Case Law State v. Gray

State v. Gray

Document Cited Authorities (13) Cited in (23) Related

Joseph K. Mulholland, District Attorney, Michael T. Garrett, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant.

Farmer, Farmer, Malone & Sherrer, Richard M. Adams, for appellee.

MIKELL, Judge.

Angela Gray was indicted on charges of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, criminal attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, and possession of marijuana of less than one ounce. Gray filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the search of her home violated her constitutional rights. The trial court entered an order granting Gray's motion to suppress, from which the state appeals. We affirm.

When reviewing a trial court's order on a motion to suppress, we apply the "any evidence" standard: A trial court's order on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed if there is any evidence to support it, and the trial court's decision with regard to questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. We construe all evidence presented in favor of the trial court's findings and judgment.1

So construed, the evidence shows that on February 23, 2006, at approximately 7:40 p.m., Deputy Sheriff Edward Moorhead of the Decatur County Sheriff's Office initiated a traffic stop of a Ford Explorer because the taillights on the vehicle were not illuminated. Moorhead testified that as he exited his patrol car, he saw the passenger, Chris Walker, throw a piece of paper from the passenger-side window; that he approached the driver, William Ezell, and explained the reason for the stop; and that Ezell explained that he believed the taillights were out because of a blown fuse. While Moorhead was talking to Ezell, Deputy Michael Logue arrived, and Moorhead instructed Logue to talk to Walker about his littering violation.

After talking with Walker, Logue asked Ezell for consent to search the vehicle, which Ezell refused because the vehicle did not belong to him. The officers were told that the vehicle belonged to Angela Gray and determined that the vehicle's registration identified Nancy Gray as the owner. Despite not receiving Ezell's consent to search the vehicle, Logue deployed his canine, Bear, for the purpose of detecting narcotics, and Bear alerted on the passenger side of the vehicle. Logue then searched the vehicle, finding drug paraphernalia including a brass fitting or tube, and potential methamphetamine lab-related items. Logue and Moorhead contacted narcotics investigator Billy Hunter, who arrived an hour later. The officers, who were traveling in four different vehicles,2 followed Ezell to Angela Gray's residence to speak to her about the defective condition of the Ford Explorer and about the items found therein.

The property on which the residence was located was enclosed by a sizable, black wrought iron electronically controlled gate that could not be opened by hand unless the person attempting to open it knew to flip the switch in the locked box to the left of the gate. Moorhead testified that Ezell used an automatic door opener to enter the gate to access the property. Once they parked the cars, Hunter and Moorhead followed Ezell and Walker to the back door of the residence. Hunter testified that he observed several items often used in the manufacture of methamphetamine while en route to the door. A young woman, who identified herself as Shannon Cobb, met them at the back door. Hunter testified that while standing at the door talking to Cobb, he saw suspected marijuana inside a cigarette pack in plain view on the living room counter. Moorhead recalled that from his position behind Hunter, he could see through the kitchen window and observed brass fittings, tubes, and "things of that nature" along with a plastic bag on the kitchen counter.

Hunter asked Cobb to step outside and for consent to search the residence. Cobb told him that the house was not hers and that she could not give him consent to search. Hunter testified that despite Cobb's refusal, he entered the residence to secure it and did a walk-through to make sure that no one was present. Hunter then left the property, leaving Moorhead and Logue there, while he sought a search warrant.

Hunter further testified that he obtained a search warrant at 11:30 p.m. that evening but did not execute it until the early morning on the following day, February 24; that he had to call Moorhead to let him onto the property once he returned with the warrant because of the gate; that during the search, the officers seized marijuana and several items used to manufacture methamphetamine; and that he never saw Angela Gray that night. On cross-examination, Hunter, Logue, and Moorhead all admitted that before proceeding to the residence, they did not ask Ezell and Walker if they lived there, had clothes there, helped to pay the rent, mortgage, or any other bills at the residence or why they had been there. Moorhead also admitted that Ezell and Walker gave conflicting stories about from where they had departed prior to being stopped and testified that Hunter knew about their conflicting stories, which Hunter denied. Hunter acknowledged on cross-examination that he had no idea as to whether Ezell had authority to let the officers onto the property; that once Ezell arrived at the property, the broken taillights were no longer an issue as Ezell was not subject to the rules of the road while on private property; that he knew the residence belonged to the Gray family; and that he did not ask Cobb any questions to establish her connection to the residence.

In ruling on Gray's motion to suppress, the trial court found that the officers illegally searched the curtilage of the property as they did not have a right to be where they were when they observed the items in question in plain view; that Hunter then entered the residence without consent, which entry constituted a search, without a warrant; and that there were no exigent circumstances that justified a warrantless entry into the residence. After construing all the evidence in favor of the trial court's findings, we affirm.

1. In its first enumerated error, the state argues that the evidence presented at the hearing established that Ezell and Walker had a sufficient relationship to the property or possessed common authority to grant consent to law enforcement officers to enter the curtilage of the property to speak to Angela Gray. The trial court found otherwise.

Under the Fourth Amendment, police officers are prohibited from entering a person's home or its curtilage without a warrant absent consent or a showing of exigent circumstances.3 In a case such as this involving a third party's consent to search the State has the burden to prove not only that consent was voluntary but that the third party had authority over, and other sufficient relationship to, the premises sought to be inspected. The type of authority or relationship to the premises by the third party must constitute the following: mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.4

To resolve the issue of third party consent, we must determine "whether the objective facts available to the officer at the time would warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that the third party had authority over the premises."5 The officer's belief that the third party has authority over another person's property to consent to...

5 cases
Document | Georgia Court of Appeals – 2016
State v. Vickers
"...sufficient to authorize a warrantless entry into a home." (Citations, punctuation and footnote omitted.) State v. Gray , 285 Ga.App. 124, 128 (2), 645 S.E.2d 598 (2007). Here, the officers had no more right to enter the curtilage of the home to make an arrest than they did to enter it to in..."
Document | Georgia Court of Appeals – 2008
Johnson v. State
"...these cases should be reversed.20 I am authorized to state that Judge PHIPPS and Judge ADAMS join in this dissent. 1. State v. Gray, 285 Ga.App. 124, 645 S.E.2d 598 (2007), citing State v. Starks, 281 Ga.App. 15, 635 S.E.2d 327 2. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct. 889,..."
Document | Georgia Court of Appeals – 2021
Lewis v. State
"...particularly describing the place or places to be searched and the person or things to be seized.").15 State v. Gray , 285 Ga. App. 124, 126 (1), 645 S.E.2d 598 (2007) ; accord State v. Gravitt , 289 Ga. App. 868, 870 (2) (a), 658 S.E.2d 424 (2008) ; see State v. David , 269 Ga. 533, 535 (2..."
Document | Georgia Court of Appeals – 2007
Morse v. State
"...at 180, n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1735; State v. Clark, 263 Ga.App. 480, 484-485, 588 S.E.2d 254 (2003). 12. See, e.g., State v. Gray, 285 Ga.App. 124, 126(1), 645 S.E.2d 598 (2007) (police cannot enter "a person's home or its curtilage without a warrant absent consent or a showing of exigent 13. Su..."
Document | Georgia Court of Appeals – 2020
Edwards v. State
"...swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.(Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Gray , 285 Ga. App. 124, 127-128 (2), 645 S.E.2d 598 (2007). See also Kirsche v. State , 271 Ga. App. 729, 732-733, 611 S.E.2d 64 (2005) ("use of protective sweeps has been..."

Try vLex and Vincent AI for free

Start a free trial
5 books and journal articles
Document | Georgia Benchbook 2017 edition
C3 Warrantless Searches
"...at the time would warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that the third party had authority over the premises.' "[Gray, 285 Ga. App. 124, 127, 645 SE2d 598 (2007) (can't assume driver of resident's vehicle with automatic opener for locked gate on driveway has authority to consen..."
Document | Georgia Benchbook 2022 edition
C3 Warrantless Searches
"...at the time would warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that the third party had authority over the premises.' "[Gray, 285 Ga. App. 124, 127, 645 SE2d 598 (2007) (can't assume driver of resident's vehicle with automatic opener for locked gate on driveway has authority to consen..."
Document | Georgia Benchbook 2016 edition
C3 Warrantless Searches
"...at the time would warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that the third party had authority over the premises.' "[Gray, 285 Ga. App. 124, 127, 645 SE2d 598 (2007) (can't assume driver of resident's vehicle with automatic opener for locked gate on driveway has authority to consen..."
Document | Georgia Benchbook 2023 edition
C3 Warrantless Searches
"...at the time would warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that the third party had authority over the premises.' "[Gray, 285 Ga. App. 124, 127, 645 SE2d 598 (2007) (can't assume driver of resident's vehicle with automatic opener for locked gate on driveway has authority to consen..."
Document | Georgia Benchbook 2015 edition
C3 Warrantless Searches
"...at the time would warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that the third party had authority over the premises.' "[Gray, 285 Ga. App. 124, 127, 645 SE2d 598 (2007) (can't assume driver of resident's vehicle with automatic opener for locked gate on driveway has authority to consen..."

