State v. Franklin

897 S.E.2d 432

The STATE

v.FRANKLIN.

S23A0842

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: January 17, 2024

Superior Court, Fulton County, Belinda E. Edwards, Judge

Kevin Christopher Armstrong, Senior A.D.A., Fani T. Willis, District Attorney, Fulton County District Attorney’s Office, 136 Pryor Street SW, Third Floor, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334, for Appellant.

Jonathan Reuven Melnick, Jonathan R. Melnick PC, Suite 750, 3355 Lenox Road, Atlanta, Georgia 30326, for Appellee.

Boggs, Chief Justice.

Appellee Dequavius Dexter Franklin was indicted for the murder of Jaquon Anderson and related offenses. Appellee filed a generalized motion to suppress, through which he later challenged the introduction of a statement he made to law enforcement while in a hospital on January 4, 2022, and the State filed a corresponding motion in limine to adjudicate the admissibility of the same. After the trial court granted Appellee’s motion to suppress the January 4 statement he made to law enforcement on the basis that "the statement was not voluntary" due to Appellee’s medication, medical condition, and circumstances surrounding his physical condition, the State appealed pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4). The State contends that Appellee’s statement was voluntary. We agree because no evidence in the record shows that law enforcement coerced Appellee’s statement and accordingly, reverse.

[1–4] 1. When ruling on a motion to suppress, a trial court decides whether a defendant’s statement is admissible based on the preponderance of the evidence considering the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Rumph, 307 Ga. 477, 477, 837 S.E.2d 358 (2019). The State bears the burden of proof. See State v. Hinton, 309 Ga. 457, 457, 847 S.E.2d 188 (2020). We have previously explained that "when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a suppression issue, an appellate court must construe the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the factual findings and judgment of the trial court." Walker v. State, 312 Ga. 332, 336, 862 S.E.2d 542 (2021) (cleaned up). In cases where "some or all of the material facts [are] undisputed," we "properly may take notice of the undisputed facts — even if the trial court did not — without interfering with the prerogative of the trial court to resolve disputes of material fact." Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 746 n.4, 770 S.E.2d 636 (2015).¹ Finally, we review de novo the application of the facts to the law — that is, the trial court’s ultimate conclusion whether, under all the circumstances, the defendant’s statement was voluntary. See Doricien v. State, 310 Ga. 652, 656, 853 S.E.2d 120 (2020). See also Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 348, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976) ("When [a voluntariness] claim is raised, it is the duty of an appellate court, including this Court, to examine the entire record and make an independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness." (cleaned up)).

2. Viewed in this light, the evidence in the record and presented at the Jackson-Denno² hearing showed the following. The arrest warrant affidavit recited ³ that on December 31, 2021, Detective Alfred Hogan with the Atlanta Police Department responded to a 911 call reporting a shooting and armed robbery by two masked assailants at a residence in Fulton County. Detective Hogan discovered Anderson’s body lying in the main room of the residence and noticed a large amount of blood on the opposite side of the room from Anderson as well as a black ski mask on the floor near his body. Detective Hogan deduced that the blood on the opposite side of the room did not belong to Anderson, and subsequent investigation led Detective Hogan to believe that Anderson fired shots during the robbery and injured an assailant and that the injured assailant fled, leaving the blood and ski mask behind. Detective Hogan learned while responding to the 911 call that someone wearing a black ski mask delivered Appellee to Emory Hospital Midtown ("Emory") and that Appellee was suffering an abdominal gunshot wound.⁴

Appellee’s medical records were introduced at the hearing, but there was no testimony offered about the records. Those records show that Emory transferred Appellee to Atlanta Medical Center ("AMC") for surgery to remove his spleen, left kidney, and pancreas and to repair his abdomen. AMC administered propofol, fentanyl, and other medication to Appellee for anesthesia and pain relief. On January 3, 2022, Appellee underwent a second surgery due to respiratory failure and blood loss anemia and received nourishment through a feeding tube.

