State v. Hanson, 08-15-00205-CR

STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant, v. CRISPEN HANSON, Appellee.

No. 08-15-00205-CR

COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS

March 27, 2020

Appeal from the 243rd Judicial District Court of El Paso County, Texas

(TC# 20120D03212)

OPINION

If the State and a defendant enter into a plea agreement whereby the defendant waives the right to a suspended sentence, can the trial court after having approved the agreement, later suspend the sentence? The State raises that question in its appeal from the trial court's order sua sponte suspending the execution of Appellee Crispen Hanson's prison sentence and placing him on what is commonly referred to as "shock probation."¹ The State argues that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the order because it violated the terms of the parties' plea agreement that the trial court had previously approved. Because we agree with the State that the plea agreementcontained provisions in which Hanson knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to seek or permit the suspension of his sentence, or to be placed on shock probation, we reverse the trial court's order, and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our opinion.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Plea Agreement

On July 13, 2012, Hanson was indicted on one count each of capital murder and murder in the death of his sixteen-month old son, Malachi Cosby, and two counts of the third-degree felony offense of injury to a child younger than six years old. On January 16, 2015, Hanson entered into a plea bargain agreement with the State of Texas. In the plea agreement, Hanson agreed to plead guilty to the two counts of injury to a child, and in exchange, the State agreed to recommend concurrent eight-year prison sentences for those two counts. And, as part of the agreement, the State would move to dismiss the capital murder and murder counts.

The plea papers contained the State's recommendation that Hanson be sentenced to "8 years confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Correctional Institutions Division with no period of Community Supervision." (emphasis original). That recommendation also contained the statement that when the State recommends incarceration, "it is understood by the Defendant that this recommendation . . . does NOT include any recommendation that this Defendant be granted community supervision after a period of incarceration under this Court's continuing jurisdiction . . . UNLESS specifically stated in the above State's recommendation to the Court." (emphasis original).

Hanson also signed an acknowledgment stating:

After consulting with my attorney, I hereby knowingly and voluntarily waive the right, if any should exist, to file a petition of non-disclosure or to request dismissalor suspension of further execution of sentence under any circumstances or for any reason without first obtaining the express written consent or approval of the attorney representing the State of Texas, and I further agree that no such nondisclosure or suspension shall be effective without the express written agreement of the attorney representing the State of Texas.

The trial court held a hearing on the plea agreement that same day. Hanson, who was represented by counsel, testified that he had read and understood the plea agreement. After determining that Hanson was competent to enter into the agreement, the trial court approved the agreement, accepted Hanson's guilty plea to the two counts of injury to a child, and agreed to the State's sentencing recommendation. That same day, as required by the plea agreement, the State contemporaneously filed a motion to dismiss the two murder counts, which the trial court granted. As well, the trial court entered a Judgment of Conviction dated January 16, 2015, convicting Hanson of two counts of injury to a child and sentencing him to concurrent eight-year prison terms. However, at Hanson's unopposed request, the trial court gave him until February 6, 2015 to surrender himself in order to get his affairs in order.

B. The Additional Extensions of Hanson's Surrender Date

On February 6, 2015, Hanson filed an unopposed motion to further extend his surrender date, which the trial court granted that same day, giving Hanson until March 16, 2015 to surrender himself to begin the sentence. In his motion, Hanson stated that he needed additional time to get his affairs in order, and that he was also currently "undergoing medical screening and treatment[.]" On March 16, 2015, Hanson filed a second motion to extend his surrender date, stating that based on recent medical testing he had been "diagnosed with a rare and serious condition and require[d] immediate medical attention." Because the State opposed this motion, the trial court did not immediately rule on Hanson's request, and Hanson surrendered himself to the detention facility on March 16, 2015 as required by the trial court's prior order.

At the hearing on this second motion, Hanson's attorney informed the court that Hanson had been diagnosed with a genetic disorder known as Ehler-Danlos Syndrome.² He further advised the court that Hanson's two remaining children needed to be tested for the disorder and requested that Hanson be released from custody and given additional time to assist his children with the testing. Over the State's objection, the trial court granted the motion and issued an order releasing Hanson from custody. The trial court did not set a new surrender date and ordered Hanson's bond to remain in effect until such time as a new surrender was set.³

C. The Shock Probation Order

On June 11, 2015, the trial court issued a motion entitled, "Court's Sua Sponte Motion to Hold a Hearing to Determine Whether to Suspend the Remainder of the Defendant's Prison Sentence and Place the Defendant on Community Supervision." In the motion, the trial court expressed its opinion that Hanson was eligible to be placed on community supervision pursuant to former Article 42.12, § 6 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (authorizing the placement of a defendant on shock probation). The trial court set a hearing for June 15, 2015 so that the parties would have an "opportunity to be heard regarding this matter."

At the hearing, Hanson, his mother, and the original prosecutor on his case gave brief testimony. Hanson further described his medical condition, and his past compliance with court-imposed conditions. In addition, Hanson testified that further imprisonment would place an undue hardship on him and his family, in light of his medical condition, the need to assist his childrenwith genetic testing, and the fact that he was financially responsible for supporting the two children and his parents.⁴ The original prosecutor testified that the terms of the original plea bargain involved the State dismissing more serious capital murder charges in exchange for an eight-year prison sentence on the lesser charges.

Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order dated June 15, 2015 that suspended further imposition of Hanson's sentence, and placed him on community supervision. In its order, the trial court found that Hanson was eligible to be placed on community supervision, and that he "would no longer benefit from further incarceration." The trial court simultaneously entered a First Amended Judgment of Conviction, reflecting that it had "suspended" Hanson's sentence, and was placing him on community supervision for eight years. Thereafter, on June 25, 2015, the trial court entered an amended order suspending further execution of Hanson's sentence, in which the court added additional fact findings, from which the State now appeals.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

The State contends that the trial court abused its discretion by suspending Hanson's sentence and placing him on "shock probation," arguing that by doing so, the trial court violated the terms of the plea agreement. Hanson had first responded that the State's appeal was untimely. We sustained that argument but were subsequently reversed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. State v. Hanson, No. 08-15-00205-CR, 2017 WL 3167484, at *3 (Tex.App.--El Paso July 26, 2017), rev'd, 555 S.W.3d 578 (Tex.Crim.App. 2018). We are now tasked with resolving the merits of the appeal, including Hanson's remaining arguments.

Hanson offers two additional responses to the State's argument. First, Hanson argues that the State did not preserve this issue for our review, contending that the State failed to make a timely and specific objection to the trial court's decision, or alternatively, that the State's issue on appeal does not comport with the objection it made in the trial court. Second, Hanson also contends that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by placing him on shock probation, arguing that the plea agreement only prohibited Hanson from seeking such relief, but did not prohibit the trial court from sua sponte ordering it.

III. CONTROLLING LAW

A. The Binding Nature of Plea Agreements

Plea bargains are an integral part of the criminal justice system. See Moore v. State, 295 S.W.3d 329, 331 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 n.10 (1970). At its core, a plea bargain is a contract between the State and the defendant into which both parties have knowingly and voluntarily entered. See Thomas v. State, 516 S.W.3d 498, 501-02 (Tex.Crim.App. 2017), citing Moore, 295 S.W.3d at 331; Ex parte Moussazadeh, 64 S.W.3d 404, 411 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). In exchange for relinquishing the right to trial, a defendant usually accepts a reduction in the charges or sentence. See Thomas, 516 S.W.3d at 502, citing Perkins v. Third Court of Appeals, 738 S.W.2d 276, 282 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987). In general, the terms of a plea agreement are left solely to the parties "who are dealing at arm's length," and therefore, a plea bargain agreement "may contain a variety of stipulations and assurances, depending on the desires of the State and the defendant." State...