Try vLex and Vincent AI for free

Start a free trial

Experience vLex's unparalleled legal AI

Access millions of documents and let Vincent AI power your research, drafting, and document analysis — all in one platform.

Start a free trial

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex
5 books and journal articles
Document | Georgia Benchbook 2017 edition
C3 Warrantless Searches
"...at the time would warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that the third party had authority over the premises.' "[Gray, 285 Ga. App. 124, 127, 645 SE2d 598 (2007) (can't assume driver of resident's vehicle with automatic opener for locked gate on driveway has authority to consen..."
Document | Georgia Benchbook 2022 edition
C3 Warrantless Searches
"...at the time would warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that the third party had authority over the premises.' "[Gray, 285 Ga. App. 124, 127, 645 SE2d 598 (2007) (can't assume driver of resident's vehicle with automatic opener for locked gate on driveway has authority to consen..."
Document | Georgia Benchbook 2016 edition
C3 Warrantless Searches
"...at the time would warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that the third party had authority over the premises.' "[Gray, 285 Ga. App. 124, 127, 645 SE2d 598 (2007) (can't assume driver of resident's vehicle with automatic opener for locked gate on driveway has authority to consen..."
Document | Georgia Benchbook 2023 edition
C3 Warrantless Searches
"...at the time would warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that the third party had authority over the premises.' "[Gray, 285 Ga. App. 124, 127, 645 SE2d 598 (2007) (can't assume driver of resident's vehicle with automatic opener for locked gate on driveway has authority to consen..."
Document | Georgia Benchbook 2015 edition
C3 Warrantless Searches
"...at the time would warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that the third party had authority over the premises.' "[Gray, 285 Ga. App. 124, 127, 645 SE2d 598 (2007) (can't assume driver of resident's vehicle with automatic opener for locked gate on driveway has authority to consen..."

Try vLex and Vincent AI for free

Start a free trial

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex
5 cases
Document | Georgia Court of Appeals – 2016
State v. Vickers
"...sufficient to authorize a warrantless entry into a home." (Citations, punctuation and footnote omitted.) State v. Gray , 285 Ga.App. 124, 128 (2), 645 S.E.2d 598 (2007). Here, the officers had no more right to enter the curtilage of the home to make an arrest than they did to enter it to in..."
Document | Georgia Court of Appeals – 2008
Johnson v. State
"...these cases should be reversed.20 I am authorized to state that Judge PHIPPS and Judge ADAMS join in this dissent. 1. State v. Gray, 285 Ga.App. 124, 645 S.E.2d 598 (2007), citing State v. Starks, 281 Ga.App. 15, 635 S.E.2d 327 2. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct. 889,..."
Document | Georgia Court of Appeals – 2021
Lewis v. State
"...particularly describing the place or places to be searched and the person or things to be seized.").15 State v. Gray , 285 Ga. App. 124, 126 (1), 645 S.E.2d 598 (2007) ; accord State v. Gravitt , 289 Ga. App. 868, 870 (2) (a), 658 S.E.2d 424 (2008) ; see State v. David , 269 Ga. 533, 535 (2..."
Document | Georgia Court of Appeals – 2007
Morse v. State
"...at 180, n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1735; State v. Clark, 263 Ga.App. 480, 484-485, 588 S.E.2d 254 (2003). 12. See, e.g., State v. Gray, 285 Ga.App. 124, 126(1), 645 S.E.2d 598 (2007) (police cannot enter "a person's home or its curtilage without a warrant absent consent or a showing of exigent 13. Su..."
Document | Georgia Court of Appeals – 2020
Edwards v. State
"...swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.(Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Gray , 285 Ga. App. 124, 127-128 (2), 645 S.E.2d 598 (2007). See also Kirsche v. State , 271 Ga. App. 729, 732-733, 611 S.E.2d 64 (2005) ("use of protective sweeps has been..."

Try vLex and Vincent AI for free

Start a free trial

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex