State v. Garcia

316 A.3d 1223

STATE

v.Dari GARCIA.

No. 2019-205-C.A.

(P1/15-394AG)

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 2, 2024

Providence County Superior Court, Associate Justice Netti C. Vogel

Christopher R. Bush, Department of Attorney General, for State.

George J. West, Esq., for Defendant.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Robinson, for the Court.

The defendant, Dari Garcia, appeals from a May 3, 2018 judgment of conviction and commitment following a jury trial held in the Superior Court for Providence County. The defendant was charged with fifteen counts pertaining to several related occurrences that took place in the evening of August 17, 2014 at a home in North Providence, Rhode Island. On appeal, the defendant presents nine grounds for reversal of his conviction. He bases his argument for reversal on a wide variety of reasons, which are enumerated and discussed in detail below.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

I Facts and Travel

The various charges against defendant arose out of a most regrettable series of events that led to several tragic consequences, including the death of Richard Catalano. We preliminarily note that it is undisputed that Richard Catalano was shot to death in the evening of August 17, 2014 in a house located at 9 Elliot Avenue in North Providence; and it is further undisputed that Lorie Catalano, Christopher Tamelleo,¹ and Lindsey Onorato were also present in that house on the night of the shooting.²

On February 12, 2015, a grand jury indicted defendant on fifteen counts: one count of first-degree murder; three counts of discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence; one count of conspiracy; one count of burglary; four counts of felony assault (three of which were assault with a dangerous weapon); one count of using a firearm during a crime of violence; one count of carrying a firearm without a license; one count of possession of a firearm after conviction of a crime of violence; one count of alteration of marks of identification on a firearm; and one count of committing a crime of violence when possessing a stolen firearm.

On November 27, 2017, prior to the start of defendant’s jury trial, a hearing was held on pretrial motions—including, inter alia, defendant’s motion to dismiss, defendant’s motion to suppress, and defendant’s motion in limine to exclude any reference to defendant’s gunshot wound as being self-inflicted. Later that same day, jury selection began. Thereafter, a trial took place over eight days in November and December of 2017. On December 12, 2017, the jury, having deliberated, returned a guilty verdict on Counts One, Two, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, Nine, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, Fourteen, and Fifteen.³ The defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, and a hearing on that motion was held on January 5, 2018, after which the trial justice denied defendant’s motion. On April 13, 2018, defendant was sentenced as follows: three life sentences—the first two sentences to be served consecutively to each other, and the third life sentence to be served concurrently with the other two; five consecutive twenty-year sentences; three concurrent ten-year sentences; one concurrent five-year sentence; and a twenty-five-year consecutive sentence as an habitual offender. The defendant filed a timely, albeit premature, notice of appeal on April 13, 2018.⁴

We relate below the salient aspects of the pretrial hearing, the trial, the motion for a new trial, and the sentencing.

A The Pretrial Motions

On October 3, 2017, defendant filed a motion to suppress his verbal statements made to Rhode Island Deputy Sheriff. Ian Banigan, who was guarding defendant while he was undergoing treatment at Rhode Island Hospital as a result of the events of August 17, 2014. In his "Complaining Witness Statement," Sheriff Banigan reported that defendant had asked Sheriff Banigan if he was "f*****," at which point Sheriff Banigan asked defendant what he meant. The defendant then said: "I’m f*****, they have three bodies on me." In his motion to. suppress, defendant argued that this inquiry by Sheriff Banigan to defendant as to what his initial question had meant constituted custodial interrogation. The trial justice, citing State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491 (R.I. 2004), denied defendant’s motion to suppress. She emphasized that Sheriff Banigan was not at the hospital in order to interrogate defendant, and she further found that Sheriff Banigan’s response "was merely an instinctive reaction provoked by the [d]efendant’s initial statement."

In addition, defendant filed a motion to dismiss Count Seven on double jeopardy grounds. In his motion, defendant argued that his "alleged assaultive conduct was part of an unbroken chain of events properly considered a single act, rather than an unrelated series of discrete crimes." He contended that, due to the fact that Count Six and Count Seven charged an identical crime (viz., assault with a dangerous weapon against Lorie Catalano), Count Seven should have been dismissed under double jeopardy principles. Specifically, defendant contended that, even though defendant allegedly shot Lorie Catalano once in her son’s bedroom and a second time in a separate room, these two alleged shootings "were part of one continuing event or occurrence * * *." The trial justice did not rule on this motion to dismiss at that time, instead suggesting that defendant later "make a Rule 29 motion on that," and she indicated that she would "rule at that time."

