State v. Enriquez

1

2024 ND 164

State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Christapher Branden Enriquez, Defendant and Appellant

No. 20240087

Supreme Court of North Dakota

August 14, 2024

Appeal from the District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, the Honorable Douglas L. Mattson, Judge.

Tiffany M. Sorgen, Assistant State's Attorney, Minot, ND for plaintiff and appellee; submitted on brief.

Rina Morales-Holmes, Minot, ND, for defendant and appellant submitted on brief.

OPINION

Bahr Justice

[¶1] Christapher Enriquez appeals a district court's order revoking his probation. We hold the district court's finding Enriquez possessed a firearm or dangerous weapon in violation of his probation is clearly erroneous. We further hold the court abused its discretion by revoking Enriquez's probation. We reverse.

I

[¶2] Enriquez pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver or manufacture, a class B felony. Enriquez's sentence included probation. One condition of Enriquez's probation was he "not possess a firearm, destructive device or other dangerous weapon."

[¶3] While Enriquez was on probation, federal officers from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) executed a federal search warrant on his home. During the search, the federal officers purportedly found a handgun, fentanyl pills, and methamphetamine. A DEA agent texted Enriquez's probation officer a picture "that had the handgun and the narcotics[.]"

[¶4] The State filed a petition to revoke Enriquez's probation on three grounds: possession of a handgun; possession of fentanyl; and possession of methamphetamine. At the probation revocation hearing, the State presented testimony from Enriquez's probation officer; no other witnesses testified. Addressing the first allegation, the probation officer testified he received a picture of the handgun:

Q All right. Okay. And were you provided documentation from the Department of Justice with-from DEA with regards to this search? A So when the search was happening, I was initially sent a picture that had the handgun and the narcotics and-

. . . [Objection overruled] . . .

Q Okay. You were saying?

A I was sent a text message of a picture with the evidence that was found during the search and I was sent a report from Special Agent Uler (ph.) with the DEA.

The probation officer further testified the address of the search was the address on file for Enriquez. On cross-examination, the probation officer testified he did not know where in the house the federal officers found the handgun. He further testified he did not know whether the handgun was functional.

[¶5] The State did not introduce the firearm or the picture of the firearm. The probation officer testified he received a report from a DEA agent; he did not testify about the substance of the report and the State did not introduce the report.

[¶6] At the end of the hearing, the district court held the State did not prove Enriquez possessed fentanyl or methamphetamine. The court held the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence Enriquez possessed a handgun, which was a firearm or dangerous weapon. The court revoked Enriquez's probation and resentenced him. See State v. Hager, 2010 ND 217, ¶ 8, 790 N.W.2d 745 ("[T]he State need show only a single violation to sustain revocation of probation[.]" (quoting State v. Jacobsen, 2008 ND 52, ¶ 15, 746 N.W.2d 405)).

II

[¶7] "If an alleged probation violation is contested, the prosecution must establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Hatzenbuehler, 2023 ND 192, ¶ 6, 996 N.W.2d 649. "We apply a two-step analysis in reviewing a probation revocation. '[W]e first review the district court's factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard and then review the court's decision to revoke probation under the abuse-of-discretion standard.'" Id. (quoting State v Dockter, 2019 ND 203, ¶ 11, 932 N.W.2d 98) (internal citation omitted). "Findings of fact are adequate if they provide this Court with an understanding of the district court's factual basis used in reaching its determination." Id. (quoting State v. Bergstrom, 2006 ND 45, ¶ 15, 710 N.W.2d 407). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if, although there may be some evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made." Id. (quoting State v. Ballweg, 2003 ND 153, ¶ 14, 670 N.W.2d 490). "A court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, unconscionable, or capricious manner, if its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination, or if it misinterprets or misapplies the law." State v. Dockter, 2019 ND 203, ¶ 11, 932 N.W.2d 98.

[¶8] "Revocation of probation is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, and therefore the same rights and standards do not apply." State v. Wetzel, 2011 ND 218, ¶ 14, 806 N.W.2d 193. "The Rules of Evidence do not apply in probation revocation proceedings." Id.; see also N.D.R.Ev. 1101(d)(3)(E). "Hearsay evidence is admissible at probation revocation hearings." State v. McAvoy, 2008 ND 204, ¶ 11, 757 N.W.2d 394.

