State v. Grensteiner

1

2024 ND 218

State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Grant Michael Grensteiner, Defendant and Appellant

Nos. 20240100, 20240101

Supreme Court of North Dakota

December 5, 2024

Appeal from the District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial District, the Honorable Kirsten M. Sjue, Judge.

Nathan K. Madden, Assistant State's Attorney, Williston, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.

Kiara C. Kraus-Parr, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant and appellant.

OPINION

McEvers, Justice

[¶1] Grant Grensteiner appeals from two criminal judgments entered after a jury found him guilty of 17 counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon and 18 counts of theft of property. We affirm, concluding the district court did not err in denying Grensteiner's motion to suppress evidence there was sufficient evidence supporting his convictions, and there was no prosecutorial misconduct or improper burden shifting.

I

[¶2] Following a traffic stop and the seizure of 17 stolen firearms and other stolen items, the State charged Grensteiner, the passenger of a Chevrolet Tahoe, with 17 counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon and 18 counts of theft of property.^[1] Grensteiner moved to suppress evidence discovered as a result of the stop and search arguing the officers did not have reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation or probable cause to search the Nissan Armada, which was on a U-Haul trailer being towed by the Tahoe driven by Richard Sargent. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion, finding two traffic violations occurred when the vehicle stopped beyond two separate stop signs, violating N.D.C.C. § 39-10-24, and concluding these violations provided a lawful basis for the stop. The court further concluded that law enforcement had probable cause to search the towed Armada, determining the towing vehicle and towed vehicle were "one unit," and a drug detection dog "alerting" on the Tahoe extended to the towed Armada.

[¶3] After denying the motion to suppress, the district court held a jury trial. Grensteiner moved for a judgment of acquittal following the State's case-in-chief, which was denied by the court. The jury found Grensteiner guilty on all counts.

II

[¶4] Grensteiner argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. When reviewing a decision on a suppression motion,

[w]e defer to the district court's findings of fact and resolve conflicts in testimony in favor of affirmance. We will affirm a district court's decision on a motion to suppress if there is sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial court's findings, and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Our standard of review recognizes the importance of the district court's opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility. Questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal, and whether a finding of fact meets a legal standard is a question of law.

State v. Casatelli, 2021 ND 11, ¶ 8, 953 N.W.2d 656.

[¶5] Grensteiner argues law enforcement did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him because, as the passenger, he did not commit the traffic violations; an anonymous tip did not provide reasonable suspicion to detain him; there was no reasonable suspicion as to him to extend the stop to wait for the drug detection dog; and there was no probable cause to search the towed Armada. The State argues the first three issues concerning reasonable suspicion were not raised before the district court and therefore have not been preserved for appeal.

[¶6] In his brief in support of the suppression motion Grensteiner argued the vehicle legally stopped at the stop signs and therefore there was no legal basis for the traffic stop, the anonymous tip did not provide probable cause to search the Armada, and the drug detection dog alert providing probable cause to search the Tahoe did not extend to the Armada. His arguments did not change at the suppression hearing. With respect to the anonymous tip issue, Grensteiner argued in the district court that the anonymous tip did not provide probable cause to search the Armada, but now argues on appeal that the anonymous tip did not provide reasonable suspicion to detain him. The other two issues now raised-illegal detainment as to him and extension of the stop-were not raised in the district court. Because these three issues were not raised before the district court, they have not been preserved for appeal. State v. Black, 2021 ND 103, ¶ 19, 960 N.W.2d 820; State v. $44,140.00 U.S. Currency, 2012 ND 176, ¶ 7, 820 N.W.2d 697. Further, Grensteiner does not challenge on appeal the court's finding that traffic violations were committed under N.D.C.C. § 39-10-24 or its conclusion that these violations provided a lawful basis for the stop.

[¶7] Grensteiner contends the probable cause to search the Tahoe provided by the dog alert did not extend to the Armada. We addressed this issue in State v. Sargent, 2024 ND 121, 8 N.W.3d 278. In Sargent, we noted that the defendant did not challenge whether there was probable cause based on the dog alert to search the Tahoe:

One exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception. "Under the automobile exception, law enforcement may search for illegal contraband without a warrant when probable cause exists." State v. Lark, 2017 ND 251, ¶ 16, 902 N.W.2d 739. The district court found "there was clearly probable cause to search the [Tahoe], as the K-9 alert gave probable cause to search the [Tahoe.]" Sargent does not challenge this conclusion. Thus, the issue is whether the automobile exception extends to the Armada on the trailer towed by the Tahoe.

Id. at ¶ 25.

[¶8] Grensteiner, like Sargent, does not challenge the district court's conclusion that the dog alerting to the Tahoe provided probable cause to search the Tahoe. See also State v. Lelm, 2021 ND 118, ¶ 10, 962 N.W.2d 419 ("A drug-sniffing dog indicating the presence of a controlled substance in a vehicle establishes probable cause for officers to search that vehicle."). In Sargent, we specifically concluded that probable cause extended to the towed vehicle, stating "the officers had probable cause to search the Armada on the trailer towed by the Tahoe driven by Sargent." 2024 ND 121, ¶ 30; see also id. at ¶ 28 ("[U]nder the automobile exception, once probable cause to search is established, it extends 'bumper-to-bumper' to the entire travelling unit." (quoting State v. Crudo, 541 P.3d 67, 73 (Kan. 2024))). Grensteiner requests that the Court reconsider its conclusion in Sargent. We reject that request and follow Sargent, concluding the automobile exception applies because there was probable cause to search the Armada based on the dog alert.

III

[¶9] Grensteiner argues there was insufficient evidence supporting his convictions. Our review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is well-established:

When the sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal conviction is challenged, this Court merely reviews the record to determine if there is competent evidence allowing the jury to draw an inference reasonably tending to prove guilt and fairly warranting a conviction. The defendant bears the burden of showing the evidence reveals no reasonable inference of guilt when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. When considering insufficiency of the evidence we will not reweigh conflicting evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses.... A jury may find a defendant guilty even though evidence exists which, if believed, could lead to a verdict of not guilty.

State v. Dahl, 2022 ND 212, ¶ 5, 982 N.W.2d 580. Grensteiner contends there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the stolen firearms and other stolen items. He asserts there was no evidence that he knew what was in the Armada or that he had the ability to access what was in the Armada.

[¶10] Under N.D.C.C. § 62.1-02-01(1)(b) (2022),^[2] a felon is prohibited from possessing or controlling a firearm within five years of his conviction. Under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-02(3), a person is guilty of theft if he "[k]nowingly receives, retains, or disposes of property of another which has been stolen, with intent to deprive the owner thereof." Grensteiner challenges only the possession element, and does not differentiate it from controlling, receiving, or retaining the stolen firearms and items. Addressing only the arguments raised, we turn to whether there was sufficient evidence that he possessed the stolen firearms and items.

[¶11] Possession "may be actual or constructive, exclusive or joint and may be shown entirely by circumstantial evidence." Dahl, 2022 ND 212, ¶ 6. "To prove constructive possession the State must present evidence which establishes that the accused had the power and capability to exercise dominion and control over the contraband." State v. Morris, 331 N.W.2d 48, 53 (N.D. 1983). The State does not have to specifically prove "the accused had knowledge of the presence of the [contraband]." Id. at 54. "The evidence required to show an individual's power and capability to exercise control over a controlled substance need only establish his right or his ability to control, in a realistic and practical sense, the area where, or the container in which, the contraband is found." Id. Constructive possession may be inferred from the totality of circumstances, including "an accused's presence in the place where a controlled substance is found, his proximity to the place where it is found, and the fact that the controlled substance is found in plain view." Id. (citations omitted).

[¶12] At trial, the evidence showed that the 17 stolen firearms and a stolen pellet gun were found in the Armada, and other stolen items, including tools and a...