State v. Fairchild

1

The State of Arizona, Appellee, v. Antron Fairchild, Appellant.

No. 2 CA-CR 2022-0164

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Second Division

July 29, 2024

Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. CR20192416001 The Honorable Javier Chon-Lopez, Judge

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General Alice M. Jones Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals By Tanja K. Kelly, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee

Law Offices of Thomas Jacobs, Tucson By Thomas Jacobs Counsel for Appellant

Chief Judge Staring authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Gard and Judge Eckerstrom concurred.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

STARING, CHIEF JUDGE

¶1 Antron Fairchild appeals from his convictions and sentences for assault, aggravated domestic violence, and two counts of aggravated assault. Fairchild argues the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the victim's statement to a treating physician regarding the identity of her assailant. Additionally, he asserts there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Finally, Fairchild argues the court erred in dismissing his motion for a new trial based on its refusal to order reevaluation of his competency. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdicts. State v. Pena, 235 Ariz 277, ¶ 5 (2014). In May 2019, an altercation occurred between Fairchild and K.R., who have a child together. K.R. sustained injuries that included facial and spinal fractures. She received treatment at a hospital where she was examined by a trauma surgeon, Dr. Bellal Joseph.

¶3 The next day, a Tucson Police Department detective interviewed K.R. at the hospital and subsequently executed a search warrant at the home she shared with Fairchild. After a failed attempt to hide from police,^[1] Fairchild exited the home and spoke to the detective, acknowledging that an "incident" had occurred "in the master bedroom" while his son was "in an adjacent bedroom." Fairchild was arrested and charged with assault, aggravated domestic violence, aggravated harassment, and two counts of aggravated assault.^[2]

¶4 After a jury trial, Fairchild was acquitted of aggravated harassment but convicted of the remaining charges. After unsuccessfully moving for a new trial, Fairchild was sentenced to concurrent prison terms, the longest of which is eight years. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13- 4033(A)(1), (2).

Discussion I. K.R.'s Statement to Treating Physician

¶5 Fairchild argues the trial court erred by permitting the state to introduce through Dr. Joseph K.R.'s statement to him that her "baby's daddy" had assaulted her. Fairchild argues the statement was inadmissible under Rule 803(4), Ariz. R. Evid., as it was "unnecessary for her medical treatment." Fairchild also contends admission of K.R.'s statement through Joseph's testimony violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. We review the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion but review challenges under the Confrontation Clause de novo. State v. Bennett, 216 Ariz. 15, ¶ 4 (App 2007); see State v. Wall, 212 Ariz. 1, ¶ 12 (2006) (error of law in reaching discretionary conclusion may constitute abuse of discretion).

¶6 Before trial, the state moved for admission of K.R.'s statements to doctors for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment pursuant to Rule 803(4). At the hearing on the state's motion, Fairchild acknowledged the admissibility of medical testimony regarding K.R.'s injuries and how they had occurred. However, he argued, testimony regarding the identity of the person who had inflicted the injuries was irrelevant to K.R.'s medical treatment and was therefore inadmissible. The state countered that, pursuant to State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191 (1987), testimony about "who committed the assault" is relevant to a victim's medical treatment because it "guides the doctors as to further treatment follow-up, consultation with any social workers, [and] whether or not the victim would be safe to return home." The trial court agreed with the state, ruling K.R.'s statements to doctors identifying her assailant were admissible.

¶7 On the second day of trial, during the state's direct examination of Dr. Joseph, Fairchild reminded the court he had "previously made an objection to identifying [him] through [K.R.'s] medical records" and asked the court to acknowledge his "standing objection" to such testimony. The court, in "repeat[ing]" its previous ruling, noted the statements were "admissible for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment," and, "just from the foundation that was laid, it is important to devise any treatment plan knowing the history and sometimes the perpetrator who committed the offenses." The doctor subsequently testified K.R. had reported "[h]ead, neck, [and] facial pain after being assaulted by her baby's daddy earlier th[at] evening." K.R. did not testify at trial.

¶8 We first address Fairchild's argument that admission of Dr. Joseph's testimony was erroneous under the rules of evidence. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered "in[to] evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement." Ariz. R. Evid. 801(c). Generally, such statements are inadmissible unless they fall within a recognized exception. See State v. Lopez, 217 Ariz. 433, ¶ 8 (App. 2008); Ariz. R. Evid. 802, 803. Rule 803(4) creates such an exception for a victim's statements that are "made for-and [are] reasonably pertinent to-medical diagnosis or treatment" and "describe[] medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause." The rationale behind Rule 803(4) is that "doctors will seek and patients will give reliable information to further necessary medical treatment." Robinson, 153 Ariz. at 199. The defining question for application of Rule 803(4) is "whether the declarant's out-ofcourt statements were 'reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436 (8th Cir. 1985)). To determine whether statements were reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment, our supreme court has developed a two-part test requiring us to consider whether: (1) the declarant's apparent motive was consistent with receiving medical care, and (2) it was reasonable for a doctor to rely on the information in diagnosing or treating the declarant. Id.; see State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 420-21 (1983).

¶9 Here, Fairchild argues that, "[w]hile the description of how [K.R.] was assaulted may have been relevant to medical treatment, the identification of the alleged assailant was not." In support of his argument, Fairchild cites Robinson, 153 Ariz. at 200, for the proposition that Arizona courts "recognize that the identity of the victim's assailant and other statements attributing fault ordinarily are inadmissible under Rule 803(4) because identity and fault usually are not relevant to diagnosis or treatment." The Robinson court, he asserts, permitted only "limited use of identification testimony that was offered during medical treatment in child sex abuse cases, where the identification of the perpetrator is necessary for treatment." And, because this case does not involve sexual abuse of a child, Fairchild argues, K.R.'s "identification of her 'baby daddy' as her assailant was in no way relevant to her treatment" and the court erred in admitting Dr. Joseph's testimony.

¶10 The trial court did not err in admitting K.R.'s statement to Dr. Joseph that she had been assaulted by her "baby's daddy." Although Robinson set forth a general rule that the identity of the perpetrator is usually not relevant to medical care, it concluded that the identity can become relevant where "effective treatment" requires the victim to "avoid contact with the abuser, not just to prevent further abuse, but also to facilitate recovery from past abuse." 153 Ariz. at 200. We do not read that opinion as limiting that reasoning to cases of child sex abuse. And as in child sex abuse cases, medical providers treating domestic violence victims must identify the abuser to counsel the patient in the practical steps necessary to prevent further injuries and allow the current injuries to heal.

¶11 Notably, Dr. Joseph testified that "we traditionally try to screen for domestic violence whether the person says it or not." He also testified that if domestic violence is identified or documented, "based on the history, . . . we do have a case manager and social worker who also approach the patient" to identify "places they can go that are safe." Thus, "[w]hen the abuser's identity is elicited and given to further treatment, the doctor's and the declarant's 'selfish interest[s]' in giving and obtaining proper treatment are sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to at least allow the jury to evaluate the statements." Id. (alteration in Robinson) (quoting Renville, 779 F.2d at 438).

¶12 Further, even were we to conclude the trial court erred by admitting K.R.'s statement regarding the identity of her assailant, any error was harmless. See State v Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶ 18 (2005). In assessing whether an objected-to error is harmless, we must determine whether the state has shown "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict or sentence." State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, ¶ 30 (2018) (quoting State v. Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. 254, ¶ 126 (2017)). "The inquiry . . . is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely...