State v. Gaffin

2021-Ohio-2659

STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KEVIN GAFFIN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20CA1115

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Adams

August 3, 2021

William R. Gallagher, Elizabeth Conkin, Arenstein &amp Gallagher, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant.

D Vincent Faris, Clermont County Prosecutor, Nick Horton, Scott O'Reilly, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, Batavia, Ohio for Appellee.

DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Jason P. Smith Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Kevin Gaffin appeals the Decision and Final Judgment Entry Denying Petition for Postconviction Relief of the Adams County Common Pleas Court, entered May 4, 2020. Gaffin asserts the trial court abused its discretion by failing to adhere to the law of the case doctrine, in contravention of this court's decision in State v. Gaffin, 4th Dist. Adams No. 17CA1057, 2019-Ohio-291, affirmed in part and reversed in part. Gaffin further asserts that the trial court failed to objectively review his petition and the witnesses' testimony, demonstrating bias, and thereby compromising the integrity of the postconviction hearing and the court's final decision on his petition. Upon review we find no merit to Appellant's arguments. Accordingly, we overrule the assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶2} Mr. Gaffin, "Appellant," was indicted in 2015 on seven counts: three counts of rape, R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) each felonies of the first degree; three counts of sexual battery, R.C. 2907.03(A)(5); each felonies of the second degree, with specifications; and one count of felonious assault, R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the second degree. The alleged victim was his stepson, R.A. The underlying facts adduced at trial are set forth fully in State v. Gaffin, 4th Dist. Adams No. 16CA1027, 2017-Ohio-2935, ¶¶ 4-15, "Gaffin I."

{¶3} Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief which the trial court dismissed without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Appellant challenged the trial court's dismissal of his petition in State v. Gaffin, 4th Dist. Adams No. 17CA1057, 2019-Ohio-291, "Gaffin II." In Gaffin II, Appellant presented three assignments of error. First, Appellant asserted that the trial court violated his right to due process under the United States and Ohio Constitutions when it dismissed his postconviction petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Next, Appellant asserted the trial court violated his right to due process under the United States and Ohio Constitutions when it dismissed his own affidavit attached to his petition as self-serving and not credible. Finally, Appellant asserted that the trial court violated his right to due process under the United States and Ohio Constitutions when it denied his petition, as it contained a sufficient constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and was supported by adequate documentary evidence to warrant vacation of his conviction and sentence.

{¶4} Upon review, we found the trial court did abuse its discretion in dismissing Appellant's petition without an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we sustained the first assignment of error and the third assignment of error in part. We overruled the second assignment of error.

{¶5} When resolving Appellant's third assignment of error in Gaffin II, we found as follows at ¶ 78:

After reviewing the eight listed affidavits, we find that the trial court erred in finding that certain portions of specific affidavits would have been inadmissible under Evid.R. 608(B). Specifically, we find that the trial court improperly found that the statements made in Decker's, Bowling's, and Malott's affidavits were inadmissible under Evid.R. 608(B).^[1] (Emphasis added). Accordingly, we find that this portion of Gaffin's third assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled in part.

{¶6} We further opined in Gaffin II at ¶ 88:

[I]n light of the admissible evidence Gaffin provided, we find that there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have returned a different verdict. Had the jury heard the witnesses' testimony, especially that of the two officers from the Manchester Police Department, it is reasonably likely that the outcome of the trial would have been different.

{¶7} Finally, in Gaffin II at ¶ 90, we concluded:

Based on the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Gaffin's petition for postconviction relief without a hearing. Having sustained Gaffin's first assignment of error, * * * and sustained in part his third assignment of error, we remand the matter to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Gaffin's postconviction relief consistent with this opinion.

{¶8} Pursuant to this court's mandate in Gaffin II, the trial court conducted the evidentiary hearing on October 15, 2019. Appellant presented the following witnesses: Tyler Cantrell, Appellant's original trial attorney; Jimmy Vaughn, Appellant's friend; Mike Decker, Appellant's friend and co-worker; Officer Jeff Bowling; Officer Jason Malott; and Bruce England, a former investigator with Adams County Children's Services (ACCS). At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered that a transcript of the proceedings be prepared and filed. The parties also filed memoranda of their closing arguments, pursuant to a briefing schedule order.

