State v. G.O.

543 P.3d 1096

STATE of Kansas, Appellant,

v.G.O., Appellee.

No. 124,676

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Oral Argument Held January 31, 2023.

Opinion Filed March 1, 2024.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, protects the right of a person to remain silent, unless the individual chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of the person’s own will, and to suffer no penalty for such silence. Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), law enforcement officers must inform individuals subject to custodial interrogation of this and other Fifth Amendment rights. Once the Miranda advisories are communicated, an individual may waive the right to remain silent, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Courts use this same voluntariness standard to evaluate a juvenile’s waiver of Miranda rights.

2. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies when the interrogation techniques were improper because, in the circumstances of the case, the confession is not the product of an individual’s free and rational will. Applying this aspect of the due process protection requires courts to assess the totality of all an interrogation’s surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the individual and the details of the interrogation—to determine if a confession is a free and unconstrained choice by its maker.

3. Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to a finding that a confession is not voluntary. And there must be a link between coercive activity of the State and a resulting confession by a defendant.

4. An individual’s mental condition, by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion, can never dispose of the inquiry into constitutional voluntariness of a confession.

5. Even where there is a link between police misconduct and a confession, it does not automatically follow that there has been a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Voluntariness must be determined from the totality of the circumstances.

6. Potential circumstances of the interrogation that may be relevant to whether a confession was voluntary include, but are not limited to, the length of the interview; the accused’s ability to communicate with the outside world; any delay in arraignment; the length of custody; the general conditions under which the statements took place; any physical or psychological pressure brought to bear on the accused; the officer’s fairness in conducting the interview, including any promises, inducements, threats, methods, or strategies used to compel a response; whether the accused was informed of the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination through the Miranda advisory; and whether the officer negated or otherwise failed to honor the accused’s Fifth Amendment rights.

7. Potential characteristics or circumstances of the accused that may be relevant to a determination of whether a confession was voluntary include, but are not limited to, the accused’s age; maturity; intellect; education; fluency in English; physical, mental, and emotional condition; and experience, including experience with law enforcement.

8. When the protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments apply, the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that an individual voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and voluntarily—that is, based on the person’s unfettered will—made a statement. To do so, the State must establish that police or other state actors did not intimidate, coerce, deceive, or engage in other misconduct that, when considered in the totality of the circumstances, was the motivation for the individual to make a statement.

9. On appeal from a trial judge’s determination of whether the State met the burden of proving an individual voluntarily confessed, appellate courts apply a mixed standard of review. The appellate court reviews the trial judge’s findings of fact about the totality of circumstances to see whether each is supported by substantial competent evidence. Appellate courts assess de novo the trial judge’s legal conclusion based on those facts. This means the appellate court gives no deference to the trial judge’s legal conclusion about voluntariness.

10. Neither K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-460(f)(2)(B), a hearsay exception, nor the reliability standard it incorporates apply when a court decides whether an accused’s statements to law enforcement officers violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The purpose of the Due Process Clause is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false. Holdings to the contrary in State v. McCarther, 197 Kan. 279, 285, 416 P.2d 290 (1966), and its progeny are overruled.

Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed September 23, 2022. Appeal from Shawnee District Court; Nancy E. Parrish, judge.

Natalie Chalmers, assistant solicitor general, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, was with her on the briefs for appellant.

Reid T. Nelson, of Capital and Conflicts Appeals Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Luckert, C.J.:

G.O., a minor, seeks to prevent the State from using statements he made during an interview with a police officer at trial. He argues the officer’s coercive tactics caused him to involuntarily waive rights protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The trial judge agreed with his arguments, but a divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the suppression order. State v. G.O., No. 124,676, 2022 WL 4391366, at *9 (Kan. App. 2022) (unpublished opinion).

We affirm the trial judge and reverse the Court of Appeals. In reversing the Court of Appeals, we hold the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against an involuntary confession being used as evidence against an accused regardless of its reliability. In reaching that holding, we overrule caselaw cited by the Court of Appeals majority in holding the record did not support the conclusion that G.O. falsely confessed and, because his confession was reliable, it should not be suppressed. Rather than focusing on the reliability of G.O.’s confession, we examine the coercive nature of the police detective’s interrogation techniques and the totality of other circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This review leads us to hold that the interrogation offended concepts of due process.

Factual and Procedural Background

When G.O. was 16 years old, his younger stepsister, while hospitalized, revealed G.O. had molested her. Hospital personnel notified G.O.’s mother, his stepfather, and the Kansas Department for Children and Families, known as DCF. A DCF representative came to G.O.’s home and told G.O.’s mother that G.O. would need to be removed from the home by the time G.O.’s stepsister was released from the hospital. The representative also suggested individual and family counseling and discussed a long-term goal of reintegrating the family. The DCF representative said that all family members would be interviewed, and they would be contacted to set up the interviews.

The next call received by G.O.’s mother was from a Topeka Police Department detective. G.O.’s mother testified she understood DCF had referred the family for interviews, so they cooperated in setting up interviews with the detective. The detective interviewed G.O.’s stepsister first and then other members of the family, except G.O. The detective then told G.O.’s mother he would like to interview G.O. at the police station. He assured her that G.O. would not be arrested, only interviewed.

G.O. had moved in with his father, but G.O.’s mother drove him to the interview at the Topeka Police Department. She told G.O., who had no earlier contact with law enforcement, that he had to talk to the detective because she "thought we all had to." She also told G.O. that "he was going to have to give more details when he talked to" the detective than he had when he talked to her about the allegations. No one explained to her that G.O. and the other family members could refuse to talk to the police.

When they arrived at the police station, G.O.’s mother asked if she could sit in on the interview. The detective told her to wait in the lobby. He then took G.O. to an interview room.

The detective began the interview by saying they would just "hang out" in the room and that he would not take long so that G.O. could get back to school. G.O. explained he was on his way to the orthodontist to repair a broken bracket and wire on his braces. The detective reassured G.O. their talk would not take long. He then thanked G.O. for coming "so we can get some stuff cleared up. Your Mom probably told you but I’m going to tell you again, all right. You are not under arrest," G.O. said he knew. The detective added: "You’re not going to be under arrest when we’re done." G.O. nodded his head affirmatively.

The detective then framed the purpose of the meeting: "I’m just trying to clear some things up for you and your sister, especially for your sister." G.O. replied, "Yeah," and the detective continued: "I mean, you know, I think you know that your sister is kinda hurting right now." G.O. responded: "Oh, big time. I want her to be better." The detective followed that by saying, "If we can get some of this stuff cleared up and kind of aired out, I think that’s going to help out everybody. Okay?" When G.O. replied, "Yeah," the detective added: "And, so, that’s what we are here to do, right. This isn’t about getting people in trouble. This is about trying to fix some things. Okay?" G.O....