State v. Grazzini-Rucki

State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Sandra Grazzini-Rucki, Appellant.

A16-1997

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

November 6, 2017

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Dakota County District Court

File No. 19HA-CR-15-2669

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Kathryn M. Keena, Assistant County Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Halbrooks, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SMITH, TRACY M., Judge

Appellant Sandra Grazzini-Rucki was convicted of two counts of depriving another of custodial or parental rights. She seeks reversal of her convictions, reversal of her sentence, and dismissal of the charges against her or a new trial. In support of these requests, Grazzini-Rucki raises a number of issues, including that (1) she was denied her Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, (2) the district court erroneously excluded certain evidence, (3) the state engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, (4) the district court improperly instructed the jury, (5) media communications with the jury prejudiced the result of her trial, (6) various other procedural violations resulted in prejudice against her, (7) the district court abused its discretion and exceeded its authority in sentencing, and (8) her conviction was barred by double jeopardy. The only reversible error we find is in Grazzini-Rucki's sentencing. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district court to execute Grazzini-Rucki's sentence.

FACTS

In 2011, Grazzini-Rucki divorced her ex-husband after 19 years of marriage. They have five children, including S.R. (age 14 in 2013) and G.R. (age 13 in 2013). Following the divorce, custody of the children changed several times until April 19, 2013, when a district court judge filed an order granting a paternal aunt exclusive physical and legal custody of all five children. That evening, the aunt picked up two of the children, S.R. and G.R., and took them home. Shortly after their arrival, S.R. surreptitiously telephoned Grazzini-Rucki, told her that she and G.R. were planning on running away, and asked for her help in doing so. S.R. and G.R. then left the house and met Grazzini-Rucki a short distance away. After picking up S.R. and G.R., Grazzini-Rucki dropped them off at a ranch owned by Gina and Douglas Dahlen. S.R. and G.R. remained at the Dahlens' ranch until November of 2015 when they were recovered by the police.

During the intervening time period, both the police and Grazzini-Rucki's ex-husband were attempting to locate S.R. and G.R. In June of 2013, the district court handling Grazzini-Rucki's divorce ordered Grazzini-Rucki and her ex-husband to divulge any information they had about the whereabouts of S.R. and G.R. Despite this order, Grazzini-Rucki never indicated to her ex-husband or the court that she had any information regarding S.R. and G.R.'s location. In November 2013, while the children were still missing, Grazzini-Rucki's ex-husband was awarded sole physical and legal custody of S.R. and G.R. Finally, in the summer of 2015, police received information implicating Grazzini-Rucki in the disappearance of her children. Based on that information, she was charged with eight counts of depriving another of custodial or parental rights under Minn. Stat. § 609.26 (2012): two for concealing a child from a parent with parental rights, two for concealing a child from a person with custody, two for failing to return a child in violation of a court order, and two for contributing to a child being a runaway.

A jury trial took place from July 18 to 28, 2016. Among the witnesses called by the state was Gina Dahlen, the only witness in the state's case-in-chief with firsthand knowledge of Grazzini-Rucki leaving S.R. and G.R. at the ranch. At the close of the state's case-in-chief, Grazzini-Rucki moved for a judgment of acquittal on a basis unrelated to this appeal. After that motion was denied, Grazzini-Rucki proceeded with her case-in-chief. Among other things, she attempted to offer evidence of information that had led her to believe that her actions were necessary to prevent physical or sexual assault or substantial emotional harm to her children. As relevant to this appeal, three such pieces of evidence were excluded: (1) a news interview with S.R. and G.R. that occurred shortlyafter Grazzini-Rucki left them at the ranch, (2) testimony that a GPS tracker was found on a car belonging to Grazzini-Rucki's boyfriend, and (3) social services records based on an interview of S.R. conducted after her recovery from the ranch. Toward the end of her case-in-chief, Grazzini-Rucki again moved for judgment of acquittal, this time arguing that, at the time the state rested its case-in-chief, it had failed to corroborate Dahlen's accomplice testimony by any other evidence linking Grazzini-Rucki to the crime. Although Grazzini-Rucki admitted that her case-in-chief had corroborated Dahlen's testimony, she asked the district court to grant the motion based on the evidence that was on the record at the time the motion should (according to Grazzini-Rucki) have been made. The district court denied this motion and submitted the case to the jury, which found Grazzini-Rucki guilty of six counts.