{¶9} Thereafter, in the May 4, 2020 entry, the trial court once again overruled Appellant's postconviction petition. This timely appeal followed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

I. THE TRIAL ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO FOLLOW THE LAW OF THE CASE, BY FINDING MR. GAFFIN DID NOT PROVE HIS TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO FUNCTION AS COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT, THEREBY VIOLATING MR. GAFFIN'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO FOLLOW THE LAW OF THE CASE, BY FINDING MR. GAFFIN SUFFERED NO PREJUDICE WHERE THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE HEARING WAS SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME AS THE AVERMENTS CONTAINED IN THE AFFIDAVITS, THEREBY VIOLATING MR. GAFFIN'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT REVIEW MR. GAFFIN'S PETITION, NOR THE WITNESSES' TESTIMONY, OBJECTIVELY, THEREBY COMPROMISING THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROCEEDING AND DEPRIVING MR. GAFFIN HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES

1. The postconviction relief process.

{¶10} The postconviction relief process is a collateral civil attack on a criminal judgment rather than an appeal of the judgment. See State v. Betts, 4th Dist. Vinton No. 18CA710, 2018-Ohio-2720, at ¶ 11; State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 281, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999). Postconviction relief is not a constitutional right; instead, it is a narrow remedy that gives the petitioner no more rights than those granted by statute. Id. It is a means to resolve constitutional claims that cannot be addressed on direct appeal because the evidence supporting the claims is not contained in the record. See State v. McDougald, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 16CA3736, 2016-Ohio-5080, ¶ 19-20, citing State v. Knauff, 4th Dist. Adams No. 13CA976, 2014-Ohio-308, ¶ 18.

{¶11}" '[A] trial court's decision granting or denying a postconviction relief petition filed pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 should be upheld absent an abuse of discretion; a reviewing court should not overrule the trial court's finding on a petition for postconviction relief that is supported by competent and credible evidence.'" Betts, supra, at ¶ 12, quoting State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 58. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. See In re H.V., 138 Ohio St.3d 408, 2014-Ohio-812, 7 N.E.3d 1173, ¶ 8.

{¶12} As indicated above, Appellant's postconviction petition was originally denied without a hearing. See Gaffin II, at ¶ 2. In Gaffin II, we recognized that a petitioner seeking postconviction relief is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Id. at ¶ 22. See Betts, supra, at ¶ 13, citing State v. Black, 4th Dist. Ross No. 15CA3509, 2016-Ohio-3104, ¶ 9, citing State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 282, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999); State v. Slagle, 4th Dist. Highland No. 11CA22, 2012-Ohio-1936, ¶ 13. Rather, before granting a hearing on a petition, the trial court must first determine that substantive grounds for relief exist. R.C. 2953.21(C). "Substantive grounds for relief exist and a hearing is warranted if the petitioner produces sufficient credible evidence that demonstrates the petitioner suffered a violation of the petitioner's constitutional rights." In re B.C.S., 4th Dist. Washington No. 07CA60, 2008-Ohio-5771, ¶ 11. Furthermore, in order to merit a hearing, the petitioner must show that the claimed "errors resulted in prejudice." Id., quoting Calhoun at 283.

2. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims within the context of the postconviction process.

{¶13} The Second District recently considered the denial of a postconviction petition raising four ineffective assistance of counsel claims in State v. Crossley, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2020-CA-10, 2020-Ohio- 6640. In considering Crossley's first and second assignments of error, the appellate court recognized the proper standard for analysis of ineffective assistance claims as set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984):

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate both that trial counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the errors were serious enough to create a reasonable probability that, but for the errors, the outcome of the case would have been different. (Internal citations omitted.) See Crossley, at

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