State v. Espinosa

1

The State of Arizona, Appellee, v. Adrian Arthur Espinosa, Appellant.

No. 2 CA-CR 2023-0173

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Second Division

August 6, 2024

Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No CR2020004007001 The Honorable Joseph Kreamer, Judge

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General Alice M. Jones Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals By Diane Leigh Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee

Steve Koestner, Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate By Kyle Kinkead, Deputy Legal Advocate, Phoenix Counsel for Appellant

Judge Kelly authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge O'Neil and Judge Vasquez concurred.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

KELLY JUDGE

¶1 Adrian Espinosa appeals from his convictions and sentences for felony murder, burglary, two counts of attempted first-degree murder, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdicts and resolve all reasonable inferences against Espinosa. See State v. Fierro, 254 Ariz. 35, ¶ 2 (2022). In December 2020, the victims, A.G., R.E., and J.G., along with R.E.'s two children, were at J.G.'s home when Espinosa approached the front door carrying a gift box and a plant, while wearing a backpack. Espinosa waited at the front door for A.G. to open it, and when she did, he forced himself inside the house while attempting to physically restrain her. R.E. came to A.G.'s assistance in fighting off Espinosa, and Espinosa then ran back out through the front door. A.G. chased after Espinosa, and was then fatally shot in the head by another man, Jose Beltran, outside the house.

¶3 Beltran then pointed the gun at R.E. and J.G., who were standing in the doorway, and attempted to fire the weapon. The gun jammed and no shots were fired. J.G. pulled R.E. inside the house and closed the door. Beltran attempted to force the door open, but J.G. managed to keep it shut and the victims were able to run to the backyard and escape.

¶4 Espinosa and Beltran were arrested and charged together. The trial court granted Espinosa's motion to sever his case from Beltran's. A jury found Espinosa guilty of felony murder, burglary, two counts of attempted first-degree murder, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of release after twenty-five years on the felony murder conviction and to concurrent lesser sentences on the remaining convictions. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A).

Discussion

¶5 Espinosa raises three issues on appeal. He argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for disclosure of an investigative report, referred to as the "Powers Report," and by precluding him from admitting evidence of and cross-examination regarding the victims' alleged criminal activity. He also asserts that the court erred in precluding him from cross-examining R.E. about her U-Visa application.^[1]

Denial of Motion to Compel Discovery

¶6 Espinosa argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for disclosure of the Powers Report, following the court's in camera review of the four hundred fifty-nine page report prepared by a private investigator as to victim J.G. He contends the court's ruling that the report contained no relevant evidence and was therefore not discoverable under Rule 15.1(g), Ariz. R. Crim. P., violated his due process and confrontation clause rights.

¶7 We review the trial court's discovery rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Garza, 216 Ariz. 56, ¶ 35 (2007); Blazek v. Superior Court, 177 Ariz. 535, 537 (App. 1994) ("A trial court has broad discretion over discovery matters, and this court will not disturb that discretion absent a showing of abuse."). We review an alleged constitutional violation de novo. State v. Connor, 215 Ariz. 553, ¶ 6 (App. 2007).

¶8 The state argues that Espinosa waived this claim because he did not raise it below. As to the discoverability ruling, we disagree. Espinosa challenged the trial court's preliminary assessment of the report's relevance in a pretrial hearing. See State v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz. 485, ¶ 64 (1999) ("An objection is sufficiently made if it provides the judge with an opportunity to provide a remedy."). However, Espinosa raises his due process and confrontation clause claims for the first time on appeal, and has therefore forfeited review for all but fundamental, prejudicial error. See State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, ¶ 12 (2018). This standard requires Espinosa to demonstrate that "(1) the error went to the foundation of the case, (2) the error took from the defendant a right essential to his defense, or (3) the error was so egregious that he could not possibly have received a fair trial." Id. ¶ 21.

¶9 A trial court may order any person to make available to the defense material or information that are found to be of substantial need for the preparation of the defendant's case when the substantial equivalent cannot be obtained without undue hardship. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(g)(1). If production would infringe on a victim's constitutional rights, the defendant must show that the substantial need is "one of constitutional dimension." R.S. v. Thompson, 251 Ariz. 111, ¶ 12 (2021) (quoting Connor, 215 Ariz. 553, ¶ 22). If the defendant makes this showing, the court must balance the defendant's and the victim's rights and interests. Id. "Information is not discoverable unless it could lead to admissible evidence or would be admissible itself." State v. Fields, 196 Ariz. 580, ¶ 4 (App. 1999).

¶10 Before trial, Espinosa requested disclosure of the Powers Report, arguing it was relevant to "a factual determination of [Espinosa's] role, what he knew, or didn't know, et cetera." During a case management conference, the parties informed the trial court that this was a voluminous report prepared by a private investigator, and the state generally described in court what the report contained-personal information regarding victim J.G., including her marital history, bank and retirement accounts, property ownership, and other private information. The state argued the report was not relevant or discoverable, but would submit it to the court if ordered. The court agreed to review the report in camera. Following this review, the court denied Espinosa's disclosure request, finding that the "documents constitute an asset investigation of [J.G.]" and that:

none of the documents are inculpatory, exculpatory; nor do they contain any . . . admissible evidence; nor do they contain documents that . . . could reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or would be otherwise-would otherwise form the basis of cross-examination of any witness.

¶11 Espinosa argues on appeal that the trial court erred because the report "was potentially relevant and necessary to have access to all information which could help the defense show what [Espinosa] did or did not know," and that there was "also the possibility that the Powers Report would be probative to the theory that the attack was engineered due to [R.E.] owing money" to a former business partner in Mexico. Lastly, he contends there was "the possibility that the report would be probative to whether the attack had any connection to the father of [R.E.'s] children, who had threatened the family previously."

¶12 Evidence is relevant if it "has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence" and is a fact "of consequence in determining the action." Ariz. R. Evid. 401. Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Ariz. R. Evid. 402. Espinosa fails to articulate, beyond pure speculation, how any information that might have been in the report would have had any tendency to make it more or less probable that he attempted to break into the victims' home, that Beltran shot and killed A.G., or that he and his accomplice committed any of the other criminal acts he was convicted of. "[M]ere conjecture without more that certain information might be useful as exculpatory evidence is not sufficient to reverse a trial court's denial of a request for disclosure." State v. Hatton, 116 Ariz. 142, 150 (1977); see also State v. Superior Court, 107 Ariz. 332, 334 (1971) (defendant must show how evidence "could have made a valid contribution to his defense").

¶13 Based on the record before us, and given the trial court's determination that the Powers Report lacked any relevant or discoverable information, the court properly concluded that Espinosa had failed to demonstrate a substantial need for this report and the state was not obligated to disclose it.^[2] See Connor, 215 Ariz. 553, ¶¶ 18-25 (defendant failed to establish substantial need for victim's medical records when, among other reasons, majority of the evidence sought would be inadmissible). We find no error, let alone fundamental, prejudicial error, see Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, ¶ 12, and the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Espinosa's motion to compel disclosure of the Powers Report, see Brown v. Superior Court, 137 Ariz. 327, 332 (1983) (an appeals court must defer to the trial court's ruling denying disclosure of irrelevant evidence after in camera review).

Cartel Activity and Criminal Enterprise

¶14 Espinosa next argues that the trial court erred by precluding him from introducing evidence and cross-examining witnesses as to one of the victims being "involved in fraudulent activity" and "wanted by the Mexican cartel." We review a court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an...