State v. English

443 S.C. 49

902 S.E.2d 385

The STATE, Respondent,

v.Eric Emanuel ENGLISH, Petitioner.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000760

Opinion No. 28206

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard March 6, 2024

Filed June 5, 2024

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal from Lexington County, Eugene C. Griffith, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Defender Joanna Katherine Delany, of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Samuel R. Hubbard, III, of Lexington, for Respondent.

JUSTICE JAMES:

Eric English was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor. English appealed, arguing the trial court erred in allowing into evidence laboratory reports containing his and Jamie Stroman’s test results for sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling and English’s conviction. State v. English, 436 S.C. 338, 872 S.E.2d 191 (Ct. App. 2022). We granted English’s petition for a writ of certiorari and now affirm as modified in part and vacate in part the court of appeals’ opinion.

I.

The Victim in this case is English’s biological daughter. She was six or seven years old at the time she was sexually abused. On March 4, 2014, after Victim began experiencing symptoms consistent with an STD, Victim told her mother English had sexually abused her. Victim’s mother took Victim to Palmetto Health Richland where Victim tested positive for gonorrhea.

The next day, Jamie Stroman, Victim’s mother’s boyfriend, went to Lexington Medical Center’s Swansea urgent care branch and asked to be tested for STDs. Stroman tested negative for gonorrhea. The day after that, English went to Lexington Medical Center’s Lexington urgent care branch and requested an STD test. Like Victim, English tested positive for gonorrhea. There is no evidence personnel at either testing facility were aware of allegations of sexual abuse at the times Stroman’s and English’s samples were taken or at the times the test reports were prepared.

Before trial, the parties stipulated that Stroman admitted in June 2014 to digitally penetrating Victim and further stipulated Stroman was convicted in 2017 of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor. The stipulation was published to English’s jury. The State advised the trial court it would seek to introduce Victim’s, English’s, and Stroman’s STD test reports, contending they were admissible under Rule 803(6), SCRE, the business records exception to the rule against hearsay. English lodged two objections to the admission of these test reports. First, citing State v. James, 255 S.C. 365, 370, 179 S.E.2d 41, 43 (1971), English argued the test reports were not admissible without the substantiating testimony of the persons who actually performed the tests. In James, we held that "[w]here the results of tests or analyses are offered to prove an essential element of a crime or connect a defendant directly with the commission of a crime, such results must be substantiated by the person who conducted the tests or analyses." Id. Second, English objected on generic hearsay grounds but did not argue the reports did not qualify for the business records exception to hearsay found in Rule 803(6), SCRE. The trial court indicated it was inclined to admit the test reports under the business records exception if a suffi- cient foundation was established but stated it would withhold a final ruling until the records were actually offered into evidence.

During trial, the State offered Stroman’s test report into evidence through the testimony of Pamela Levi, a family nurse practitioner at Lexington Medical Center’s Swansea branch, where Stroman went for STD testing. Levi testified facility records indicated Stroman was seen by another nurse practitioner named Janice Black, who took blood samples and a urethral swab from Stroman and sent them to the main hospital’s lab for analysis. Levi testified the facility maintained contemporaneous patient records in the ordinary course of business. She testified she saw Stroman’s test results in the records system two days after Stroman’s visit and then "reviewed them and signed off on them because no additional treatment was needed." English renewed his objection under James and his hearsay objection. The trial court admitted the Stroman report under Rule 803(6), SCRE. English has never argued the Stroman report did not satisfy the particulars of Rule 803(6).

