State v. Hampton

2022-Ohio-1380

STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEARRIUS HAMPTON, Defendant-Appellee.

No. C-210423

Court of Appeals of Ohio, First District, Hamilton

April 27, 2022

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County, No. B-2101597 Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary Stier, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,

The Law Office of Wendy R. Calaway, Co., LPA, Wendy R. Calaway and The Lewis Law Firm, Inc. LPA, Cornelius "Carl" Lewis, for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

Bergeron, Judge

{¶1} A traffic stop premised on tailgating ended with the indictment of defendant-appellee Dearrius Hampton on multiple drug-related felonies. Mr. Hampton moved to suppress the evidence against him, arguing that the stop ran afoul of his constitutional rights. The trial court agreed and granted his motion to suppress, finding that the officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to effectuate the traffic stop. The state now appeals, but because competent and credible evidence supports the trial court's determination and the court correctly applied the governing legal standard, we affirm its judgment.

I.

{¶2} Mr. Hampton first caught the eye of a police officer who was part of the Regional Narcotics Unit task force while driving a silver Dodge Charger on southbound I-75 allegedly at a rate of speed slower than the surrounding traffic. As Mr. Hampton passed by him, the officer noticed the car's heavily-tinted windows and Tennessee license plates. Based on those initial observations, and knowing that the out-of-state plates prevented him from stopping Mr. Hampton for a window-tint violation, the officer pulled out and followed the vehicle to scrutinize his driving habits.

{¶3} By the time the officer caught up to Mr. Hampton, the Charger was purportedly tailgating the vehicle in front of it. Mr. Hampton changed lanes and began similarly following a second car at a distance that the officer believed unsafe for the conditions. According to the investigative report, at this point, the officer queried the Tennessee license plate, ascertained that the vehicle was a rental, and decided to stop Mr. Hampton for tailgating because rental companies do not (in his experience) tint their car windows and he hoped to find evidence of drug trafficking.

{¶4} After stopping Mr. Hampton, the officer deployed the drug-sniffing canine that was riding along with the task force and the dog alerted to the presence of a drug odor emanating from the Dodge Charger. The task force officers found a small bag of drugs in the center console left cup holder and three bags of drugs on the rear passenger floor board inside a microwaveable popcorn box. After his arrest, Mr. Hampton lodged objections to the stop, claiming that because he was legally operating the car, the officer lacked any justification to initiate the traffic stop, contravening his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court agreed, suppressing the evidence as "fruits of the poisonous tree," and the state now appeals.

II.

{¶5} Our review of the trial court's decision granting the motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Winfrey, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-070490, 2008-Ohio-3160, ¶ 19. "In considering a motion to suppress, the trial court is in the best position to decide the facts and to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses." Id. And while "we must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent and credible evidence," we will review de novo the trial court's application of the law to those facts. Id.; State v. Jordan, 2020-Ohio-689, 145 N.E.3d 357, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.) ("We defer to the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by competent and credible evidence, but we review de novo the court's application of the law to those facts.").

{¶6} Traffic stops initiated by law enforcement officers constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment, thus "any traffic stop must comply with the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement." State v. Brown, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190186, 2020-Ohio-896, ¶ 8, citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Ohio law recognizes two types of constitutionally permissible traffic stops, and "[t]he applicable standard depends on the type of traffic stop." State v. Johnson, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-010621 and C-010622, 2002-Ohio-2884, ¶ 5. The first type of traffic stop, an investigative stop, occurs when a police officer lacks probable cause to stop a defendant based on the lack of a first-hand observation of a traffic violation. Even absent probable cause, "a traffic stop is constitutionally valid if an officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime." State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 7, 23 ("[W]e have not held that probable cause is required. Probable cause is a stricter standard than reasonable and articulable suspicion * * * which is all the officer needs to justify a stop.").

{¶7} Seeking to avail itself of this option, the state asserts that, at the very least, the officer's suspicion that Mr. Hampton violated an Ohio traffic law was reasonable and justified an investigative stop of the car. But the state failed to develop that argument on appeal or direct us to specific and articulable facts giving rise to suspected criminal activity that required further investigation by the officer, particularly given that he pulled the vehicle over for allegedly driving too close to another car. As a result, the driving offense (if any) was completed by the time that he stopped the car, leaving nothing to investigate. See Johnson at ¶ 6 (limiting this type of stop to situations where the officer "does not necessarily witness a specific traffic violation"). On these facts, therefore, reasonable suspicion cannot support the stop.

{¶8} We accordingly confine our analysis to the typical noninvestigatory stop that officers perform after witnessing specific traffic violations, premised on probable cause. This second type of constitutionally-permissible traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when supported by probable cause" 'even if the officer had some ulterior motive for making the stop, such as a suspicion that the violator was engaging in more nefarious criminal activity.'" State v. Mosley, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200448, 2021-Ohio-3472, ¶ 8, quoting City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996); State v. Slaughter, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-170110, C-170111 and C-170112, 2018-Ohio-105, ¶ 10 ("A police officer's decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Probable cause is a complete justification for a traffic stop.").

{¶9} According to the state, the officer had probable cause to stop Mr. Hampton because he witnessed Mr. Hampton twice violating R.C. 4511.34 by following the vehicles in front of him too closely. In assessing the officer's belief that Mr. Hampton violated Ohio law, the trial court should examine the circumstances and historical facts "from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer. Determination of probable cause that a traffic offense has been committed, 'like all probable cause determinations, is fact-dependent and will turn on what the officer knew at the time he made the stop.'" (Emphasis deleted.) City of Bowling Green v. Godwin, 110 Ohio St.3d 58, 2006-Ohio-3563, 850 N.E.2d 698, ¶ 14, quoting United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391 (6th Cir.1993). "Thus, the question whether a traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires an objective assessment of a police officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances." Id.

{¶10} Turning to Mr. Hampton's alleged violation, R.C. 4511.34 renders it unlawful for the operator of a motor vehicle to follow another vehicle "more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway." "Although R.C. 4511.34(A) does not provide a specific standard for determining when a motorist is following another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, numerous courts have concluded that a motorist's failure to follow another vehicle at a distance greater than one car length for every ten miles per hour the motorist's vehicle is traveling may, in some circumstances, indicate that the motorist is in violation of R.C. 4511.34." State v. Holmes, 2019-Ohio-2485, 139 N.E.3d 574, ¶ 29 (3d Dist). The officer testified that based on the cars around them, he believed Mr. Hampton was traveling the posted speed of 55 m.p.h. and following the cars in front of him at a distance of one to one and a half car lengths.

{¶11} During the hearing on the motion to suppress, Mr Hampton's counsel presented video evidence obtained from the Ohio Department of Transportation. The videos captured only Mr. Hampton's second alleged violation of R.C. 4511.34, though the officer confirmed the first...