State v. Groves

478 P.3d 915

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Elexus Jolaine GROVES and Paul Anthony Garcia, Defendants-Appellees.

NO. S-1-SC-37039

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Filing Date: November 30, 2020

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, M. Victoria Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant

Jeffrey J. Buckels, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee Elexus Jolaine Groves

Harrison & Hart, LLC, Nicholas Thomas Hart, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee Paul Garcia

THOMSON, Justice.

{1} This opinion addresses New Mexico's application of the felony murder statute, NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1(A)(2) (1994).¹ More specifically, the present issue concerns a subrule of felony murder—the collateral felony rule that the predicate felony to a felony murder "must be independent of or collateral to the homicide." State v. Harrison , 1977-NMSC-038, ¶ 9, 90 N.M. 439, 564 P.2d 1321, superseded by court rule on other grounds as recognized in Tafoya v. Baca , 1985-NMSC-067, ¶ 17, 103 N.M. 56, 702 P.2d 1001. The last time this Court addressed the collateral felony rule, we replaced an elements test with the felonious purpose test to determine whether a particular felony was "a collateral felony for purposes of felony murder." State v. Marquez , 2016-NMSC-025, ¶¶ 22-24, 376 P.3d 815. The test requires the felony that forms the basis of a charge of felony murder (the predicate felony) to have a felonious purpose different from that of "endangering the physical health of the victim." Id. ¶¶ 24-25. Put another way, a felony cannot serve as a predicate felony if the defendant's purpose in committing the felony is to injure or kill another. Id. ¶¶ 19, 23-25.

{2} The sole issue before the Court in this interlocutory appeal is whether aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer, NMSA 1978, § 30-22-1.1 (2003), may serve as a predicate felony to support a charge of felony murder. We conclude that aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer does have an independent felonious purpose and, as we explain, may serve as a predicate felony so long as the requisite mens rea is also present.

I. BACKGROUND

{3} For purposes of this interlocutory appeal, the following facts are not disputed. Codefendants Elexus Groves and Paul Garcia (Defendants) stole a van from an Albuquerque business. Groves drove, and Garcia rode in the passenger seat. Rather than stopping when they realized that police were in pursuit, they fled. During the pursuit through residential neighborhoods, Groves drove in excess of the speed limit, at one point reaching a speed of 78 miles per hour (mph) in a 35 mph zone. Their flight from law enforcement ended when Defendants ran a stop sign and hit another car while driving at 68 mph. Two passengers in the car that Defendants hit died from injuries sustained in the collision, and the third passenger sustained injuries. Defendants fled from the scene on foot, stole a second vehicle, abandoned that vehicle soon afterwards, and were later apprehended.

{4} The State charged each Defendant with (1) two counts of first-degree murder (felony murder), § 30-2-1(A)(2), or, in the alternative, two counts of homicide by vehicle (reckless driving), NMSA 1978, § 66-8-101(D)(2016) and (2) aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer, § 30-22-1.1. Relevant to this appeal, the State proffered the crime of aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer, a fourth-degree felony, as the predicate felony for felony murder. The Defendants moved the district court to dismiss the two counts of felony murder against each of them. They argued that aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer cannot serve as a predicate felony for felony murder. The district court agreed and dismissed the first-degree murder charges.

{5} The district court reasoned that "the felonious purpose [of aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer] is flight which endangers the public" and therefore that the purpose of committing the felony is the same as the purpose of committing a homicide. (Emphasis added.) The district court concluded that aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer may not serve as the predicate felony for a felony murder charge under Marquez .

{6} The State sought interlocutory appeal of the district court's order pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 39-3-3(B)(1) (1972) and Rule 12-201(A)(1)(b) NMRA. We take this opportunity to correct the reasoning of the district court, and we conclude that the district court erred by dismissing the first-degree murder (felony murder) charges. As we explain, aggravated fleeing has a felonious purpose independent from that of second-degree murder, and therefore the State may attempt to prove the charges of felony murder using aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer as the predicate felony. In focusing on the felonious purpose test, we specifically note that the felonious purpose of a criminal act is distinct and separate from a defendant's mens rea, and we caution practitioners and courts against merging the two.

II. DISCUSSION

{7} New Mexico's murder statute broadly states that "[m]urder in the first degree is the killing of one human being by another without lawful justification or excuse, by any of the means with which death may be caused ... in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony ." Section 30-2-1(A)(2) (emphasis added).² This type of first-degree murder is often discussed using the term felony murder because it is based on, or predicated on , the commission of another felony.³ It is the Legislature's prerogative to enumerate which felonies may serve as predicate felonies for felony murder, but so far the Legislature has chosen not to do so. See § 30-2-1(A)(2). Without further legislative guidance, this Court, through a number of cases, has attempted to discern what the Legislature meant by "any felony" because, despite the broad language of the statute, this Court has "repeatedly emphasized that the Legislature intended to limit the application of [felony murder]." Marquez , 2016-NMSC-025, ¶ 14, 376 P.3d 815.

{8} The purpose of the felony murder statute is to deter killings that occur in the course of grossly negligent or reckless conduct. See, e.g. , State v. Campos , 1996-NMSC-043, ¶ 16, 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266. However, we must balance this statutory purpose with the need to preserve the mens rea requirements for each legislatively defined category, or degree, of murder.

{9} In this case, we consider which felonies are appropriate predicate felonies for felony murder, which are not, and how to know the difference. Our analysis centers on the three requirements that a felony must meet before it can be the predicate to felony murder: "(1) there must be a causal relationship between the felony and the homicide, (2) the felony must be independent of or collateral to the homicide, and (3) the felony must be inherently or foreseeably dangerous to human life." Harrison , 1977-NMSC-038, ¶ 9, 90 N.M. 439, 564 P.2d 1321. We discuss each requirement.

A. Causal Relationship

{10} The felony murder statute states that the death must occur "in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony." Section 30-2-1(A)(2) (emphasis added). However, just because a death occurred when and where a defendant committed a felony does not mean that commission of the felony caused the death. See Harrison , 1977-NMSC-038, ¶ 10, 90 N.M. 439, 564 P.2d 1321. There must be more linking the death to the felony than mere coincidence of time and place; "a more exact definition of causation is required." Id. ¶¶ 10-11. Harrison requires that "causation must be physical; causation consists of those acts of defendant or his accomplice initiating and leading to the homicide without an independent force intervening, even though defendant's or his accomplice's acts are unintentional or accidental. Causation ... primarily deals with the actus reus of the crime." Id . ¶ 11 (footnote omitted). The law requires a fundamental nexus between the act of the felony and the death. That is, the actus reus of the felony must have an actual connection to the cause of the death.

{11} In this case, neither party disputes that there was a causal relationship between the felony and the deaths because Defendants’ felonious act of aggravated fleeing, without an intervening force, caused a car crash that resulted in both deaths. Therefore, the predicate felony in this case satisfies the first Harrison requirement.

B. Collateral Felony Rule: A Predicate Felony Must Be Independent of or Collateral to the Homicide

{12} We now turn to the second, and perhaps most vexing, requirement, which is embodied by the collateral felony rule: the felony must be independent of or collateral to the homicide to be a predicate felony. As we will explain, we hold that the felonious purpose of aggravated fleeing is to escape apprehension by law enforcement. Because this felonious purpose is independent of the felonious purpose to injure or kill, aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer may serve as a predicate felony for felony murder in certain circumstances, which we will further explain in the following section.

{13} The discussion of the collateral felony rule compels us to look back at the original purpose of the felony murder statute itself. "The commonly stated purpose of the felony-murder rule was not to deter the underlying felony, but instead to deter negligent or accidental killings that may occur in the course of committing a felony." Campos , 1996-NMSC-043, ¶ 9, 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266. The policy underlying the felony murder rule is that it should be easier for the state to prove that a defendant intended to harm a victim when the defendant decided to engage in reckless conduct that put others (the victim) in harm's way, resulting in a death from that conduct. See id. ¶¶ 9-10. Charging felony murder lowers the traditionally high threshold for proving a criminal defendant's culpable state of mind when the crime was committed. This relieves the state of the burden to prove...