Following the verdict, Grazzini-Rucki was sentenced on two of the six counts. On count one, she was sentenced to a stayed year-and-a-day prison term and three years of probation. As a condition of probation, she was required to serve 250 days in jail. On count three, she was sentenced to a stayed year-and-a-day prison term, running concurrently with her count-one prison term, and three years of probation, running consecutively to her count-one probation. At her sentencing hearing, Grazzini-Rucki moved to terminate probation and execute her prison terms. That motion was denied. At two subsequent probation-violation hearings, the district court twice denied renewed motions to execute the prison terms. Following the second probation-violation hearing, the court relieved the county corrections department of its probation-supervision obligation and placed Grazzini-Rucki on court-supervised probation.

Grazzini-Rucki appeals.

DECISION

I. Grazzini-Rucki's counsel was not ineffective.

To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument, a defendant "must affirmatively prove that his counsel's representation 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness' and 'that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Gates v. State, 398 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. 1987) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)). We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel arguments de novo. Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016).

In support of her argument that her counsel was deficient, Grazzini-Rucki argues (1) that Minn. Stat. § 634.04 (2014) requires accomplice testimony to be corroborated by other evidence showing the defendant committed the offense in order for it to serve as a basis for conviction and (2) that, at the close of the state's case-in-chief, only Dahlen's uncorroborated testimony implicated Grazzini-Rucki in her daughters' disappearances; therefore, (3) her trial counsel was deficient in failing to argue for a judgment of acquittal on that basis after the state rested its case-in-chief. Although this argument might hold true if premises (1) and (2) were both met, because other evidence in the state's case-in-chief implicated Grazzini-Rucki, we conclude that her trial counsel's representation was not deficient.

Grazzini-Rucki argues that there was no corroboration of Dahlen's testimony. However, "corroborative evidence need not be of itself adequate to establish a prima faciecase of guilt. Instead, it must simply affirm the truth of the accomplice's testimony and point to the guilt of the defendant in some substantial degree." State v. Chavarria-Cruz, 839 N.W.2d 515, 519 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). Evidence offered by the state meets this burden.

During its case-in-chief, the state established, through witnesses other than Dahlen, that:

(1) Grazzini-Rucki is the mother of S.R. and G.R.;

(2) there was controversy regarding custody of S.R. and G.R. following the divorce;

(3) after S.R. and G.R. disappeared, their aunt suspected the children had gone to see their mother;

(4) during the first year of the police investigation into her daughters' disappearances, Grazzini-Rucki never inquired into the status of the investigation;

(5) Grazzini-Rucki was unaccounted for when S.R. and G.R. disappeared; and

(6) a photo, taken near the time of the disappearances, of a business owned by Douglas Dahlen was found on the cellphone of a friend of Grazzini-Rucki.

Although this evidence, by itself, does not "establish a prima facie case of guilt," it does "point to the guilt of the defendant in some substantial degree." This evidence establishes motive, suggests Grazzini-Rucki knew where S.R. and G.R. were, and implies a link between Grazzini-Rucki and the Dahlens at the time of the disappearance. As a result, had Grazzini-Rucki's trial counsel made the argument in question, it would have been unlikely to succeed. Therefore, Grazzini-Rucki's trial counsel did not fall below the objective standard of reasonableness in failing to make it. Because Grazzini-Rucki's trial counsel's representation did not fall below this standard, we conclude that Grazzini-Rucki is not entitled to a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

II. The district court...