State v. Fussell

286 So.3d 1011

STATE of Louisiana

v.Hunter FUSSELL

No. 2019-KA-01061

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

December 11, 2019

Matthew Caplan, for appellant.

Shannon Christian Mese, for appellee.

PER CURIAM:^*

Children's Code article 305(A), pertaining to divestiture of juvenile court jurisdiction and original criminal court jurisdiction over children, provides:

A. (1) When a child is fifteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of first degree murder, second degree murder, aggravated or first degree rape, or aggravated kidnapping, he is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court until either:

(a) An indictment charging one of these offenses is returned.

(b) The juvenile court holds a continued custody hearing pursuant to Articles 819 and 820 and finds probable cause that he committed one of these offenses, whichever occurs first. During this hearing, when the child is charged with aggravated or first degree rape, the court shall inform him that if convicted he shall register as a sex offender for life, pursuant to Chapter 3-B of Title 15 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950.

(2) Thereafter, the child is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate court exercising criminal jurisdiction for all subsequent procedures, including the review of bail applications, and the court exercising criminal jurisdiction may order that the child be transferred to the appropriate adult facility for detention prior to his trial as an adult.

Defendant Hunter Fussell was indicted for a first degree rape of a victim under the age of thirteen, La.R.S. 14:42(A)(4), that he was alleged to have committed on or shortly after his fifteenth birthday. At that point, pursuant to Article 305(A), defendant became subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court exercising its criminal jurisdiction.

Defendant filed motions contending that the automatic transfer provision of Article 305(A) violates several constitutional provisions, both state and federal, as well as evolving United States Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizing the special characteristics of juveniles that can affect their capabilities and culpability. In response, the district court ultimately ruled that this automatic transfer provision violates due process and that a transfer hearing, comparable to the one provided in Children's Code art. 862,¹ is constitutionally required before a juvenile can be transferred to a district court exercising criminal jurisdiction. In reaching those conclusions, the district court relied on United States Supreme Court jurisprudence holding that juveniles are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.² The district court also relied heavily on Kent v. United States , 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), for the propositions that transfer from juvenile court imposes a significant deprivation of liberty and therefore warrants protection under the due process clause, and that a transfer from juvenile court should not occur unless the due process protections provided to juveniles are satisfied. A probable cause determination based solely on the nature of the offense alleged and evidence defendant committed the offense is inadequate to satisfy due process, the district court found, without a judicial determination that the juvenile will not benefit from the special protections and opportunities for rehabilitation offered by the juvenile court. The district court also found that a juvenile who is subject to the automatic transfer provision is denied the equal protection of law. Thus, the district court quashed the transfer of defendant from the juvenile to district court.

Because the district court declared the automatic transfer provision of Article 305(A) to be unconstitutional, that declaration is appealable to this court pursuant to La. Const. Art. V, § 5 (D). Before determining the correctness of the trial court's declaration, this court must first decide whether the issue of constitutionality was properly raised below. "[A] constitutional challenge may not be considered by an appellate court unless it was properly pleaded and raised in the trial court below." State v. Hatton , 07-2377, p. 13 (La. 7/1/08), 985 So.2d 709, 718. In Hatton , the court described the proper procedure for challenging the constitutionality of a statute, expressing the challenger's burden as a three-step analysis. "First, a party must raise the unconstitutionality in the trial court; second, the unconstitutionality of a statute must be specially pleaded; and third, the grounds outlining the basis of unconstitutionality must be particularized." Id. , 07-2377,p. 14, 985 So.2d at 719.

In the present case, a review of the record shows that defendant properly raised, pleaded, and particularized his challenge under the Due Process Clause, and its state constitution counterpart, and the district court's declaration of unconstitutionality on that ground is properly before this court on appeal. Defendant's equal protection challenge, however, was not specially pleaded.³ Nonetheless, we will briefly address equal protection for the sake of completeness and expediency.

