State v. Halverson

395 Wis.2d 385

953 N.W.2d 847

2021 WI 7

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Brian L. HALVERSON, Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.

No. 2018AP858-CR

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oral Argument: September 14, 2020

Opinion Filed: January 29, 2021

For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs filed by Megan Sanders-Drazen, assistant state public defender. There was an oral argument by Megan Sanders-Drazen.

For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by Sarah L. Burgundy, assistant attorney general; with whom on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by Sarah L. Burgundy.

HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous Court. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ZIEGLER, J., joined. DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.

BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.

¶1 You have "a right to remain silent." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). So begins the ubiquitous Miranda warnings, procedural safeguards the United States Supreme Court has mandated must be administered to suspects prior to any "custodial interrogation." Id. If the warnings are not given, any statements made are inadmissible in court. Id.

¶2 The question in this case concerns the scope of "custody" for purposes of Miranda. The defendant, Brian L. Halverson, was an inmate in jail when he returned a call from an officer regarding an incident at Halverson's prior correctional institution. During the short call, the officer asked Halverson about an inmate's missing property, and Halverson admitted that he took and destroyed the property. No Miranda warnings were given. Halverson argues that his statements must be suppressed because he was in custody as an inmate in jail, and therefore he also was most assuredly "in custody" for purposes of Miranda.

¶3 In a 1999 case, this court agreed. State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999). Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent, we held "that a person who is incarcerated is per se in custody for purposes of Miranda." Id. at 355, 588 N.W.2d 606. In 2012, however, the United States Supreme Court clarified this is not what federal law requires. In Howes v. Fields, the Court concluded that the Constitution contains no such per se rule. 565 U.S. 499, 508, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012). The Court emphasized that "custody" for purposes of Miranda is a term of art; it is not consonant with the inability to leave or with incarceration generally. Id. at 508-09, 132 S.Ct. 1181. Whether a suspect was "in custody" depends on an inquiry of the totality of the circumstances, looking to the degree of restraint and coercive nature of the interrogation. Id. at 509, 132 S.Ct. 1181.

¶4 Recognizing that the federal constitutional landscape does not support his argument, Halverson asks this court to readopt the per se rule, this time relying on the Wisconsin Constitution. We decline Halverson's request. While this court need not always follow federal constitutional interpretation in lockstep, we conclude that neither the Wisconsin Constitution nor the purposes underlying the Miranda warnings support a judicially-created rule treating all incarcerated individuals as "in custody." In the alternative, Halverson contends that his incriminating statements should be suppressed because he was "in custody" under the traditional Miranda custody test. We disagree and conclude that Halverson was not in custody for purposes of Miranda.

I. BACKGROUND

¶5 Brian L. Halverson was an inmate in the Vernon County Jail when Officer Matthew Danielson called and requested to speak with him. Officer Danielson was investigating a claim of theft and destruction of property at Stanley Correctional Institution that occurred when Halverson was incarcerated there.

Halverson returned the call and admitted to the crimes. The State charged Halverson with one count of criminal damage to property and one count of misdemeanor theft, both as a repeater. Halverson filed a motion to suppress his statements in part on the grounds that he was not read his Miranda warnings.

¶6 During the suppression hearing, Officer Danielson testified that he called the Vernon County Jail the morning of September 27, 2016, and requested to speak to Halverson. He received a call back within ten minutes from a deputy at the jail who put Halverson on the phone. Officer Danielson began the call by introducing himself, explaining the purpose of the call, and asking if Halverson knew the individuals who were involved in the incident at Stanley Correctional Institution. When questioned initially, Halverson stated that he believed the items were inadvertently placed in the garbage. But when asked about two letters admitting his guilt that Halverson wrote to the victim and another inmate, Halverson's tone shifted. While calm at the outset, Halverson began yelling. He ultimately admitted to Officer Danielson that he took and destroyed the property. The entire phone call lasted no more than five minutes. Officer Danielson testified that, for his part, his tone was calm and normal throughout the call. Halverson was not read his Miranda warnings, Officer Danielson explained, because while "he was in custody somewhere else for something else," Halverson was not "in custody with me."

¶7 The circuit court relied on Officer Danielson's uncontested testimony as factual background, but it granted Halverson's motion to suppress.¹ The circuit court concluded it was bound to apply Armstrong’s per se rule that incarcerated individuals are in custody for Miranda purposes. The State moved for reconsideration.

¶8 At the reconsideration hearing, Vernon County Sheriff's Deputy Matthew Hoff testified.² Deputy Hoff did not specifically remember the call. Instead, he testified regarding the standard operating procedures at the Vernon County Jail, testimony the circuit court accepted as credible.

¶9 When an inmate at the jail receives a phone call, the inmate can choose whether to take or return the call. If an inmate wishes to do so, a deputy escorts the inmate from his pod to the jail's community room. The community room is approximately 15-by-25-feet in size and doubles as the jail library. The deputies visually monitor the inmate through observation glass, but they cannot hear what occurs in the community room and the calls are not recorded. Once the call is complete, the inmate is escorted back to his pod. The inmate is not handcuffed at any point during this process.

¶10 Following the hearing, the circuit court denied the State's motion for reconsideration, once again concluding it was bound to follow the per se rule in Armstrong and suppress Halverson's statements.

¶11 The State appealed and the court of appeals reversed. The court of appeals held that the per se rule adopted by this court in Armstrong was effectively overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Howes, and it declined to readopt the per se rule under the Wisconsin Constitution. State v. Halverson, 2019 WI App 66, ¶65, 389 Wis. 2d 554, 937 N.W.2d 74. It further concluded that Halverson was not in custody for purposes of Miranda under the totality of the circumstances. Id., ¶66.

We granted Halverson's petition for review and agree with the court of appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

¶12 The issues in this case center on the nature of "custody" for purposes of determining whether Miranda warnings must be administered. Halverson contends he was in custody for two independent reasons. First, Halverson argues all incarcerated individuals should be deemed "in custody" for purposes of Miranda solely due to their incarceration. Although the United States Supreme Court rejected a per se rule to this effect, he asks us to adopt this approach under the Wisconsin Constitution. Second, if we decline that request (as we do), Halverson asserts the totality of the circumstances nonetheless demonstrates he was in custody for purposes of Miranda. We begin with the constitutional backdrop underlying these claims, and then address the merits of each in turn.

A. The Law of Miranda

¶13 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ...." U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda, the Supreme Court created a set of procedural safeguards, enforced by the remedy of exclusion, aimed at "protecting a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 123 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). These safeguards were proposed in response to four cases consolidated before the Court. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491-99, 86 S.Ct. 1602. All four concerned the questioning of a defendant by a law enforcement officer, detective, or district attorney in a police station where the defendant was isolated from the outside world and eventually orally admitted to the underlying crime after at least two hours of questioning. Id. at 491-98, 86 S.Ct. 1602.

¶14 The Court has explained that these warnings, and the evidentiary penalty for failing to administer them, constitute a prophylactic rule that extends beyond the requirements of the constitutional text itself. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) ("The Miranda exclusionary rule, however, serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation."). Instead, Miranda is a judicially instituted effort to protect against self-incrimination by creating an unrebuttable legal presumption of coercion whenever the warnings are not administered. Id. at 306, 105 S.Ct. 1285 n.1 ("A Miranda violation does not constitute coercion but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of all unwarned statements.").

¶15 This...