State v. Edwards

900 N.W.2d 722

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Tommy James EDWARDS, Appellant.

A16–1482

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed August 14, 2017

Review Granted In Part October 25, 2017

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Michael Everson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Mark Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent).

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant).

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Bratvold, Judge.

OPINION

RODENBERG, Judge

Appellant Tommy James Edwards appeals his conviction of second-degree assault, arguing that the district court gave erroneous jury instructions. He also argues that his right to a jury trial was violated when the district court included two Wisconsin convictions in calculating his criminal history score without submitting to a jury the question of whether those Wisconsin offenses would have been certified for adult prosecution under Minnesota law. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant was charged with second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon under Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2014), after he stabbed L.R.D. with a knife during a fight outside a nightclub.¹ While the state did not produce the knife at trial, it introduced testimony to support its theory. L.R.D. described the knife used by appellant, the state provided photos of L.R.D.'s wounds, and a police investigator testified that the wounds were consistent with a stabbing.

Appellant's theory at trial was that he used no knife to attack L.R.D., and that he used only his fists during the fight. A witness for appellant testified that he did not see either combatant use a knife during the fight. In summation, appellant's attorney stated the "key question is whether or not [appellant] had a knife" during the fight.

There were no objections to the district court's jury instructions. The jury convicted appellant of second-degree assault.

Appellant did not request a jury trial concerning his criminal history score. But before sentencing, appellant moved the district court to exclude two of his prior Wisconsin felony convictions from his criminal history score. The convictions were for two separate attempted robberies, both involving appellant's use of a handgun to threaten the imminent use of force. Appellant argues to the district court that it could not include those convictions in his criminal history score because he was a minor when he was convicted and, although Wisconsin tried him as an adult, the district court had not made sufficient findings that appellant would have been tried as an adult in Minnesota. The district court included the Wisconsin felony points in appellant's criminal history score, concluding that appellant would have been certified for adult prosecution in Minnesota had the offenses been committed here.

This appeal followed.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court plainly err by not instructing the jury on the statutory definitions of "bodily harm" and "great bodily harm," or by defining "assault" as either intentionally inflicting bodily harm or attempting to inflict bodily harm?

II. Did the district court violate appellant's constitutional right to a sentencing jury trial by including in appellant's criminal history score two Wisconsin felony convictions resulting from appellant's certification for adult prosecution there, without submitting to a jury the question of whether appellant would have been certified under Minnesota law?

ANALYSIS

I. The district court did not plainly err in its jury instructions.

Appellant makes two arguments concerning claimed plain error in the district court's jury instructions. First, he argues that the district court should have instructed the jury on the definitions of "bodily harm" and "great bodily harm." Second, he argues that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury that it could find appellant guilty if he either intentionally inflicted bodily harm or attempted to inflict bodily harm.

A district court has "broad discretion" to craft jury instructions, and it abuses that discretion if the instructions given "confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law." State v. Taylor , 869 N.W.2d 1, 14–15 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). Appellant did not object to the jury instructions at trial, so we apply plain-error analysis to his jury-instructions arguments. Id. at 15. Plain error exists if "(1) there is an error, (2) the error is plain, and (3) the error affects the appellant's substantial rights." State v. Moore , 863 N.W.2d 111, 119 (Minn.App. 2015), review denied (Minn. July 21, 2015).

Here, the third element our of plain-error review is dispositive. It is clear from how the case was tried that the errors alleged by appellant did not affect his substantial rights regardless of the instructions given. "[A]n error affects substantial rights when there is a reasonable likelihood that a more accurate instruction would have changed the outcome in [the] case." Id. at 123 (quotation omitted). There is no chance that the additional instructions now sought by appellant would have changed the outcome.

Appellant claims on appeal that the district court should have defined "bodily harm" and "great bodily harm" for the jury because those definitions are included in the statute. Because the state had to prove that a knife could cause "great bodily harm," he argues that omission of these definitions was plainly erroneous and affected his substantial rights.

At trial, the state argued that appellant stabbed L.R.D. with a knife. Appellant argued that he only used his fists. Nobody argued that a knife cannot cause great bodily harm. Everyone tacitly agreed that a knife can cause great bodily harm. The jury's verdict reflects its finding that the state proved that appellant assaulted L.R.D. with a knife. Instructing the jury on the definition of "bodily harm" and "great bodily harm" would not have changed the outcome of the case.

Appellant also argues that the district court should not have included the language "attempting to inflict bodily harm" in the jury instructions.

In summation, appellant's counsel conceded that "[d]uring the early morning hours of April 25th, 2015, [appellant] got in a fist fight with [L.R.D.]." As discussed, the case was tried and submitted to the jury on a simple factual question: did appellant cause L.R.D.'s injuries with a knife or with his fists? The jury's verdict demonstrates its conclusion that the state proved that appellant injured L.R.D. with a knife. Further definitions concerning issues not disputed at trial would have made no difference, as trial counsel appears to have understood by not objecting to the district court's jury instructions.

II. The district court did not violate appellant's constitutional right to a sentencing jury trial by computing his criminal history score without submitting to a jury the question of whether appellant's Wisconsin convictions while a juvenile would have been certified for adult prosecution in Minnesota.

Appellant argues that the district court erred by including his Wisconsin convictions in his criminal history score without submitting to a jury the question of whether he would have been certified as an adult had he committed those crimes in Minnesota. The district court resolved this question.² Appellant now argues that the district court could not include the past convictions in his criminal history score without a jury finding that appellant would have been certified as an adult in Minnesota had his Wisconsin juvenile offenses been committed here.

We review determinations of a defendant's criminal history score for abuse of discretion. State v. Stillday , 646 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Minn.App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2002). The interpretation of the sentencing guidelines is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Williams , 771 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Minn. 2009). We review de novo whether appellant was unconstitutionally denied a jury trial. State v. Kuhlmann , 806 N.W.2d 844, 848–49 (Minn. 2011).

A. Appellant did not forfeit the issue by not raising it below.

Respondent argues that appellant forfeited his argument that Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), requires a jury trial in these circumstances because he did not raise the jury-trial question to the district court. See Blakely , 542 U.S. at 301, 124 S.Ct. at 2536 (requiring any facts that increase a defendant's sentence above the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, to be submitted to a jury). We do not generally consider issues not raised to the district court. Roby v. State , 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996).

Generally, a criminal defendant may neither waive nor forfeit the issue of a proper and correct criminal history score, an issue which is fundamental to the state's "public policy to maintain uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and predictability in sentencing." State v. Maurstad , 733 N.W.2d 141, 146–47 (Minn. 2007) (quoting State v. Misquadace , 644 N.W.2d 65, 69 (Minn. 2002) ). Here, appellant objected to the lack of findings supporting inclusion of the Wisconsin convictions in his criminal history score. He did not expressly waive his jury-trial claim. Even if appellant did not raise this precise argument below, the issue has been fully briefed and can be resolved on the record as constituted. We therefore address appellant's argument on its merits.

B. The district court did not unconstitutionally deny appellant a sentencing jury trial.

Appellant argues that the district court improperly included his Wisconsin convictions in his criminal history score without submitting to a jury the question of whether he would have been certified for adult prosecution had his Wisconsin offense been committed here. Minnesota law requires a "factfinder" to make additional findings in order to add a conviction from another...