This court held that when a statute classifies persons on the basis of any of the six enumerated grounds in La. Const. Art. I § 3, including age, the statute is unconstitutional unless the proponents are able to prove that the legislative classification "substantially furthers an appropriate state purpose." Manuel v. State , 95-2189, p. 4 (La. 3/8/96), 692 So.2d 320, 323, quoting Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University , 477 So.2d 1094, 1108 (La. 1985). Defendant here contends that the automatic transfer provision draws a suspect age-based distinction between juveniles that not only fails to further an appropriate state purpose but defeats one—i.e., the rehabilitative purpose of having a separate juvenile court system—because the transfer is automatic without regard to whether the juvenile could benefit from the rehabilitative opportunities afforded by a juvenile court. However, in scrutinizing La.R.S. 13:1570(A)(5),⁴ which was a predecessor to Article 305(A), this court found that provision furthered the state's interest in protecting the public from serious, violent felonies. State v. Perique , 439 So.2d 1060, 1064 (La. 1983) ; see also State v. Leach , 425 So.2d 1232, 1236-37 (La. 1983) ("In the instant case the classifications embodied are not arbitrary and bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest, the protection of its citizens by exposing older minors who are accused of committing serious and violent felonies to the usual procedures and sanctions of the state's criminal law system."). Defendant fails to persuade the court erred there (even if this claim was properly before the court now). The automatic transfer provision is the product of the balancing of policy considerations involving not only those relating to the special treatment of juveniles but also public safety. It is the prerogative of the legislature to engage in this balancing calculus.

The Perique decision also informs our analysis of due process. In Perique , this court discussed Kent v. United States , which figures prominently in defendant's arguments and the district court's reasons here. The juvenile court in Kent opted to waive its jurisdiction over a 16-year-old child without holding a hearing, making any findings, or providing any reason for the waiver. The United States Supreme Court found the waiver invalid because it violated the procedures established by statute in that jurisdiction. Kent , 383 U.S. at 557, 86 S.Ct. at 1055. The Supreme Court's statutory interpretation was informed by "constitutional principles relating to due process and assistance of counsel." Id. The Supreme Court noted that the juvenile's right to assistance of counsel in conjunction with the waiver would be "meaningless—an illusion, a mockery—unless counsel is given the opportunity to function" at a waiver hearing. Kent , 383 U.S. at 561, 86 S.Ct. at 1057. In addition, the Supreme Court found the waiver hearing "must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment." Kent , 383 U.S. at 562, 86 S.Ct. at 1057 ; see also Application of Gault , 387 U.S. 1, 12–13, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1436, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). In Perique , we distinguished the statutory framework in Kent from that under the predecessor to Article 305(A) :

The situation in the case at bar, however, is easily distinguishable from that in Kent . In this case, there are no statutory rights of which defendants are being deprived. Once a sixteen-year-old is charged with armed robbery, the question is not one of "transfer" of jurisdiction. Rather, the juvenile court is automatically divested of jurisdiction. This divestiture is not a matter of discretion on the part of the juvenile court or the district attorney, but is controlled by the statute defining the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts, La.R.S. 13:1570 A(5).

Since the defendants are not being deprived of "important statutory rights," the question is not one of due process, but of whether La.R.S. 13:1570 A(5) is a valid exercise of the State's police powers. We have already held that classifications by age and seriousness of the offense are not arbitrary or capricious, and that the classifications bear a rational relationship to the legitimate state interest of protecting the public from serious, violent felonies. State v. Leach , supra . Further, since the legislative intent is clearly that those fifteen and sixteen year olds charged with the enumerated offenses be treated in all respects as adults, we see no reason to depart from the rule that the district attorney has "entire charge and control of every criminal prosecution instituted and pending in his district, and determines whom, when and how he shall prosecute."

Perique , 439 So.2d at 1064 (citations omitted).

Defendant here contends our ...