State v. Eldridge

1

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GALE EDWARD ELDRIDGE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A-1-CA-38868

Court of Appeals of New Mexico

January 29, 2024

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY Robert A. Aragon District Judge

Raul Torres, Attorney General

Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender

Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GERALD E. BACA, Judge

{¶1} Having granted Defendant's motion for rehearing and considered the State's response, we withdraw the opinion filed September 21, 2023, and substitute the following in its place. Defendant entered into a conditional plea agreement wherein he pleaded guilty to criminal sexual contact of a minor in the third degree (child under 13), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-9-13(C)(1) (2003), but reserved his right to appeal his motion to suppress and his motion to dismiss. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) his Fifth Amendment rights were violated because the officers failed to read him his Miranda warnings, (2) the officers coerced his incriminating statement, (3) the twenty-nine-month delay in resolving this case violated his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the district court erred in denying his speedy trial motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436 (1966). Concluding that the district court erred in failing to provide Defendant an evidentiary hearing on his speedy trial motion, we reverse and remand so that Defendant may have a hearing on this issue. Otherwise, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

{¶2} On July 18, 2017, Detective Andrew Gilbert called Gale Eldridge (Defendant) asking Defendant to come to the San Juan County Sherriff's Office to discuss his daughter's allegation that he had sexually assaulted her. Defendant agreed to be interviewed, but asked to be given a polygraph as part of the interview. Defendant drove himself to the Sheriff's Office. Upon arrival, Detective Gilbert escorted Defendant to an interrogation room, which was about a 10-foot by 10-foot room, accessible by a single door that had no windows apart from a one-way viewing window. The door to the interrogation room was left unlocked during the entire period that Defendant was in the room. When Defendant arrived in the interrogation room, Detective Gilbert informed him that he was free to leave at any time.

{¶3} Defendant was taken to a second interrogation room, where Captain Dowdy administered a polygraph test as well as a pre- and post-polygraph interview. At the outset of the polygraph test, Captain Dowdy told Defendant that he was not trying to add more charges. The polygraph examination and post-polygraph interview lasted approximately one hour and eight minutes.

{¶4} Following the post-polygraph interview with Captain Dowdy Detective Gilbert re-entered the room. Defendant was then interrogated by Detective Gilbert, Captain Dowdy, and then again by Detective Gilbert, in tag-team fashion.^[1] This interrogation lasted approximately two hours.

{¶5} At the beginning of the interrogation, Detective Gilbert positioned himself between Defendant and the door. Detective Gilbert admitted to having Defendant in the corner with his back against the wall. Though Defendant repeatedly denied the charges, Detective Gilbert told Defendant, "I don't know what to do to get you over the hump as far as being able to be honest and getting you out of this room and being done and moving on with life."

{¶6} After interrogating Defendant for some time, Detective Gilbert left the room again, and Captain Dowdy re-entered. Neither Captain Dowdy nor Detective Gilbert offered Defendant a break before they started another round of interrogation. Upon the commencement of this portion of the interrogation, Defendant said, "I'm tired. I want to go home. I'm tired." Captain Dowdy responded, "I know," and patted Defendant on his knee. Defendant again stated, "Guys, I want to go home. I'm done," to which Captain Dowdy said, "We can't stop you from walking out of here, and I think you know the ramifications if you do. We don't have your side of the story."

{¶7} When defense counsel asked Captain Dowdy if it would be reasonable for a person in Defendant's position to believe he was not free to leave when he asked numerous times and the officers did not let him go, Captain Dowdy responded that potentially a reasonable person might not think he was free to leave. At one point during the interrogation, Captain Dowdy placed his knees over Defendant's knees. As well, during the interrogation, Defendant was confronted with a letter allegedly written by his daughter and was told that the officers thought he did what she accused him of.

{¶8} Later, Detective Gilbert once again re-entered the room. He then stated, "I wouldn't keep you in a room talking about the same stuff if I didn't feel confident." By this point, Defendant had asked to leave twice.

{¶9} In response to a third request to leave, Detective Gilbert responded, "I can't stop you from walking out that door, but something happened. You walk out this door on your terms, you're the one that's going to make your bed, you've got to lie in it."

{¶10} At the end of the questioning, Defendant stated that on one occasion, when his daughter was twelve years old, she slept in his bed and when he woke up, his hand was rubbing her crotch, for maybe a "few minutes," while he had an erection.

{¶11} In total, Defendant was at the sheriff's office for approximately four and a half hours. Detective Gilbert never informed Defendant that he was not under arrest, and Defendant was never read his Miranda warnings.

{¶12} A hearing was held on Defendant's motion to suppress his statement to the officers. Following the hearing, the parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. On November 14, 2019, the district court issued its order on Defendant's motion to suppress statements. In its order, the district court made several findings of fact, chief among them that Defendant voluntarily spoke to the officers, voluntarily participated in a polygraph examination, Defendant was told by the officers at the start of and repeatedly throughout the interview that he was free to leave at any time, and Defendant was never restrained or denied permission to terminate the interview or leave.

DISCUSSION

{¶13} On appeal, Defendant advances four grounds for his appeal. He contends that (1) his Fifth Amendment Rights were violated because the officers failed to read his Miranda warnings; (2) the officers coerced his incriminating statement; (3) the twenty-nine-month delay in resolving this case violated his right to a speedy trial and (4) the district court erred in denying his speedy trial motion without an evidentiary hearing. We address each of Defendant's arguments below.

I. Motion to Suppress

A. Standard of Review

{¶14} "A ruling on a motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. In reviewing a district court's rulings on a motion to suppress, we review factual findings under a substantial evidence standard, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and we review de novo whether the district court correctly applied the law to the facts. In addition, we indulge in all reasonable inferences in support of the district court's ruling and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Whether a defendant was subject to a custodial interrogation and whether a defendant's statement was voluntarily given are legal determinations that we review de novo on appeal." State v. Olivas, 2011-NMCA-030, ¶ 8, 149 N.M. 498, 252 P.3d 722 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted).

B. Defendant Has Not Established That the District Court Erred by Denying His Motion to Suppress.

{¶15} Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress statements he made during a police interview contending that the police violated his Fifth Amendment rights. According to Defendant he was in custody during the interrogation and was therefore entitled to, but did not receive, Miranda warnings prior to being questioned.

{¶16} To ensure that a person suspected of a crime is not compelled to make incriminating statements, the United States Supreme Court held in Miranda that a person "must be warned that [they have] a right to remain silent, that any statement [they do] make may be used as evidence against [them], and that [they have] a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." 384 U.S. at 444; State v. Snell, 2007-NMCA-113, ¶ 9, 142 N.M. 452, 166 P.3d 1106 (same).

{¶17} Miranda warnings are required during custodial interrogation. See State v. Nieto, 2000-NMSC-031, ¶ 20, 129 N.M. 688, 12 P.3d 442. Thus, the obligation to administer Miranda warnings arises where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render them in custody. See id. If during custodial interrogation, Miranda warnings are not read, a suspect's statements cannot be used against them as substantive evidence at trial. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; Snell, 2007-NMCA-113, ¶ 9.

{¶18} Custody is determined objectively, and not from the subjective perception of any of the participants (Defendant or police) of the interrogation. See Snell 2007-NMCA-113, ¶ 10. Whether an interrogation is custodial turns on whether there was a "formal arrest or restraint...