of his conviction; and that the district court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the revival of an aggressor's right of self-defense, that it denied appellant his right to a fairtrial when it allowed the state to introduce excessive "spark-of-life" evidence, and when it failed to sequester the jury overnight during deliberation.

I.

Appellant challenges the district court's ruling that he opened the door to character evidence. The admissibility of character evidence is governed by Minn. R. Evid. 404(a). It is well settled that the prosecution may not attack the character or reputation of the accused unless he first introduces evidence of good character. State v. McCorvey, 262 Minn. 361, 364, 114 N.W.2d 703, 705 (1962); State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Minn. 1981) ("No rule of criminal law is more thoroughly established than the rule that the character of the defendant cannot be attacked until he himself puts it in issue by offering evidence of his good character.") (quotation omitted).

On direct examination, appellant testified about his reaction when he learned of A.M.'s death, stating: "It broke my heart to know that I took the life of another human being because that's - - that's not who I am." The state questioned appellant on cross-examination about his proclivity to use racial epithets to instigate fights. Appellant objected, arguing the state was seeking to elicit impermissible character evidence. The district court ruled that appellant opened the door to character evidence when, on direct examination, he testified, "that's not who I am." The district court held appellant's statement "entitled [the state] to find out who he is."

We will not reverse the district court's evidentiary rulings absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003). Appellant must establish not only an abuse of discretion but also that he was prejudiced because of the districtcourt's ruling. Id. When evaluating whether an error in admitting evidence was prejudicial, the reviewing court determines "whether there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict." State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 n.2 (Minn. 1994). If there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant without the evidence, the error is prejudicial. Id.

Appellant argues he did not offer affirmative evidence of his good character and at most, his statement, "that's not who I am," constitutes a general denial. Citing State v. Sharich, appellant asserts that a general denial that he did a particular kind of act is insufficient to put his character into issue. 297 Minn. 19, 23, 209 N.W.2d 907, 911 (1973). In Sharich, the supreme court held that the defendant's "mere denial that she was a prostitute or had prostituted herself on this occasion did not put her character into issue." Id. Other cases appellant references also support this proposition. See State v. Flowers, 262 Minn. 164, 167-68, 114 N.W.2d 78, 80-1 (1962) (holding that defendant's general denial on cross-examination that he ever kicked or struck anyone was insufficient to put his character into issue); State v. Stockton, 181 Minn. 566, 569, 233 N.W. 307, 308 (1930) (stating defendant did not put his general character into issue when he testified on cross-examination he had never robbed anyone); State v. Sobocinski, 395 N.W.2d 128, 129-30 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding that defendant's testimony as to group practices and prior farm-sale conduct did not place his character in issue, so the prosecution could not introduce evidence as to defendant's character for peacefulness).

As the state asserts, these cases are distinguishable from the instant case, which is more analogous to State v. Willis, 559 N.W.2d 693 (Minn. 1997). The supreme court in Willis found that "[w]hen defense counsel specifically asks whether a criminal act is out of character for an accused, defense counsel opens the door to the introduction of character evidence," and concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion "when it permitted the state to engage in limited questioning to rebut the same." Willis, 559 N.W.2d at 699.

The testimony of the defendants in Sharich, Flowers, and Stockton all included denials of particular acts—Sharich denied she was a prostitute; Flowers denied he had ever kicked or struck anyone; and Stockton testified he had never robbed anyone. Appellant's testimony did not deny a particular act, such as "I have never stabbed anyone." Instead, similar to testimony in Willis, appellant made a general assertion that the charged criminal act was out of character for him—that he is not someone who takes another person's life. Appellant's direct-examination testimony was calculated to lead the jury to conclude the conduct he was accused of is out of character for him and that he is not a violent, cold-hearted killer. Because appellant put his character in issue on direct examination, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled his testimony opened the door to the state's inquiries regarding his character.

Specific-instance evidence

Next, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the state to inquire into his use of racial epithets to instigate fights. Appellant claims that the state's inquiry was substantively and procedurally improper under Minn. R. Evid. 608.Ordinarily, evidence of a defendant's other crimes or prior bad acts is not admissible to show behavior consistent with the defendant's character. State v. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d 500, 502-03 (Minn. 1991); State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 491, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (1965). However, prior misconduct, other than conviction of a crime, may be admissible for the purpose of attacking a witness's credibility if the prior misconduct is probative of untruthfulness. Minn. R. Evid. 608(b).

The state argues that rule 608 is inapplicable because its inquiry into specific instances of conduct was not for the purpose of...