The State offered English’s test report into evidence through the testimony of Dr. Wesley Frierson, a board-certified emergency medicine physician employed at Lexington Medical Center’s Lexington urgent care facility, the same facility where English was tested. Dr. Frierson testified facility records indicated English came to Lexington Medical Center’s Lexington urgent care branch on March 6, 2014 requesting to be checked for unspecified STDs. Dr. Frierson testified he collected samples from English, sent the samples to Lexington Medical Center’s in-house lab for analysis, and viewed and verified the test results after they were entered into the hospital’s records system. He also testified contemporaneous patient records were kept in the ordinary course of business for the purpose of patient care, he relied upon those records for treatment purposes, and, while he did not conduct the tests, he personally verified the test results. Dr. Frierson did not expand on what his "verification" entailed. English renewed his James and hearsay objections, but the trial court ruled English’s report was admissible as a business record under Rule 803(6), SCRE. English has never argued his test report did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 803(6).

The jury convicted English of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor. English appealed, arguing the trial court erred in admitting his and Stroman’s test reports in violation of this Court’s mandate in James.¹ The court of appeals affirmed, holding James was distinguishable from the facts of this case and did not prohibit the admission of English’s and Stroman's test reports even though the individuals who performed the tests did not testify. English, 436 S.C. at 344-45, 872 S.E.2d at 194-95. Addressing an issue not raised in the trial court, the court of appeals also held the reports were nontestimonial under the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Davis v. Washington.² Id. at 345, 872 S.E.2d at 195. The court of appeals also held the testimony of Levi and Frierson satisfied the particulars of Rule 803(6), SCRE. Id. at 346-48, 872 S.E.2d at 195-96. The court also noted, "[a]lthough we acknowledge James has not been expressly overruled, the South Carolina Rules of Evidence, which provide exceptions to the rule against hearsay, were enacted subsequent to James. We believe this point distinguishes this case from James and supports the trial court’s ruling that the evidence is admissible under Rule 803(6)." Id. at 348 n.5, 872 S.E.2d at 196 n.5.

II.

[1–5] In criminal cases, appellate courts sit to review errors of law only. State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). Appellate courts typically review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard and give great deference to the trial court. State v. Cross, 427 S.C. 465, 473, 832 S.E.2d 281, 285 (2019). An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law. Id. We employ the abuse of discretion standard when we review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence under Rule 803(6), SCRE. However, the admissibility of Stroman’s and English’s STD test reports presents a mixed question of law and fact, as a defendant’s constitutional right is in play. We will affirm the trial court’s factual findings underpinning its legal conclusion if the factual findings are supported by any evidence in the record; however, the legal conclusion—whether either report is testimonial and therefore subject to the Confrontation Clause—is a question of law we review de novo. State v. Brewer, 438 S.C. 37, 44, 882 S.E.2d 156, 160 (2022) (citing United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 255 (4th Cir. 2019)); cf. State v. Miller, 441 S.C. 106, 119, 893 S.E.2d 306, 313 (2023) ("[W]e will review the trial court’s factual findings regarding voluntariness [of confessions under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments] for any evidentiary support. However, the ultimate legal conclusion—whether, based on those facts, a statement was voluntarily made—is a question of law subject to de novo review."); State v. Frasier, 437 S.C. 625, 633-34, 879 S.E.2d 762, 766 (2022) ("[A]ppellate review of a motion to suppress based on the Fourth Amendment involves a two-step analysis. This dual inquiry means we review the trial court’s factual findings for any evidentiary support, but the ultimate legal conclusion—in this case whether reasonable suspicion exists—is a question of law subject to de novo review.").

III.

We first address English’s argument that our holding in James renders English’s and Stroman’s test reports inadmissible. In James, we held:

Where the results of tests or analyses are offered to prove an essential element of a crime or connect a defendant directly with the commission of a crime, such results must be substantiated by the person who conducted the tests or analyses. Otherwise, the effect of their admission would be to allow a witness to testify without being subject to cross-examination, and thus deprive the accused of his constitutional right to be confronted with and to cross-examine the witness against him.

James, 255 S.C. at 370, 179 S.E.2d at 43.

[6] We decided James in 1971, more than two decades before the adoption of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence in 1995, and more than three decades before the United States Supreme Court significantly altered the...