State v. Goode

211 Conn.App. 465

272 A.3d 748

STATE of Connecticut

v.Jason GOODE

AC 43765

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 26, 2022

Officially released March 29, 2022

Tamar Rebecca Birckhead, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Meryl R. Gersz, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state's attorney, and Christopher Parkilas, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Cradle, Alexander and Eveleigh, Js.

CRADLE, J.

The defendant, Jason Goode, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of assault of public safety personnel in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred by (1) denying his request for new counsel, (2) requiring him to remain shackled in the courtroom during his trial, and (3) not inquiring into a potential conflict of interest with his counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On May 29, 2018, the defendant was charged with the assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in violation of § 53a-167c (a) (1) in connection with an incident that occurred on January 5, 2018, while the defendant was incarcerated at the MacDougal-Walker Correctional Facility (MacDougal). By way of an amended information filed on July 29, 2019, the state alleged: "[O]n or about January 5, 2018, at approximately 2:55 p.m. in the professional visitation room area of ... MacDougal ... [the defendant], with the intent to prevent Matthew Mann, an identifiable employee of the State of Connecticut Department of Correction, from performing his duties as a Department of Correction Officer and while acting in the performance of such duties, caused physical injury to ... Mann by swinging his right fist and striking ... Mann on the right side of his face and neck, thereby causing physical injury ...." The defendant pleaded not guilty and elected a jury trial. Following that trial, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged, and the defendant thereafter was sentenced to ten years of incarceration, to run consecutively to the sentence he was then serving.¹ This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred by (1) denying his request for new counsel, (2) requiring him to remain shackled during his trial, and (3) not inquiring into a potential conflict of interest with his counsel. We address each claim in turn.

I

The defendant first claims that the court abused its discretion in denying his request for new counsel.² We are not persuaded.

The following procedural history is relevant to our analysis of this claim. On June 14, 2018, the defendant was arraigned on the aforementioned charge and the Office of the Public Defender was appointed to represent him. Attorney J. Patten Brown was thereafter appointed as a special public defender to represent the defendant, and he filed his appearance on behalf of the defendant on July 3, 2018.

On July 29, 2019, the defendant and Brown appeared before the court to commence jury selection for the defendant's trial. At the outset of that proceeding, the court noted that the defendant was represented by Brown, and the defendant interjected and stated, "That's incorrect, Your Honor." Brown then explained to the court that the defendant had informed him that he was fired but that he told the defendant that he needed to address the court because the court had appointed him to represent the defendant. Brown told the court that the defendant had expressed a desire for different counsel to represent him.

The court then asked the defendant to explain his position. The defendant told the court that Brown did not give him timely notice of his trial date and, therefore, that he had not been afforded an opportunity to prepare for trial. The defendant further complained that Brown had not "erected" a defense to the charge for which he was being tried. The defendant told the court, "I told Brown on June 24, the last time we were in Enfield Superior Court, that I needed to have the criminal investigator come up to corroborate or verify these witnesses’ statements against me. No investigator popped up. He hasn't even appeared to the jail to visit me to discuss this case or any other pretrial motions that the state may have against me or any evidence like this, unprepared. This is unprepared, man."

In response to the defendant, the court explained that it would address his complaints in order, beginning with his complaint that he learned of his trial date only a few days earlier. The court explained to the defendant that his case had been pending since June, 2018, and, because it was on the trial list, it was subject to being "called in for immediate trial at any point given that the pretrial discussions about the case weren't able to work it out." The court informed the defendant that Brown had been contacted by the clerk's office and notified of the upcoming trial date just the previous week, and Brown, in turn, immediately notified the defendant.

The court then turned to the defendant's complaint that Brown had not sufficiently investigated the charge against him. Brown explained that, because the defendant had informed him that he no longer wished to speak to him or wanted his representation, he had opted not to waste time driving to the correctional facility. Brown told the court, however, that his investigators had met with the defendant at the prison. When pressed by the court, the defendant admitted that Brown had retained "a number of investigators" and that one had visited him at the correctional facility at least two times and reviewed "some insignificant video footage" with him. The defendant described another investigator who met with him at the correctional facility and discussed potential plea negotiations but never shared with him any details regarding a potential defense strategy. Brown assured the court that he had conducted an appropriate investigation so that he could zealously represent the defendant. Brown informed the court that he had identified three potential witnesses that may be helpful to his defense but, because those witnesses were employees of the Department of Correction, he could not compel them to speak to him prior to trial.

The court explained to the defendant that Brown, as an attorney with twenty to thirty years of experience, would understand the strengths and weaknesses of the state's case and would identify the best manner to represent the defendant and cross-examine the state's witnesses. Although the defendant sought to have Brown explain his defense strategy on the record, the court declined to compel Brown to do so "because if he says it to me on the record, then the prosecutor gets a sneak preview of what the defense is going to be."

The court told the defendant that there was no reason to remove Brown from representing him and asked the defendant if he could afford to hire his own lawyer who would be ready to represent him at trial the next week.

The defendant indicated that he could not and that he was unable to represent himself because he was in long-term solitary confinement at the prison with no access to the legal resource center. When the defendant persisted with his complaint that Brown had not adequately communicated or discussed his case with him, the court again advised the defendant of his right to represent himself and offered to appoint Brown as standby counsel. The court explained that it was not, however, advising the defendant to represent himself. It explained the advantages of having an attorney to represent him and asked the defendant about his history with Brown. The defendant informed the court that Brown had been representing him for approximately one and one-half years and that either Brown or one of the other attorneys in his firm had met with him on each of the numerous times that he previously had been brought to the courthouse. The court again explained to the defendant that Brown had investigated his case, reviewed witness statements, and identified potential defenses. The defendant again expressed his frustration that Brown had not shared his trial strategy with him, but, when the court asked the defendant if he was going to allow Brown to represent him at trial, the defendant responded, "I might take him for now but, you know, in the midst of the trial he may be gone." The defendant suggested to the court that either Brown or one of the attorneys in his firm should have prepared him and explained the jury selection process to him. The court asked Brown, and Brown agreed, to use considerable efforts to keep the defendant apprised of the proceedings as the trial proceeded. The court told the defendant that Brown was willing to work with him, that Brown had already done a lot of work on his case, and that the defendant had to be willing to work together as well. The defendant again asked to see Brown's work, arguing that none of it had been shared with him. The court reiterated that it would not be wise to "tip off" the state as to Brown's defense strategy and then asked the defendant if he was willing to commence the proceedings that day with Brown representing him. The defendant responded, "We can get going today, but this is what I'm saying. If at any point during the trial or the proceedings something doesn't go to my liking and stuff like that, he's got to go ...." The court warned the defendant that he would not be allowed to simply dismiss Brown in the middle of trial, explained that the court would make that decision, and again asked the defendant if he was ready to proceed with Brown representing him. The defendant reiterated, "We can get it going, but like I said I want things as far as I expressed to you." The court agreed that the defendant would have opportunities to speak to Brown throughout the proceedings. On the basis of the foregoing, Brown continued to represent the defendant through his trial, and the defendant did not...