State v. Hall

902 S.E.2d 487

STATE of West Virginia EX REL. Daniel DILLY, Superintendent of the Rubenstein Juvenile Center, Petitioner,

v.The Honorable Kurt HALL, Judge of the Circuit Court of Lewis County, the State of West Virginia, and D.P, Respondents.

State of West Virginia ex rel. Nancy Oldaker, Petitioner,

v.The Honorable Kurt Hall, Judge of the Circuit Court of Lewis County, the State of West Virginia, and D.P, Respondents.

No. 23-83, No. 23-289

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: May 1, 2024

Filed: June 6, 2024

Syllabus by the Court

1 " ‘A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simple abuse of discretion by a trial court. It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers. W. Va. Code, 53-1-1.’ Syllabus point 2, State ex rel. Peacher v. Sencindiver, 160 W.Va. 314, 233 S.E.2d 425 (1977)." Syllabus Point 1, West Virginia. Department of Military Affairs and Public Safety, Division of Juvenile Services v. Berger, 203 W. Va. 468, 508 S.E.2d 628 (1998).

2. "When a court is attempting to proceed in a cause without jurisdiction, prohibition lies, and the petitioner may apply to this court in the first instance, as matter of right, for the writ." Syllabus Point 2, Marsh v. O'Brien, 82 W. Va. 508, 96 S.E. 795 (1918).

3. Due process requirements vary in their applicability to contempt cases depending upon the nature of the contempt involved.

4. There are four classifications of contempt: direct criminal, indirect criminal, direct civil, and indirect civil.

5. The fundamental distinction between direct contempt and indirect contempt lies in the location of the contumacious act. Direct contempt occurs in the actual physical presence of the court, while indirect contempt occurs entirely or partially outside of the actual physical presence of the court.

6. "Whether a contempt is classified as civil or criminal does not depend upon the act constituting such contempt because such act may provide the basis for either a civil or criminal contempt action. Instead, whether a contempt is civil or criminal depends upon the purpose to be served by imposing a sanction for the contempt and such purpose also determines the type of sanction which is appropriate." Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. Robinson v. Michael, 166 W. Va. 660, 276 S.E.2d 812 (1981).

7. "Where the purpose to be served by imposing a sanction for contempt is to compel compliance with a court order by the contemnor so as to benefit the party bringing the contempt action by enforcing, protecting, or assuring the right of that party under the order, the contempt is civil." Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. Robinson v. Michael, 166 W. Va. 660, 276 S.E.2d 812 (1981).

8. "Where the purpose to be served by imposing a sanction for contempt is to punish the contemnor for an affront to the dignity or authority of the court, or to preserve or restore order in the court or respect for the court, the contempt is criminal." Syllabus Point 4, State ex rel. Robinson v. Michael, 166 W. Va. 660, 276 S.E.2d 812 (1981).

9. Whether a contemnor has been found in civil or criminal contempt is a question of law reviewed de novo.

10. "Indirect criminal contemnors are entitled to the same rights as criminal defendants[.]" Syllabus Point 1, in part, State ex rel. Koppers Co. v. International Union of Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 171 W. Va. 290, 298 S.E.2d 827 (1982).

11. "The due process of law guaranteed by the State and Federal Constitutions, when applied to procedure in the courts of the land, requires both notice and the right to be heard." Syllabus Point 2, Simpson v. Stanton, 119 W. Va. 235, 193 S.E. 64 (1937).

12. To the extent our cases hold or may be read to hold that an indirect criminal contempt may be punished without a jury trial, see, e.g., In re Frieda Q., 230 W. Va. 652, 742 S.E.2d 68 (2013), they are overruled.

Petitions for Writs of Prohibition

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General, Michael R. Williams, Esq., Principili Deputy Solicitor General, Jonathan M. Calhoun, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for Petitioner Dilly

Jordan K. Herrick, Esq., Samuel M. Bloom, Esq., Bailey & Wyant, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for Petitioner Oldaker

The Honorable Kurt Hall, Circuit Court Judge, Weston, West Virginia, Self-Represented Respondent

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General, Chanin W. Krivonyak, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia,

Christina C. Flanigan, Esq., Prosecuting Attorney for Lewis County, Weston, West Virginia, Counsel for Respondent State

G. Phillip Davis, Esq., Arthurdale, West Virginia, Counsel for Respondent D.P.

HUTCHISON, Justice:

The Respondent Judge, the Honorable Kurt Hall, Judge of the Circuit Court of Lewis County, West Virginia, held the Petitioners, Daniel Dilly, Superintendent of the Rubenstein Juvenile Center (RJC), and Nancy Oldaker, Health Services Administrator at RJC, in contempt of court. The Petitioners invoke our original jurisdiction asking us to grant writs of prohibition to prohibit the Respondent Judge from enforcing the contempt orders.¹ After thoroughly considering the Petitioners’ respective petitions for prohibition and the Respondents’ summary responses, reviewing the pertinent legal authorities, and hearing oral arguments, we find that procedural errors in the contempt proceedings below deprived the Respondent Judge of jurisdiction to impose such sanction and that, therefore, the requested writs of prohibition should be granted.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

RJC is part of the Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DCR). W. Va. Code § 15A-3-12(a) (2018). Petitioner Dilly is Superintendent of RJC. DCR contracts with Wexford Health Services (Wexford) to provide medical care to, among other DCR institutions, RJC. Petitioner Oldaker is Wexford’s Health Services Administrator at RJC.

On July 3, 2022, D.P.,² a resident of RJC,³ quarreled with two other RJC residents and was struck in the jaw. After the altercation, D.P. was examined by the on-duty RJC Wexford nurse. The nurse ordered Tylenol for D.P. About five hours later, D.P. was seen by the new on-duty nurse as he was still complaining of issues related to his jaw. The new on-duty nurse contacted Ms. Oldaker. Ms. Oldaker directed the nurse to contact the itinerant Wexford family nurse-practioner (FNP) who was assigned to cover RJC to determine how the FNP wished to proceed. The FNP directed D.P. be put on a soft food diet and directed the on-duty nurse to schedule an X-ray for D.P.’s jaw. X-rays are accomplished at RJC by a mobile imaging company with whom Wexford subcontracts. The imaging company was scheduled to perform the X-ray on July 5. Throughout July 5, Ms. Oldaker made several unsuccessful telephone calls to the imaging subcontractor to ascertain when the technician would arrive at RJC. At approximately 11:00 p.m. on July 5, the technician telephoned Ms. Oldaker to advise he would not arrive at RJC until July 6.

Meanwhile, on July 6, the Respondent Judge held a previously scheduled hearing to review D.P.’s RJC progress. At that hearing,⁴ the Prosecuting Attorney informed the Respondent Judge of the July 3 incident and that D.P. had not yet been X-rayed. The Respondent Judge ordered that D.P. be taken off RJC grounds for an X-ray. The X-ray showed D.P. had a broken jaw. D.P.’s jaw was set to be repaired at the WVU School of Dentistry on July 13, 2022. Prior to this surgery, the Respondent Judge entered an order that D.P.’s mother be notified of the date and time of surgery and "be permitted to be present and visit with [D.P.] prior to and after said surgery." The order continued that D.P.’s mother "will not interfere with the authorities from the [RJC] during [D.P.’s] hospitalization."

After D.P.’s surgery, the Respondent Judge held a hearing on September 22, to review D.P.’s placement. This hearing resulted in a "Medical Care Order" entered on October 20, 2022, that, in pertinent part, (1) directed the RJC internal CID report prepared concerning the July 3 incident be turned over to the probation department, and (2) ordered RJC to schedule an appointment with D.P.’s oral surgeon to have an up to-date X-ray performed as well as allowing D.P.’s mother to attend the appointment. This order directed the circuit clerk to forward a copy of it to, inter alia, RJC—but not to Superintendent Dilly or Ms. Oldaker.

Another hearing was conducted on December 7 (a transcript of which is not included in the appendices of any of the parties) which resulted in a December 16, 2022, "Review Order."⁵ In this Review Order, the Respondent Judge observed, in pertinent part, that the RJC CID report had not yet been provided as previously ordered and ordered that the RJC CID report was to be provided "immediately." The December 16 Review Order also provided "[t]he Court finds that a show cause hearing as to why Kenneth ‘Honey’ Rubenstein Center has not complied with this Court’s previous Orders should be held before this Court on the 19th day of December, 2022, at 1:00 o’clock P.M." and "It is further ORDERED that a show cause hearing shall be held before this Court on the 19th day of December, 2022, at 1:00 o’clock P.M." (emphasis in original). Superintendent Dilly denies receiving a copy of the Review Order although the Order directed the circuit clerk to "forward" a certified copy of it to RJC (but not to be served on Superintendent Dilly personally). The Respondent Judge did not direct the circuit clerk to forward the Review Order to Ms. Oldaker at all.

On December 13, RJC faxed a copy of the CID report to D.P.’s Juvenile Probation Officer.

The Respondent Judge convened a hearing on December 19 which was attended by both Superintendent Dilly and Ms. Oldaker. Neither was represented by counsel nor did the Respondent Judge advise them of a right to counsel. At this hearing, the Respondent Judge held both Superintendent Dilly and Ms. Oldaker in...