State v. Green

1

State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Dorothy Shavon Green, Appellant.

No. A22-1834

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

October 30, 2023

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-20-6028

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Mary F Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Eva F. Wailes, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Hooten, Judge. ^[*]

BJORKMAN, JUDGE

Appellant challenges her convictions of unlawful possession of ammunition and giving a peace officer a false name, arguing that (1) she is entitled to withdraw her unlawful-possession guilty plea because she did not understand that she faced a mandatory minimum sentence under Minn. Stat. § 609.11 (2018), (2) she is entitled to withdraw her false-name guilty plea because she did not admit an essential element of the offense, and (3) the district court erred by not impaneling a sentencing jury or obtaining a jury waiver with respect to the factors that would deprive it of discretion to depart from the mandatory minimum sentence for unlawful possession. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

FACTS

Following a traffic stop on March 3, 2020, appellant Dorothy Shavon Green was charged with unlawful possession of ammunition, giving a peace officer a false name, and fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance. The complaint notes that the unlawfulpossession offense is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence under Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd. 5(b) (requiring imprisonment "for not less than five years").

In mid-2021, the parties submitted arguments on whether the district court has discretion to depart from that mandatory minimum. The state argued that the court lacks sentencing discretion under Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd. 8(b), because Green had a prior qualifying conviction involving use or possession of a "firearm or other dangerous weapon." In support of its position, the state submitted: a complaint charging Green with attempted first-degree aggravated robbery based on allegations that, in October 2007, she kicked, punched, and pulled the hair of a woman while trying to steal her purse; Green's petition to plead guilty to an amended charge of second-degree assault; and a register of actions and judgment of conviction showing that Green was convicted of second-degree assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2006). Based on that evidence, the district court concluded that Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd. 8(b), applies and it lacks discretion to depart from the mandatory minimum.

That September, after Green's case was briefly reassigned to a second judge, Green pleaded guilty before a third judge. The district court accepted Green's pleas and stated that it was "considering a departure." Sentencing was scheduled for January 2022 but did not take place because Green absconded from conditional-release supervision; the district court issued a warrant for Green's apprehension. While Green was on warrant status, her case was again reassigned to a new judge. Green was arrested in July 2022.

The following month, Green moved to withdraw her guilty plea to unlawful possession. She asserted that she pleaded guilty because she believed the judge who accepted her plea was considering a mitigated departure, she did not understand a different judge might sentence her or that she might face a 60-month mandatory minimum sentence, allowing another judge to sentence her is prejudicial, and plea withdrawal would not prejudice the state. Green argued that these circumstances indicate her plea is invalid and, alternatively, make plea withdrawal fair and just. The district court denied the motion.

At sentencing, Green renewed her plea-withdrawal motion. She also moved the district court to reconsider its prior decision that it lacks discretion to depart from the mandatory minimum sentence. The district court denied the motion, adopted the earlier findings as to Green's prior conviction, and imposed the five-year mandatory minimum prison sentence.

Green appeals.

DECISION

I. The record supports the district court's denial of Green's request to withdraw her unlawful-possession guilty plea.

A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016). But a district court "must" allow a defendant to do so at any time when necessary to "correct a manifest injustice." Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Manifest injustice exists when a guilty plea is invalid. Taylor, 887 N.W.2d at 823. To be valid, a plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. A defendant who seeks plea withdrawal before sentencing need only show that it is "fair and just" to allow withdrawal. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. Green sought to withdraw her plea under both standards and challenges both aspects of the district court's decision.

Manifest Injustice

Green argues that she is entitled to withdraw her guilty plea because it was not intelligent. For a plea to be intelligent, the defendant must understand the direct consequences of the plea. Taylor, 887 N.W.2d at 823. Direct consequences mean, principally, "the maximum sentence and fine." State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 96 (Minn. 2010). In determining whether a plea is intelligent, we look to what the defendant knew at the time they entered the plea. Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn. 2017). We review the validity of a guilty plea de novo. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.

Green argues that she did not understand the consequences of her unlawfulpossession guilty plea. Specifically, she asserts that she did not know she faced the prospect of a five-year mandatory minimum sentence because the judge who accepted her guilty plea told her that a departure was "a distinct possibility." Green identifies no authority to support this argument, and the record defeats it.

Green was repeatedly informed and confirmed her awareness that she faced a 60-month mandatory minimum sentence. The complaint indicates as much by citing the statute containing that mandate. The district court reinforced the point by ruling-just months before Green entered her guilty plea-that it could not depart from the mandatory minimum sentence. And Green acknowledged in her plea petition that she understood that "[i]f a minimum sentence is required by statute the court may impose a sentence of imprisonment of not less than 60 months for this crime." The district court's brief discussion of a departure during the guilty-plea hearing did not contradict any of this. Indeed, the court stated only that it was "considering a departure" and expressly disclaimed any guarantee, saying: "I can't make any promises."

We discern nothing in this record indicating that Green faced a "distinct" chance of a departure rather than simply the opportunity to argue for one despite the earlier sentencing decision. Moreover, Green's awareness of a possible departure confirms her awareness of the departure's reference point-the mandatory minimum sentence. In short, Green knew at the time she pleaded guilty that the direct consequences of her plea included a mandatory five-year prison sentence. Accordingly, her plea was intelligent.

Fair and Just

The "fair and just" standard looks to (1) a defendant's reasons for withdrawal and (2) any prejudice to the state from granting the motion. Id. at 97. The defendant bears the burden of presenting fair and just reasons for withdrawal. Id. We review a district court's denial of plea withdrawal under this standard for an abuse of discretion. State v. Nicholas, 924 N.W.2d 286, 293 (Minn.App. 2019), rev. denied (Minn Apr. 24, 2019).

Green contends the district court abused its discretion by denying plea withdrawal under this standard because (1) she believed she could be sentenced only by the judge who indicated willingness to consider departure, (2) she merely answered leading questions to establish the facts supporting her guilty plea, and (3) the state would not be prejudiced by plea withdrawal. None of these arguments persuade us to reverse.

First, the record supports the district court's finding that Green's claimed belief that she could not be sentenced by a different judge is not credible. Green pleaded guilty before the third judge assigned to her case, making her amply aware that judicial reassignment was a possibility. And while she may have anticipated that the judge who accepted her guilty plea and scheduled her sentencing hearing would be the one to impose sentence, Green's own failure to appear for that hearing thwarted her surest chance of being sentenced by that judge. Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Green's contention that facing a new judge at sentencing is a fair and just basis for withdrawing the plea.

Second, the record supports the district court's determination that the use of leading questions does not support plea withdrawal. While the practice is disfavored, it does not invalidate a guilty plea. Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 860 (Minn. 2016). And Green does not dispute the district court's finding that she answered the leading questions affirmatively, establishing the elements of the offense without hesitation or equivocation.

Finally Green's argument that plea withdrawal would not prejudice the state does not provide a basis for reversal. A defendant's failure to establish a fair and just reason for plea withdrawal may justify denying the motion,...