A

[¶9] Enriquez argues the district court erred when it found he possessed a firearm or dangerous weapon.

[¶10] Enriquez argues the State did not prove he possessed the handgun.

[¶11] "Possession may be 'actual or constructive exclusive or joint and may be shown entirely by circumstantial evidence.'" State v. Wiese, 2024 ND 39, ¶ 11, 4 N.W.3d 242 (quoting State v. Christian, 2011 ND 56, ¶ 11, 795 N.W.2d 702). "Constructive possession is proven where evidence 'establishes that the accused had the power and capability to exercise dominion and control over the [item].'" Id. (quoting Christian, ¶ 11). Constructive possession "can be inferred from the totality of circumstances associated with a particular case." State v. Dymowski, 458 N.W.2d 490, 500 (N.D. 1990). Some "circumstances which may support an inference of constructive possession are an accused's presence in the place where [the item] is found, his proximity to the place where it is found, and the fact that the [item] is found in plain view." State v. Dahl, 2022 ND 212, ¶ 6, 982 N.W.2d 580 (quoting State v. Demarais, 2009 ND 143, ¶ 8, 770 N.W.2d 246). Of course, the identified factors are "not intended to be an all-inclusive list. As mentioned, constructive possession can be inferred from the totality of the circumstances." Dymowski, 458 N.W.2d at 500.

[¶12] Here, the probation officer testified the address of the search was the address on file for Enriquez. He also testified Enriquez was present when the federal officers executed the search warrant, but that he does not know where in the house the handgun was found. On cross-examination, the probation officer acknowledged "there was another person at his residence as well[.]" It is not clear from the record whether the other person lived at Enriquez's residence or was simply present when the search warrant was executed. Thus, the essence of the State's evidence is the federal officers located a handgun at Enriquez's residence while Enriquez was at the residence.

[¶13] In Dymowski, we noted other jurisdictions have recognized "the presence of a controlled substance on a person's premises is relevant evidence of possession of the substance." 458 N.W.2d at 500. "Possession of a firearm by a prohibited possessor is akin to illegally possessing a controlled substance or other contraband." In Int. of D.D., 2018 ND 201, ¶ 15, 916 N.W.2d 765. "It is well established that, ordinarily, when narcotics or contraband materials are found on a defendant's premises, the evidence of unlawful possession is deemed sufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of any other reasonable explanation for its presence." State v. Brennen, 356 N.W.2d 861, 865 (Neb. 1984); see also United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 617, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("A jury is entitled to infer that a person exercises constructive possession over items found in his home."); Moore v. United States, 927 A.2d 1040, 1050 (D.C. 2007) ("Evidence showing the accused's control or occupancy of the premises in which the contraband is found may also serve to prove constructive possession."); Johnson v. United States, 290 A.3d 500, 516 (D.C. 2023) ("When illicit items have been discovered in the accused's own home, a jury usually may infer that the accused had the requisite knowledge, dominion and control of them."); State v. Lattin, 256 So.3d 484, 489 (La. Ct. App. 2018) ("Courts have generally found evidence of constructive possession when a gun is found in an area customarily occupied by the defendant."); cf. Morris, 977 F.2d at 620 ("The inference that a person who occupies an apartment has dominion and control over its contents applies even when that person shares the premises with others[.]").

[¶14] The federal officers found the handgun at Enriquez's residence while he was present. The district court could reasonably infer Enriquez had control over his residence, and thus the handgun. McAvoy, 2008 ND 204, ¶¶ 12-13 (affirming probation revocation after noting reasonable inferences the district court could make based on the evidence).

[¶15] We conclude the district court's finding Enriquez possessed the handgun is not clearly erroneous because there is some evidence to support it and we are not left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.

[¶16] Enriquez argues the State did not prove the handgun was functional. Specifically, Enriquez argues there was no "testimony that the firearm was capable of expelling a projectile or was functional in any regard."

[¶17] Although not cited in his brief, Enriquez's argument appears to be based on the...