Detective Hogan testified at the hearing that during his investigation, he narrowed the suspects down to Appellee and a second, unidentified person. Detective Hogan obtained a search warrant for Appellee’s DNA, and on January 4, 2022, he obtained the permission of hospital staff to interview Appellee and did so in his hospital room; the interview was audio-recorded. Before the interview he "ma[d]e efforts to make sure that [Appellee] was physically and mentally capable and well enough to speak with [him] during [the] investigation" by contacting hospital staff. During the interview, only Detective Hogan and Appellee were in the room, although nurses occasionally entered and exited. Detective Hogan testified that Appellee was not under arrest at the time; that he had not obtained an arrest warrant for Appellee; that Appellee was not in handcuffs; and that neither Appellee’s hands nor feet were bound together. Detective Hogan further testified that he believed that Appellee comprehended English, understood the questions, and answered the questions. Before leaving he executed the search warrant for Appellee’s DNA by obtaining a buccal swab. He intended to seek an arrest warrant for Appellee if the DNA results placed Appellee at the crime scene.

The medical records show that Appellee remained in the hospital until January 19, 2022. According to Detective Hogan’s testimony and the arrest warrant affidavit, Detective Hogan later learned that the DNA at the crime scene matched that of Appellee. After the arrest warrant was issued, Detective Hogan arrested Appellee.

Following the hearing, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion to suppress the January 4 statement. In its order, the trial court considered the testimony of Detective Hogan set forth above, referenced Appellee’s medical records, and concluded:

Based on this medical history it is readily apparent that the statement the State is attempting to admit should not be admitted as Mr. Franklin was in no physical or mental condition to give a knowingly voluntary statement or waive his Fifth Amendment privilege.

Due to the medication the Defendant was receiving, his medical condition and the circumstances surrounding the Defendant’s physical condition, this Court exercises its[ ] discretion and finds that the statement was not voluntary and is inadmissible in the trial of this case.

3. The State argues that the trial court erred in excluding the statement on the ground that it was "not voluntary." We agree.

At the outset, we note that we read the trial court’s order as ruling that Appellee’s statement was involuntary under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the order focuses on "the medication [Appellee] was receiving, his medical condition and the circumstances surrounding [his] physical condition." See State v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 779, 770 S.E.2d 808 (2015) (distinguishing statutory and constitutional voluntariness analyses). Although the issues of whether Appellee’s statement was involuntary under OCGA § 24-8-824 and whether he should have been notified of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), were raised by the parties, the trial court’s order does not expressly make such rulings, and we do not read the trial court’s order as making those determinations, so we need not address them.

[5] Constitutionally, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands that a confession or inculpatory statement be "the product of a rational intellect and a free will" under the totality of the circumstances.⁵ Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206, 208, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960). See also Doricien, 310 Ga. at 657, 853 S.E.2d 120; Chulpayev, 296 Ga. at 771, 770 S.E.2d 808 (explaining "that the rule as to the admissibility of an incriminatory statement is the same as that applied to a full confession" (cleaned up)). The Supreme Court of the United States has held "that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). In Connelly, the Supreme Court reversed the suppression of a confession that a defendant gave "without any prompting" by law enforcement and due to voices in his head that demanded he confess. Id. at 159-163, 107 S.Ct. 515. The Supreme Court observed that, although the mental condition of a defendant had become the focus of voluntariness analyses "as interrogators … turned to more subtle forms of psychological persuasion," the Supreme Court’s involuntariness cases remained "focused upon the crucial element of police overreaching." Id. at 163-164, 107 S.Ct. 515. The Supreme Court further explained that requiring "state action" for a due process violation was consistent with the general principle that "[t]he most outrageous behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence against a defendant does not make that evidence inadmissible under the Due Process Clause" and avoided applying the exclusionary rule when it would not deter constitutional violations...