B Jury Selection

Upon the completion of the hearing on the pretrial motions, jury selection began. In the course of the voir dire process, Juror 98 indicated that she had a son who was "locked up * * * in Bridgewater"⁵ because he had "tried to rob a bank." Juror 98 further stated that the authorities in Massachusetts had treated her son well, and she also stated that both the prosecutors and defense counsel were "all very good with him." When asked by the trial justice if she could be fair in the instant case, Juror 98 answered in the affirmative and additionally confirmed that she could "keep an open mind and consider all the evidence [the parties] offer." The trial justice engaged in further questioning and then asked Juror 98 whether, in this case, she would hold the state to "a higher standard than [beyond a reasonable doubt] because of the nature of the charges * * *?" Juror 98 responded by stating: "That’s hard to say." Subsequently, the following exchange occurred:

"THE COURT: I know. Well, is there anything about you that would prevent you from sitting in judgment against somebody in a case like this?

"[JUROR 98]: I never been in a situation like this. I don’t even know what to say.

"THE COURT: No, no. Are you a person who just can’t sit in judgment? "[JUROR 98]: I probably can’t.

"THE COURT: I’m not suggesting it to you. I’m trying to get --

"[JUROR 98]: I understand what you’re saying.

"THE COURT: You would have to make a decision --

"[JUROR 98]: That decision, I don’t think I can.

"THE COURT: You don’t think you can do it?

"[JUROR 98]: No."

Defense counsel then asked Juror 98: "[I]f you feel the State does prove this case beyond a reasonable doubt, will you be able to follow the Judge’s instructions and find him guilty?" Juror 98 responded: "Yes, I would. I would be able to follow the instructions." The following further questioning then took place between the trial justice and Juror 98:

"THE COURT: * * * Maybe you suspect he’s guilty, but [the state] didn’t prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Could you say ‘not guilty’?

"[JUROR 98]: If they didn’t prove it, that’s hard.

"THE COURT: That’s hard for you?

"[JUROR 98]: Yeah.

"THE COURT: Why is that?

"[JUROR 98]: I don’t know."

The trial justice then posed the following question to Juror 98:

"THE COURT: * * * If the State doesn’t prove each and every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, even if you suspect the Defendant did it but they didn’t prove it, even if it’s a strong suspicion, but they didn’t prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, in spite of the nature of these charges, could you come back and say ‘not guilty’? Can you do that?

"[JUROR 98]: If they didn’t prove it?

"THE COURT: Yes.

"* * *

"THE COURT: You’re hesitating.

"[JUROR 98]: If I feel they didn’t prove it, and I feel he’s not guilty, or if I feel he’s guilty --

"THE COURT: You might feel he’s guilty, but the question is if they didn’t prove it. You might feel he’s guilty, but you feel they didn’t prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Can you come back and even if you kind of feel he’s guilty, but they didn’t prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, can you come back and say ‘not guilty’? Take your time.

"[JUROR 98]: I can’t say that he’s guilty if they didn’t prove it."

The prosecutor proceeded to ask Juror 98 if she had ever been a victim of a crime, and Juror 98 responded that she had once been "assaulted" while she was jogging in a park. When asked if that experience would "hinder [her] ability to be fair and impartial" in the instant case, Juror 98 replied: "I’m sorry. I can be fair." Juror 98 added that she did not believe that the perpetrator of the assault on her was ever caught. She further indicated that she was "satisfied with the job that the police did in that case."

On the next day, the state exercised a peremptory challenge with respect to Juror 98. Upon the state exercising this peremptory challenge, defense counsel objected on Batson grounds,⁶ stating that he felt that the state’s reason for striking Juror 98 was because "she’s a person of color." Defense counsel proceeded to assert that he felt that Juror 98 had been hesitant about answering certain questions due to how she "understood the language." Defense counsel pointed out that Juror 98 "made it clear that she would consider what was said and that she would make a decision based on the evidence that if she felt he was...